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Introduction 
 
In July 1946, the President of the United States appointed John Leighton Stuart 
as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China.  This appointment was a surprise to 
many, particularly General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who was so sure of the appointment 
for himself that he had bought a new civilian wardrobe in preparation.  Both men had 
experience in China, Wedemeyer as an advisor to Chinese President Chiang Kai-Shek 
and Stuart as a career missionary.  The choice of Stuart over Wedemeyer was not 
meant to symbolize a shift in US policy, but was tacit recognition that the missionary 
presence in China was a large asset in a chaotic situation.  President Truman’s personal 
envoy to China, General George C. Marshall, recognized that he needed Stuart’s 
knowledge and personal contacts across China to prevent a Chinese Civil War. 
Prior to World War II, the American presence in China was largely made up of 
missionaries.  The United States Government had a very small presence on the ground 
in China, so missionaries like Stuart were largely better informed on the day-to-day 
life of the Chinese people, as well as the political climate of the country.  When 
Marshall and Stuart later failed to prevent the Chinese Civil War, American reticence 
to become involved in the conflict further reduced the official American presence, 
putting missionaries in a surprisingly important position. 
These missionaries represented the front lines of the Sino-American 
relationship, but they were very different from the average American.  Many of them 
had been in China for decades.  A few, like Stuart, had been born in China during their 
parents’ time as missionaries.  Despite this prolonged absence from their native land, 
many of them carried American assumptions with them, such as the importance of 
separation of church and state, the ideal of religious freedom and the value of 
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representative government.  Yet they were also missionaries, preaching the gospel of 
Jesus Christ.  Their primary purpose was to bring the Chinese to Christ, which their 
doctrine said they should do with no bias towards race or nationality.  This put them in 
a position of being caught between the competing ideas of nationalism and religion.  
Nationality, by its definition, separates those in a nation from those outside of it.  
Because of its history as a nation of immigrants, American nationalism can be more 
inclusive than many forms of nationalism, but it still contains the belief that the 
American system is the best one.  Christianity, at least in theory, is universally 
inclusive.  American missionaries in China often struggled between their feelings of 
nationalism, which drew a distinction between themselves and the Chinese, and their 
devotion to Christianity, which had a more Universalist approach. 
Of course, it is difficult to generalize about missionaries as a whole, especially 
Protestant missionaries.  Their motivations, backgrounds and religious beliefs varied 
widely.  Some were evangelicals who saw proselytization as their core mission.  
Others had a more liberal view of Christianity, which believed that putting Christ’s 
work into action in the world was their primary duty.  Each missionary was shaped by 
the churches or mission organizations that sponsored them, but also carried their own 
individual beliefs with them. 
Even before World War II, these missionaries had faced decades of upheaval in 
China, but the Chinese Civil War created an unprecedented crisis for them.  
Unprecedented is not used lightly here. While their history had been a very rocky 
road, from early restrictions on their movement to repeated uprisings against their 
influence, the challenge of the Chinese Communists was something entirely different.  
Even so, most missionaries did not realize it immediately.  Prior disturbances, even 
including the Japanese invasion, had been restricted in geographic scope and were 
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limited in duration.  Although there were many casualties, missions were able to 
retreat to safe areas and wait the disturbances out.  Missionaries had the backing of 
foreign governments and guarantees of protection through the “Unequal Treaties” of 
the 19
th
 Century, so the threats were always dealt with quickly.  The Chinese 
Communists, however, presented an existential threat to missions.  The Communists 
were avowedly atheist.  Communist doctrine stated that religion was one of the many 
ways that capitalists distracted the poor from their exploitation.  Removing religion 
was necessary for the class consciousness needed for a revolution.  Previous Chinese 
organizations had been anti-Christian, some violently so, but unlike those groups, the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was gaining the power to enforce it.  By 1948, it 
looked poised to gain control of the entire country, something that no group had been 
able to do in the 20
th
 Century.  Just as dangerous, its program called for control over 
all aspects of Chinese society.  The CCP was not only anti-religious, it was gaining the 
power to implement its policies. 
This type of threat was something new to missions.  If the CCP gained power, 
as looked likely by 1948, how would missions survive?  This spawned some new 
questions: Was the CCP dogmatically Communist or was it a nationalist party with 
Communist leanings? How anti-religious was it?  Experience from Eastern Europe 
showed that a Communist takeover meant wholesale persecution of the church.  But if 
the CCP was really nationalist first, would it follow a different plan?  Some reports 
from the areas it controlled in northern China suggested that it was less dogmatic than 
its Eastern European brethren. 
This dissertation looks at how missionaries understood and reacted to the 
Communist victory in China.  They were a key source for most Americans for 
understanding what was happening in China.  This project is primarily interested in 
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how they interpreted the events of the Chinese Civil War and what they communicated 
in these interpretations back to the American public.  What divisions of opinion were 
there among missionaries on how to deal with the Communists and what caused those 
divisions?  How did their experience both before going to China and during the 
Chinese Civil War affect that interpretation?  Finally, how did they participate in the 
larger American debate over Communism and China? 
This dissertation has discovered that there was a forgotten voice among liberal 
Protestant American missionaries in China.  Those missionaries went against what 
would seem conventional wisdom by seeking accommodation with the atheist Chinese 
Communists during and immediately after the Chinese Civil War.  They were 
primarily from liberal denominations, usually doing service work rather than 
evangelization, and possessed an ecumenical perspective toward both religion and 
politics.  They focused more on the universality of their religious beliefs than on the 
particularities of the nationality.  Ironically, they were counting on the CCP’s 
nationalist tendencies to be stronger than its Communist ones.  In this judgment they 
were proven correct, but it did not get them the outcome they wanted.  They did not 
understand that the hyper nationalism of the CCP would force them out of the country 
not because they were Christians, but because they were Americans. 
Once they were back in the United States, they again took a less popular stance 
by remaining open to dealing with the Communists, both in terms of accepting that 
Chinese Christians must make accommodations to the CCP and then by advocating 
better relations with the People’s Republic.  Yet they were out of touch with 
mainstream America in the 1950’s and their voices were drowned out.  Even worse, 
their stories would be used by anti-communists for Cold War purposes even as they 
argued against it. 
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Scope 
This project focuses on American Protestant missionaries as the front line in 
the American relationship with China.  I use the term missionary to refer to foreigners 
who were sent to China in association with a religious organization. As well as 
professional clergy, the term missionary includes teachers, doctors and development 
experts, most of whom were layman who were sent to China for their technical skills.  
They diverged in their religious beliefs and in their purpose for going there, but they 
were employed by mission boards in churches, hospitals and schools.   
This thesis focuses almost exclusively on Protestants, only rarely including 
Catholics in its analysis. The Catholic Church had a significantly different relationship 
with the CCP than did Protestants.  The Vatican took a strongly anti-Communist line in 
China from the beginning of the Civil War.  Experience in the Communist occupation 
of Eastern Europe after World War II had convinced it that an attempt at 
accommodation with Communism was tantamount to surrender. In addition, the 
hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church caused the CCP to see it as a potential 
rival political center. Loyalty to the Vatican, which the CCP believed that all Catholics 
must have, was incompatible with loyalty to the CCP and China.  As a result, the 
Catholic Church was considered an enemy of the CCP even as the Civil War was 
going on, while the CCP was still showing moderation to Protestants. 
A second reason for excluding Catholics was that the American presence in the 
Catholic missions in China was only a fraction of the overall mission.  The American 
Catholic Church was still itself relatively new, only losing the classification as a 
missionary region at the beginning of the 20
th
 century. The Maryknoll Mission, the 
first mission of American Catholics to go to China, was founded in 1911, but its 
numbers were still minute compared to the thousands of Catholic missionaries from 
6 
 
Europe.  Because this project is focused on Americans, Catholics will have only a 
minor part in it while discussing the missions in China. 
Catholics do play a slightly larger part in the story after the expulsion of 
missionaries.  While the missions were secure in China, cooperation between 
Catholics and Protestants was minimal.  Many Protestants were suspicious of 
Catholics in a way that they were not of Protestants from other denominations.  
Despite disagreements between Protestant groups, there was a feeling that they were 
on the same team.  Catholics, however, were largely viewed as competitors.  But after 
missionaries were driven out, the lines between Protestant and Catholic softened as 
Catholics were brought into the Cold War consensus in the United States.  Stories of 
Communist oppression of Catholics were useful to anti-Communist activists, so the 
previous hostility toward Catholics was lessened.  As a result, their stories merged 
with those of Protestants as the American debate over China developed in the 1950’s. 
Nationality is also a tricky issue.  Although this project focuses on American 
Protestant missionaries and particularly on how their American identity affected their 
reaction to Communism, the ties between American missionaries and those of other 
countries were very tight.  By the beginning of the 20
th
 Century, the United States 
provided the largest number of Protestant missionaries in China, but their missions 
were connected very closely with those of Canada and the United Kingdom.  They 
shared information and staffed many mission organizations without regard for 
nationality.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the American 
missions without including some discussion of Canadian and British missionaries. 
Structure 
This project is divided into two parts. The first three chapters look at the 
experiences of missionaries while in China.  They trace the development of missions 
7 
 
and how they reacted to the increasing threat of Communism.  The last two chapters 
look at how missionaries and their churches participated in public discussion of China 
after their return to the United States.  They look at religious and political questions 
that resulted from their expulsion from China. 
Chapter 1 looks at the development of missions in the first half of the twentieth 
century through World War II.  It examines the increasing division between 
conservative and liberal missionaries.  Conservatives tended to focus more on 
evangelization while liberals focused more on the social gospel.  This division 
dramatically sharpened in the 1920’s and 1930’s, reflecting a similarly growing 
division in the United States between fundamentalist and modernists Christians.  The 
growing fissure in goals and methods paved the way for the disparate reactions to 
Communism after World War II. 
Chapter 2 examines how American missionaries reacted to the Chinese Civil 
War.  They divided largely along the lines of their primary work in China.  
Missionaries devoted to proselytizing were much more likely to support the 
Guomindang regime.  They believed that a Communist victory would mean the end of 
Christianity in China.  On the other hand, missionaries who were focused on the social 
gospel, i.e. providing services to the Chinese people, were more likely to seek 
accommodation with the Communists, generally viewing them as a better alternative 
to the corrupt Guomindang. 
Chapter 3 looks at missionaries who chose to stay after the Communist victory 
in 1949.  These missionaries typically put more emphasis on the social gospel by 
providing services to the Chinese people.  They hoped their work would be useful 
enough to a new regime dedicated to strengthening China to be allowed to remain.  
They hoped that the CCP’s nationalist tendencies would win out over its dedication to 
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atheism.  What they did not anticipate was that the hyper nationalism that the CCP 
preached would not permit the permanent presence of foreigners who were so closely 
tied to imperialism.  With the Korean War dramatically exacerbating nationalist 
tendencies, almost all missionaries had been driven from China by the end of 1951. 
Chapter 4 analyses how missionaries evaluated their missions after they 
returned to the United States in the 1950’s.  Most important in their analysis was the 
health of the Chinese Christian Church they had left behind.  This issue had the dual 
importance of deciding whether their missions were successful and establishing 
whether the United States could work with the Communists.  If the church was 
healthy, then their missions had been a success despite their expulsion.  It also showed 
that with foreign influence gone, the CCP could allow religious freedom. If the church 
had compromised itself by becoming an adjunct of the Chinese government, however, 
it reinforced that Communists could not be trusted while it also suggested that the 
previous century of missionary work had been in vain. 
Chapter 5 looks at the same period as Chapter 4, but analyses how missionaries 
entered into the public debate on American relations with China.  While many 
missionaries approved of the mainstream anti-Communist message, a significant 
portion of returned missionaries argued for a more nuanced view of China.  They 
advocated better relations with China, arguing that despite their distaste for 
Communism, ignoring a quarter of the world’s population was foolish.  These 
missionaries came from largely the same ecumenical, social gospel groups that had 
advocated working with the CCP while in China.  Ultimately, however, their voices 
would be drowned out by the Cold War consensus.  Their stories would even be used 
to support isolating China, despite their opposition to it. 
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Sources 
This project relies heavily on letters and publications of missionaries in China.  
These letters were sometimes to friends or family members, but more often there were 
open letters to their home congregations.  Some sent regular newsletters to keep their 
friends and family up to date on the progress of their missions.  Some of these were 
painfully dry, discussing the difficulties of supply or logistics, but more often than not 
they were colourful and candid, at least before the Communist takeover.  After the 
Communist victory, these letters became more circumspect because of fear of 
Communist censorship and retaliation.  These letters were extremely useful, but they 
have some limitations.  For one, not all missionaries wrote home consistently and 
those who did write did not always keep their letters to be archived. This makes it 
difficult to assess the real numbers of missionaries believing a certain way. There 
were, without question, a great number of missionaries who thought that the GMD 
was hopelessly corrupt.  There were also very many who thought they could work 
with the Communists.  But determining even approximate percentages of who 
believed that out the entire missionary population in China would be extremely 
problematic. 
Mission board records were also very useful.  Minutes, meeting notes and 
correspondence between board members provided some good insight into how they 
viewed Communism from the United States and how they interacted with the 
missionaries that they were supporting.  The China Committee of the North American 
Board of Foreign Missions was particularly useful because it encompassed so many 
other denominations. It had the added benefit of showing the interaction between 
mission boards of different denominations. 
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Memoirs of missionaries in China were bountiful in the 1950’s and copies of 
some of them can still be found.  I had the opportunity to examine about twenty of 
them.  They were curious sources to use because they were written years after the fact, 
used editors who had not been missionaries and had to be viable in the market. This 
meant than most published memoirs were strongly anti-Communist.  Because of this 
inherent bias in the market, memoirs must be read with some caution. 
I also use newspaper and magazine articles, mainly from the popular press but 
occasionally from Christian presses.  Some of these were written by missionaries 
while others were written about them.  These articles were useful in showing what 
message missionaries were trying to get out and how the public was receiving it.  Most 
articles came from either large scale publications like The New York Times or 
Newsweek, but they sometimes came from smaller newspapers, especially if the article 
is syndicated across the country. 
I was fortunate enough to be able to interview one surviving missionary, Mary 
Reed Dewer.  A remarkable woman who still remembers China with an unbelievable 
clarity, Ms. Dewer was an invaluable source.  She filled in many gaps on how 
missions worked and directed me to written sources that provided more information.  
She was also a prolific letter writer while in China, giving me her perspective from 
sixty years ago and then her perspective today.  She also provided the biggest 
challenge to this project, which was resisting the urge to make it simply about her.  I 
was able to stay on course, so her writing and her interview only appear occasionally 
in this work, but her influence is throughout. 
Finally, I tried to incorporate US Government documents where possible.  The 
government was not nearly as concerned with missionaries as it was about the survival 
of the Guomindang.  More importantly, it was concerned with distancing itself from 
11 
 
the impending fall of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, so few government documents 
directly addressed missionary concerns.  Even John Leighton Stuart’s cables to 
Washington rarely directly referenced missionaries, despite his previous work as one. 
Stuart himself was a difficult aspect of this project. He had spent a lifetime as a 
missionary before becoming Ambassador and his efforts as Ambassador were clearly 
influenced by that.  Yet including the bulk of his Ambassadorial work as missionary 
work would side track the project away from the missionaries on the ground.  As such, 
he is included as part of the overall discussion, but mainly within the context of the 
continuing missions on the ground. 
Approach 
In the early 1970’s, John K. Fairbank called on historians to include 
missionaries in their narratives.  To that end, he edited The Missionary Enterprise in 
China1, published in 1974, which addresses a series of specific issues about 
missionaries in China that ranged from theology to logistics to missionary 
motivations.  Fairbank’s call did not spark a revolution to include missionaries when 
discussing relations between the United States and China.  Most histories of US-China 
relations written since then give only minor mention to missionaries, preferring to stay 
within the more comfortable realm of state-to-state relations.  Missionaries are more 
often discussed within the field of Religious History than international relations.  This 
omission is frustrating because missionaries in China were the most frequent person-
to-person contact between Americans and the Chinese. 
Paul Varg’s Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats: The American Protestant 
Missionary Movement China, 1890-1952, was probably an inspiration for Fairbank’s 
                                                        
1 John K. Fairbank. The Missionary Enterprise in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1974) 
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call.  Published in 1958, Varg showed that missionaries were a key mediator between 
the United States and China at the grass roots level in both countries and as occasional 
advisors to politicians.  His work was much more focused on the pre-WWII era, most 
likely because of the availability of documents, but also because of the political 
climate the 1950’s.  His work, unfortunately, has only rarely been expanded by 
subsequent historians, hence Fairbank’s frustration.  There has been some very 
interesting work on missionaries, but it usually focuses on the role of missionaries in 
China rather than as a mediator between the two countries.
2
 
The standard introduction for the history of US-China relations is Warren 
Cohen’s America’s Response to China.  Originally written in 1971, it has been 
repeatedly updated as new information becomes available. The most recent addition 
(2010) included a little discussion on missionaries’ impact on the ground in China.  
That impact was minimal, as Cohen and many others agree.
3
 Cohen, however, does 
not look at how missionaries affected the American attitude towards China.  He largely 
looks at the top levels of the relationship while providing only minimal discussion of 
grassroots connections.
4
 
Nancy Tucker’s The China Threat: Memories, Myths and Realities in the 
1950’s digs a little deeper into popular views of China, but focuses on how those 
views translated into political pressures on the White House.  She includes some 
former missionaries who were among the most vociferous advocates for isolating 
Communist China, but still looked at the high levels of government, such as 
Congressman Walter Judd or Ambassador Stuart.  Her main argument is that President 
                                                        
2
 Paul Varg. Missionaries, Chinese and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement China, 
1890-1952 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958) 
3
 See also Douglas Fairbank’s The United States and China, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1983); Michael Hunt’s The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) 
4
 Warren Cohen. America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010) 
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Truman and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles both believed that isolating China 
was futile and self-defeating, but were unwilling to pay the political price for shifting 
policies toward recognition. Her argument is compelling, but only includes 
missionaries and religion in a marginal way.  She does not look at missionaries as a 
whole, but only those who were putting the most pressure on the administration.
5
 
The most comprehensive work to bring religion into the early Cold War is 
William Inboden’s Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of 
Containment.  Inboden looks at how religion factored into early efforts of 
containment.  He discusses containment globally, but spends one chapter just on 
China.  Like Tucker, he brings in politicians like Judd, but he also brings in a few 
unofficial lobbyists who had been missionaries to China.  He makes a powerful case 
that religion and former missionaries were very influential in shaping American policy 
towards China.  His work and Tucker’s complement one another nicely, but both are 
focused on the highest levels of decision making.  Neither looks to the personal 
contacts that existed between American missionaries and the Chinese.  Because of 
their focus, neither is concerned with missionaries who did not share in anti-
communist fervour.
6
 
There are some works that go in the other direction, looking exclusively at 
mission work in China.  Some of these are arguing against Cohen’s assertion that 
missionaries had no impact in China by pointing out the issues, although limited, in 
which they had some effect.  Some historians have looked at how female missionaries 
in China spread their own ideas about women’s roles.  Jane Hunter’s Gospel of 
Gentility looks at how female missionaries pushed American norms of womanhood on 
                                                        
5
 Nancy Tucker. The China Threat: Memories Myths and Realities in the 1950’s, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2012) 
6
 William Inboden III. Relgion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment, 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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the Chinese.7  Fan Hong’s Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom looks at how mission 
schools used physical fitness as a way to fight against the practice of footbinding.8  
Gael Graham’s Gender, Culture and Christianity makes similar arguments by looking 
at how mission schools tried to elevate women’s status in society by promoting 
literacy and condemning footbinding, while continuing to instil the idea that women 
should be in the home taking care of family.9  These works examine how American 
cultural norms were transmitted to the Chinese people through mission schools, 
mostly focused in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  Although each makes a case 
that missionaries had some influence in China, they are at least as much about the 
missionaries themselves and the values they took with them.   
Some more recent work has touched on how missionary work changed while 
they were there.  Jessie G. Lutz’s Chinese Politics and Christian Missions looks at the 
anti-Christian movements in China during the 1920’s.  Those movements resulted 
from internal changes in China which were completely out of missionary control, but 
resulted in terrorizing missionaries so that many of them evacuated the country 
permanently.10  Lian Xi’s The Conversion of the Missionaries looks at how the 
modernist/fundamentalist split in Christianity in the United States affected the 
attitudes of missionaries in China.  Modernist missionaries became more willing to 
accept Chinese culture and less aggressive in pushing American ideas on the 
Chinese.11  Oi Ki Ling takes a similar approach, but for British missionaries after 
World War II.  Ling looks at how British missionaries tried to deal with the Chinese 
                                                        
7
 
Jane Hudson. The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn-of-the-Century China, 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). 
8
 
Fan Hong. Footbinding, Feminism and Freedom: The Liberation of Women’s Bodies in Modern Sport, 
(London, UK: Frank Cass Publishing, 1997). 
9 Gael Graham. Gender, Culture and Christianity: American Protestant Mission Schools in China, 
1880-1930, (New York City, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 1995) 
10 Jessie Lutz. Chinese Politics and Christian Missions: The Anti-Christian Movements of 1920-1928, 
(Notre Dame, IN: Cross Cultural Publications, 1988) 
11 Lian Xi. The Conversion of the Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 
1907-1932, (State College, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1997) 
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Civil War, which would lead to their eventual expulsion.12 United States Attitudes and 
Policies Toward China: The Impact of American Missionaries, edited by Patricia 
Neils, provides a collection of essays that address Fairbank’s call more directly. They 
subjects vary widely, from the arrogance of many missionaries toward Chinese culture 
to the role of former missionary John Leighton Stuart as the last US Ambassador to 
mainland China before the Communist victory. Despite the wide spread of topics, the 
collection as whole is one of the few attempts to show how missionaries were a 
significant part of the Sino-American relationship.13 
Niels’ volume shows the direction in which the field of Diplomatic History is 
slowly moving.  As many diplomatic historians broaden their queries to include 
international relations beyond just state-to-state, they are recognizing that people and 
private institutions build relationships and influence one another across national 
boundaries.  The emerging field of the US and the World incorporates non-state actors 
into our understanding of international relations.  
This project is part of that trend by beginning to incorporate missionaries into 
the larger narrative of Sino-American relations.  It seeks to bring religious history into 
the analysis of how China and the United States have interacted.  . Missionaries played 
a primary role in that relationship until WWII, when the US Government became 
more entangled with China. Until WWII, missionaries were one of the only sources of 
information that most Americans had on China. Even after the war, they were still 
important interpreter of events in China for the American people. 
This project is about the role of those missionaries in understanding 
Communism in China.  It is about how many missionaries were becoming more liberal 
                                                        
12 Oi Ki Ling. The Changing Role of the British Protestant Missionaries in China, 1945-1952, 
(Teaneck, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1999) 
13 Patricia Niels, ed. United States Attitudes and Policies Toward China: The Impact of American 
Missionaries, (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1990) 
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and tolerant of Communism at the same time that the American people were becoming 
less so.  Missionaries’ role as interlocutor for events in China had been unchallenged 
for decades, but as the threat of Communism emerged, they were overshadowed by the 
mainstream media that found direct and unambiguous news sold much better than the 
nuanced analysis coming from missionaries.  The fact that many missionaries tried to 
stay in China to work with the Communists is one manifestation of how different their 
views were than most Americans.  When they were forced out of China, many of these 
missionaries kept the view that the Communists were not evil, but were trying to 
improve the lives of their long-oppressed people.  When they expressed these views 
publicly, they were ignored or castigated. Even worse, their experience of trying to 
work with the Communists and failing was used as evidence that accommodation with 
Communism was impossible. Their role as interpreter of China was usurped at the 
moment when it became most important. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Changing Nature of Protestant Missions in China in the  
First Half of the 20
th
 Century  
 
When American missionaries began to rebuild missions after World War II, 
they were not starting from scratch.  They were building on a legacy of more than one 
hundred years. It was a legacy that existed in the physical remains of mission 
buildings that had been abandoned during the war and in the minds of the missionaries 
and the Chinese people they sought to serve.  The buildings could be repaired or torn 
down and built again, but the relationship between the missionaries and the Chinese 
people had momentum of its own. Missionaries returning to China after the war had to 
work with the foundations that they and their predecessors had laid during the 
previous hundred plus years. 
Those foundations were mixed in the extreme. From their first entry into China 
in the 1830’s, the Chinese people and the Chinese government often saw missionaries 
as imperialists or dangerous social deviants trying to undermine Chinese society. Their 
access to China was only achieved through the same gunboat diplomacy that 
Europeans had used to force China open to trade.  Once they arrived, they challenged 
Chinese society and culture with their foreign religion, making themselves and their 
converts a dangerous heterodox population.  Their recruits were often from the 
margins of Chinese society, reinforcing the view of many Chinese that they promoted 
deviancy.  Yet they also created a legacy of aid by providing valuable services that the 
Chinese government did not.  Their initial focus on evangelization gradually 
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developed into a more social gospel orientation.  In trying to implement the gospel’s 
message, they opened schools, hospitals, and tended to the poor.  Even with these 
services, some Chinese considered them arrogant and condescending because of their 
disdain for Chinese culture and their insistence on the supremacy of their own ways.  
Beginning in the 1910’s, some missions tried to repair this image of arrogance by 
bringing in better educated missionaries who were more accepting of Chinese culture.  
This was undoubtedly a step in the right direction, but was not enough to overcome 
nearly a century of Chinese suspicion and resentment towards missionaries.  
This chapter looks at the changes in Protestant missions in China in the first 
half of the 20
th
 Century.  It highlights the hurdles for missionaries in anti-foreign 
sentiment and the rise of Chinese nationalism. It argues that although missionaries 
were slow to understand how they were perceived by the Chinese, the violent protests 
against them in China, coupled with changes in Protestantism in the United States, led 
the liberal denominations to adapt. The most obvious result was to split the missionary 
movement into two groups, modernist and fundamentalist, with the modernists 
moving away from evangelism, towards an emphasis on the social gospel. Modernists 
also tried to appreciate and incorporate Chinese culture into their version of 
Christianity when possible.  Most mission work was interrupted by World War II, but 
when the missions were re-established after the war’s end, the modernist shift in 
priorities and methods continued.  Although they did not realize it at the time, these 
changes laid the groundwork for how missionaries reacted to the Communist threat. 
Early Missionaries 
In China, the term missionary has usually applied to foreigners working with 
Christian organizations.  It has been applied to those directly involved in religious 
activity, such as preaching or proselytization, or service fields such as teaching or 
19 
 
medicine. Some missionaries were trained as clergy, while others brought expertise in 
other areas.   
Christian missionaries arrived in China as early as the 6
th
 century CE, but had a 
negligible impact.14  Catholics began arriving en masse in the 16
th
 century. They had 
initial success under Jesuit monks who brought technical knowledge and often served 
as advisers to Chinese officials.  The monks, led by Matteo Ricci, adapted the Catholic 
message to its Chinese audience, allowing ancestor veneration and other traditional 
practices among Chinese converts.  They also used established Chinese words for 
Christian concepts to make them more comfortable for the Chinese. Their influence at 
court (Ricci was an adviser to the emperor) and their flexibility in adapting to Chinese 
traditions succeeded in gathering converts over the course of the 17
th
 century. In the 
early 18
th
 century, Pope Clement XI ordered that these accommodations be stopped 
because he feared they were creating a bastardized version of Catholicism.  After that, 
if the Chinese wanted to convert, they had to leave behind traditional Chinese society. 
Most Chinese felt this was too high a price to pay and renounced their Catholicism, 
undoing the gains the Jesuits had made in the previous century.  By the beginning of 
the 19
th
 century, the Catholic Church in China had only a very marginal impact as a 
whole. 
  Protestant missionaries, led by Congregationalist Robert Morrison from 
Scotland, arrived in China in 1807.15 The Qing Dynasty16 restricted foreign access 
                                                        
14 The first Christians to arrive in China were Nestorian Christians, who disagreed with the 
mainstream western Church on the relationship between Jesus’s human and divine natures. Their status 
as heretics meant they received almost no support in their missions. They had very limited success in 
China, but had considerably more with the nomadic peoples of central Asia. 
15 Because the British East India Company refused to take missionaries to China for fear of 
antagonizing the Qing Court, Morrison had to travel to the United States and book passage for India 
there. Morrison worked mainly in Macau and Guangdong. He died after 25 years in China having 
gained only ten converts. 
16 The Qing Dynasty was the political ruler of China from the middle of the 17
th
 century until the 
beginning of the 20
th
.  In this paper, the term Qing is used for political issues, laws and treaties. The 
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until it was forced to open the country after the Opium Wars.  The resulting Treaty of 
Nanjing, signed in 1842, included a requirement that British missionaries have 
increased access to China.17  The United States and other western powers negotiated 
similar “unequal treaties” within a few years, allowing their missionaries to flood into 
the country.  
Americans had been drawn to China as soon as there were Americans.  Even 
before the Treaty of Paris was signed, prominent American merchants began to refit 
their ships for the long voyage to China. In addition to the riches that merchants could 
make with millions of Chinese customers, American missionaries saw China as an 
opportunity to bring millions of souls to Christianity.  The reasons that missionaries 
chose to go to China are difficult to pin down, but most historians tie them to social 
changes in the United States.  The classic works of Paul Varg and John K. Fairbank 
attribute the growth of missionary enthusiasm mainly to two factors: the imperial 
successes of the West around the world and the Second Great Awakening.  The success 
that Europe had in dominating the world, particularly China, gave westerners a sense 
of superiority in their own culture.  Even though that domination was achieved by 
force of arms, missionaries saw the advance of western civilization, which they 
usually referred to simply as “civilization”, as irresistible.  Christianity was, from the 
missionary perspective, the central aspect of that civilization and should be spread 
across the world.18  
                                                                                                                                                                             
term China is used to describe interactions between missionaries and the Chinese people, until the Qing 
fall in 1911 and China began to reconstitute itself into a Westphalian nation-state. 
17 The clause including missionaries was at least partly because of domestic politics.  The opposition 
LIberal Party called the Opium War unjust aggression and called the ruling Conservative Party 
immoral.  The provision was added on to a clause opening four new treaty ports to British traders, most 
likely because it provided a moral justification for imposing the treaty on China. See Harry G. Gelber.  
Opium, soldiers and evangelicals : Britain's 1840-42 war with China, and its aftermath, (New York; 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); Glenn Melancon. Britain's China policy and the opium crisis : balancing 
drugs, violence and national honor, 1833-1840, (Burlington, VT; Ashgate Publishing 2003).  
18 Paul Varg. Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in 
China, 1890-1952, (Princeton NJ; Princeton University Press, 1958); The Making of a Myth: The 
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The Second Great Awakening provided a spiritual push to missionaries. As the 
movement swept the United States in the first half of the 19
th
 Century, American 
religion was reinvigorated. Michael Hunt, who agrees that imperialism helped drive 
missionaries, argues that this religious revival was much more important to American 
missionaries, particularly those going to China. It gave them a new sense of purpose to 
spread the gospel, and China was the largest market.  In addition to spreading 
Christianity, they were spreading the gospel of the United States, hoping to help the 
Chinese by showing them a better way to do things.  Regardless of what was the most 
important factor in driving missionaries to China, the flow of American missionaries 
to China continued to grow throughout the 19
th
 century. By the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, perhaps as many as one thousand American missionaries were in China. 
These came from many denominations, with Methodist, Presbyterian and 
Congregationalist being the largest in the 19
th
 century.  Americans were clearly 
hearing the call from the book of Mark: “Go ye into all the world, and preach the 
gospel to every creature.”19 
 The increased movement of missionaries to China did not change the 
involvement of the United States Government in the region. It did relatively little to 
promote either Christianity or trade directly. It was happy to take advantage of the 
success of the British in forcing China open, but did not want to expend resources in 
an area in which it had no crucial interest.20 Without a significant official presence in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
United States and China 1897-1912 (Lansing, MI; Michigan State University Press, 1968). John K. 
Fairbank. The United States and China fourth edition, (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 
1979). 
19 The numbers of missionaries are very difficult to know for certain because the organizations that 
sent them to China were so decentralized.  There was not a central list of missionaries, forcing 
historians to estimate based on the partial records available now.  Michael Hunt. The Making of a 
Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914, (New York City; Columbia University 
Press, 1983);. Lian Xi. The Conversion of the Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant 
Missions in China, 1907-1932. (University Park, PA; The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).   
20 The Treaty of Wanghia (1844) between the United States and the Qing was gained by riding the 
coattails of the British after the Opium Wars.  The Chinese offered most western countries similar terms 
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China, missionaries and traders became America’s eyes and ears in China and the 
frontline of Sino-American relations.  
American businessmen and missionaries sometimes worked in harmony, such 
as when the Opium Wars led to increased missionary access to China, while other 
times they conflicted, such as when missionaries opposed the opium trade.  Americans 
were the second largest importer of opium to China, which was illegal under Chinese 
law until 1860 when gunboat diplomacy by the British and the French forced the 
Chinese to legalize it.  Missionaries continued to campaign against opium after its 
legalization. They had only a small effect but drew the enmity of American traders 
nonetheless. The two represented competing strains in American culture as well, 
commerce and morality.  While many would argue that commerce was (and is) much 
more important in American society, missionaries’ selflessness held greater appeal to 
the American public.  Missionary stories, whether memoirs, articles or public talks, 
fascinated Americans in a way that recollections about trade rarely did. Missionaries 
became the largest voice for China, with most Americans knowing little about the 
country beyond that derived from missionary accounts.21 
The success that missionaries had in influencing the American public was not 
duplicated with the Chinese public. The “unequal treaties”22 gave missionaries access 
to China and protection from Chinese abuses, but did not guarantee a good reception 
                                                                                                                                                                             
as the British had forced as a way to promote competition and conflict between them.  The United 
States was not averse to the use of force, as shown by several instances of American warships trying to 
teach the Chinese a lesson, but official policy rarely moved beyond the rhetorical level.  See Warren 
Cohen’s America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations, (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2000);  Michael Hunt’s The Making of the Special Relationship: The United States 
and China to 1914 (New York, Columbia University Press, 1983); Charles Kitts’ The United States 
Odyssey in China, 1784-1990, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991). 
21 Stuart Creighton Miller. “Ends and Means: Missionary Justification of Force in Nineteenth Century 
China”, The Missionary Enterprise in China and America, ed. John. K. Fairbank. (Cambridge, MA; 
Harvard University Press. 1974).  
22 “Unequal Treaties” is the collective name for treaties between China foreign powers in which China 
made repeated concessions while gaining nothing in return.  Most negotiations were done at the end of 
a cannon. The Treaty of Wanghia was the first negotiated with the United States, but it was 
subsequently renegotiated many times. 
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among the Chinese.  Rather than finding millions of eager converts, they found a 
populace that was largely hostile to their presence.  Chinese who converted to 
Christianity would be separating from their traditional values and culture.  
Missionaries faced repeated reprisals, often violent, from the Chinese they sought to 
serve. The resentment towards missionaries and the foreignness of the religion 
prevented the mass conversions they had hoped for.  The repeated violence against 
missionaries and Chinese Christians was a symptom of that resentment but it was also 
a severe hindrance to getting converts.  The Chinese were even more reluctant when 
their conversion could result in their death or that of their family, as occasionally 
happened during anti-Christian riots. 
The foreignness of Christianity, the violence against Christians and the lack of 
understanding of Chinese culture all contributed to severely undercut the conversion 
effort. The Reformed Church of American was in China four years before gaining its 
first convert in 1846.23  American Methodists had an even harder time, spending ten 
years in China before they converted their first soul in 1857.24  As more missionaries 
arrived in China, the rate of conversion increased. By the 1890’s, the approximately 
1300 Protestant missionaries in China, most of whom were American or British, had 
converted an estimated 60,000 Chinese.25  Their successes continued to increase into 
the 20
th
 Century, but their dream of a Christian China was far beyond their reach.  
During the missionary era in China, Chinese Christians never made up even one 
percent of the Chinese population.  
Missionaries generally shared the goal of converting the Chinese to 
Christianity but they practiced different methods. When American missions began, 
                                                        
23 Gerald de Jong. The Reformed Church in China 1842-1951, (Grand Rapids, Michigan; William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1992)  20. 
24 Hunt 27. 
25 Fairbank. 202. 
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most missionaries looked to direct proselytization, while a smaller group looked to 
improve the situation of the Chinese people, which would eventually lead to 
conversion. The latter approach showed promise for converting the Chinese because 
traditional Chinese religion/spirituality was connected to success in life.  For example, 
correct behaviour would be rewarded with good weather and a good harvest. Or 
sacrificing to one’s ancestors could lead to having a son.26  Therefore, some 
missionaries tried to demonstrate that Christian learning, both spiritual and practical, 
would help improve the livelihood of its followers. 
The most common way to help raise the standard of living was education.  
Christian schools would initially teach Chinese children literacy, math, and science so 
they would have an economic advantage in their profession.  They would also include 
religious courses, but the emphasis on Christian teachings varied widely from school 
to school. Missionaries also sponsored small development projects, such as helping 
with irrigation or teaching new farming techniques. These would help economically, 
again showing how Christian (western) knowledge could improve Chinese lives. 
Even among those doing social gospel work, there were divisions on the best 
way to proceed.  Some missionaries focused on literacy, believing reading was the key 
to rising out of poverty and barbarism. Literacy was also essential for gaining 
converts.  Protestants generally focus on the individual’s relationship with God, which 
requires Christians to be able to read and interpret the Bible for themselves. Other 
social gospel missionaries worked on more social issues, hoping to bring Chinese 
society out of its “backwardness”. 
The terms “backwardness” and “superstition” were frequently used by 
missionaries, particularly before the 1930’s.  Missionaries inevitably took a portion of 
                                                        
26 Male children in China have always been much preferred in China.  They are referred to as “Great 
blessings” while daughters are referred to as “little blessings”.  Kam Louie, Theorizing Chinese 
Masculinity: Society and Gender in China, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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their own culture with them and looked down on China.  Some challenged traditional 
Chinese practices, even though such positions would hurt their prospect at gaining 
converts.  Most prominently, missionaries challenged the role of women in Chinese 
society.  Female missionaries became influential in China as medical missions grew in 
the late 19
th
 century.  Because Chinese women refused to see a male doctor, missions 
quickly began to send female nurses and occasionally female doctors to China.  
Female missionaries also worked in girls’ schools.  As female missionaries arrived in 
large numbers (they would outnumber male missionaries by the 1930’s) they became 
concerned that Chinese women were seen as nothing more than vessels for child 
bearing.  Few, if any, of them would have considered themselves feminists.  For these 
missionaries, being a wife and mother was a natural choice, but those roles did not 
need to be the entirety of their identity. They did not need to be merely adjuncts of 
men, but could be their own person. They eagerly shared this perspective with Chinese 
women. 
Missionaries did not target Chinese laws enforcing women’s status, knowing 
that they had almost no influence with the Qing government.  Instead they focused on 
social issues where they could make a difference. The most brutal manifestation of 
women’s status was footbinding, the breaking of young girls’ feet to keep them small 
to fit the cultural norm of attractiveness among Chinese men.27 The process was 
repeated as the girls grew up, with their toes folded under their foot. Because it 
inflicted life-long pain on girls, missionaries began a campaign in the 1870’s to end 
the practice. Over the next six decades, both male and female missionaries pushed to 
                                                        
27 Footbinding had become popular by the twelfth century.  For reasons that are not clear, Chinese men 
thought that a “three inch lotus”, meaning a foot three inches long, was the height of beauty.  For almost 
a millennium, Chinese women of the upper classes repeatedly broke their daughters’ feet and bound 
them tightly in cloth to keep them small and enhance their marriage prospects. In addition to attracting 
men, bound feet were also a status symbol. It made walking extremely painful for women with bound 
feet, demonstrating that they were wealthy enough to afford servants.  Dorothy Ko. Cinderella’s Sisters: 
A Revisionist History of Footbinding (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007). 
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enhance the status of women through education and physical fitness.  They 
encouraged competitive physical games as a way to show that girls should value their 
healthy body.  Most mission schools would not accept a girl with bound feet, putting a 
counter pressure on parents.  There was no public education system in China at the 
time, so mission schools were the best that most Chinese could hope for.  This added 
to the tension between traditional Chinese society and missions.  Upper class Chinese 
were rarely interested in Christianity, but the successes of western imperialism in 
China had shown the value of western knowledge while the failures of the Qing 
government had weakened the credibility of the Confucian model. Christian education 
offered an avenue for advancement for upper class Chinese, making it appealing in a 
way that Christianity as a religion rarely was.  Bound feet, while a necessity in the 
upper sectors of Chinese society, had a new drawback that parents had to take into 
account if they wanted their daughters to prosper. 
The movement against footbinding was the most straightforward way in which 
missionaries challenged Chinese society. It also marked their most successful effort as 
footbinding was banned by the newly established Republic of China in 1912, although 
the practice continued in some parts of China until the 1930’s. Yet there were other 
less direct ways that they made similar challenges.  Female missionaries brought their 
own ideas of domesticity which accepted the role of women as primarily mothers and 
wives.  Indeed, many female missionaries came with their husbands and children. Yet 
their presence in China demonstrated that those roles were not the limit of their 
capabilities. When they saw the extreme subservience of Chinese women, they began 
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advocating American values to China and, without thinking of themselves as 
revolutionaries, tried to instigate a social revolution in Chinese society.28 
Missions also tried other ways to influence Chinese society.  They tried to 
improve hygiene, care for the poor and teach scientific agricultural techniques.  All of 
these issues were aimed at raising the Chinese standard of living and demonstrating 
the value of Christianity and Christian knowledge.29  Although this approach to 
winning converts seemed logical in principle, it did not work as well in practice.30  
Christian schools and universities were generally well-regarded, but they did not lead 
to large numbers of conversions. The overall weakness of the country, as shown by 
western incursions, did cause the Chinese to look beyond their own traditions to 
strengthen their country.  Mission schools gained more students because western 
countries were clearly stronger than China.  Learning from foreigners could help the 
Chinese make better lives for themselves and regain the country’s rightful place in the 
world. While missionaries were hoping western knowledge would lead to conversion, 
the Chinese saw mainly the practical side of education.  One historian characterized 
the Chinese attitude as: “I taught him English to bring him to salvation,” says the 
missionary; “I learned English so I could help save China,” says the convert.31 
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Efforts at gaining conversions were hampered by the Chinese image of 
Christians.  The majority of Chinese converts were from the margins of society, such 
as tenant farmers or the homeless, who had less to lose by withdrawing from 
traditional Chinese society.  The fact that the lowest rungs of society were drawn to 
Christianity made it even less appealing for Chinese who were even slightly better off.   
Many Chinese, particularly the upper and middle classes, viewed Christianity as a 
dangerous social deviancy. It disrupted society by making converts abandon tradition 
and social norms, such as ancestor veneration, concubines and footbinding.   This 
feeling among the Chinese increased the social stigma for Chinese Christians, again 
reinforcing that only those with little stake in Chinese society would be willing to 
convert.  The protection offered by the unequal treaties further damaged the Chinese 
opinion of Christians.  To make matters worse, there were a few instances of Chinese 
who had committed crimes converting to Christianity simply to avoid prosecution.  
Local magistrates were often afraid to prosecute Christians, regardless of cause, 
because any hindrance of Christians threatened to bring retaliation from western 
powers. Missionaries’ arrogance and disdain for Chinese culture, particularly prior to 
the 1930’s, did not help. Wen Ching32, a prominent advocate of reform at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, published a book on the crisis China was facing. 
The book was aimed at the failings of the Qing government, but he strongly 
condemned missionaries as well.  He wrote of missionaries: “Their Church is an 
imperium in imperio, propagating a strange faith and alienating the people from their 
ancestors.”33 Near the end of the nineteenth century, a Chinese woman who had 
                                                        
32 Wen Ching was a pseudonym for Lim Boon Keng.  Keng advocated returning to Confucianism 
while using western science and technology to strengthen the country.  He was part of a reform group 
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business dealings with missionaries took a more personal view. She said, “There 
seems little inducement to repent and be saved, if going to heaven would entail 
associating with foreigners for all eternity.”34  
Missionary Organizations 
While missionaries were doing their work in China, they relied on a 
complicated network of organizations for their material support.  Their parent 
organizations in their home countries, which were usually established along 
denominational lines, were their direct means of financial support, but policies and 
information were often run through coordinating committees that ran across 
denominations.  To make matters more complicated, missionary organizations tended 
to follow national boundaries, but missionaries in China cooperated across those 
boundaries.  For instance, the Methodist, Presbyterian and Baptist35 churches all had 
separate mission boards in the United States.  Each denomination also had separate 
boards in Britain, Canada, Norway, and so on.  Each of these boards was independent 
but often worked with the boards of other countries and denominations in an 
ecumenical spirit.  In the United States and Canada, most Protestant denominations 
joined the Foreign Missions Conference of North America (FMC) in 1893, which was 
designed to help coordinate missionary activities across denominational divides. This 
coordination was very important not only for dealing with potential problems, but also 
to halt competition for converts.  For most of the 19
th
 Century, missionary 
organizations would seek out any potential convert they could find, even if he or she 
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had already converted to another Christian church.  By the end of the century, most 
missionaries had arrived at a consensus that this was a waste of resources.  There were 
not enough missionaries to cover all of China so each mission could operate in its own 
area without worrying about other Christians stealing their converts.  The FMC helped 
identify the areas in need of missionaries, reducing competition and waste while 
expanding the missionary coverage of China.36  
Because the FMC’s members committed so many resources to China, they 
formed the China Committee to devote specific attention to the projects there.  The 
China Committee was one of many committees set up by the FMC, but it was the first 
one devoted to a single country. China warranted its own committee because of the 
concentration of missionaries there.  The reason for the fixation on China was most 
likely a combination of the size of the country and the American idea that the United 
States served as protector of China from European aggression.   
The image of Americans protecting China comes from a few factors. First, the 
United States did not use large-scale gunboat diplomacy as the British and French did. 
There were some instances where American ships used force, but they were isolated 
incidents that the American public was mostly unaware of. As a result, the United 
States looked benign in comparison.  The United States also gave rhetorical support to 
Chinese sovereignty and sponsored hundreds of Chinese students to study in the 
United States. These all had negligible impact in China, but gave the American public 
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the image that the United States was the champion of China.  This idea no doubt 
played a major role in the resources mission boards devoted to China. 37  
Although this image was mostly a figment of American imagination, it helped 
motivate missionaries and their boards to send Americans to help save the Chinese 
people, both physically and spiritually.  For example, by the 1920's, China represented 
the destination of almost a third of all missionaries from the Presbyterian Church of 
the United States (PCUSA).38   The Congregationalists, Southern Baptists and 
Methodists had a similar commitment of personnel in China.  The China Committee 
worked fairly well in facilitating cooperation between missionary organizations, but its 
work was hampered because of the chaos in China in the first decades of the 20
th
 
Century.39  New York was too far away to deal with the constantly changing situation.  
Partially in response to that and partially in an effort to move from a mission-run 
church to a Chinese-run one, they established the National Christian Council of China 
(NCC) in 1922, which met in Shanghai.  Missionaries were initially the majority of the 
NCC’s members, but it also had a large Chinese membership that would become the 
majority by the 1940’s.40  Neither the China Committee nor the NCC had authority 
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Protestants had always struggled with creating a critical mass of Chinese Christians to make a self-
sustaining church without the taint of foreigners.  There had been many attempts to push for Chinese 
leadership in the Church and to reduce the need for missionaries, but they usually ran afoul of Church 
orthodoxy as well as Chinese government policy. The largest example was the Taiping Rebellion in the 
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over the individual denominations, but both were forums for discussing the problems 
they were facing in China and trying to find effective solutions.  As is typical for 
Protestant Churches, decisions rested with the denominational boards in theory but 
with the individual missionaries in practice, meaning responses to new problems 
varied from missionary to missionary.  
An additional complication was transnational cooperation.  Most Protestants 
were open to cooperation across nationalities in some way, but the Anglo-American-
Canadian cooperation was particularly strong.  As noted earlier, most American 
mission boards worked through the FMC, which had very active participation from 
Canadian churches.  British missionaries, while reporting to separate boards, 
cooperated so closely with North American missionaries that the only notable 
distinction between them was where their money came from.  They worked closely 
together on the NCC as well as sharing information with their home mission boards.  
In one case, a British missionary named Victor Hayward became one of the most 
consistent sources of information for American mission boards through his role as 
Secretary of the NCC.  While this chapter looks at American missionaries, it is 
important to remember how closely they worked with their British and Canadian 
brethren.41  
Catholic missionaries, regardless of nationality, operated in a separate sphere 
than did Protestants.  With a much longer presence in China, Catholics had gained 
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more converts than all of the Protestant churches combined.42  Yet their influence in 
China was less. This was because converts to Catholicism were almost entirely from 
the margins of society, even more than for Protestants. They also faced hostility from 
the Chinese government (or governments) particularly after Chiang Kai-shek came to 
power in 1927.  Chiang’s wife, Soong Mei-ling, was a Methodist and the daughter of a 
Methodist minister43. One of the conditions for the marriage was his conversion to 
Christianity.  Chiang duly converted to Methodism and had adopted at least part of the 
Protestant fear of Catholicism.44 Chiang also looked at the Catholics as a challenge to 
his power because of their loyalty to the Vatican and because of the property and 
wealth they had accumulated over the centuries in China.45 While Chiang was often 
annoyed at Protestant missionaries because of their calls to reform, he showed outright 
hostility towards Catholics.   
The Catholic Church was also a different type of organization than were 
Protestant churches.  Although most missions for Catholicism were organized at a 
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national level, the ultimate authority was in Rome, in contrast to Protestants, who were 
decentralized in the extreme. In addition, most Catholic missionaries to China came 
from Europe. American Catholic missionaries were a very small percentage of the 
Catholic mission in China.  Americans, on the other hand, made up the majority of 
Protestant missionaries in China by the 1920’s.  Because of the large differences in 
longevity, structure and origin, Catholics in China were in a much different situation 
than were Protestants, so they will be treated only peripherally in this chapter. 
Denominational Differences 
Each Protestant denomination brought its own theological approach to 
missionary work.  For Americans, the most active denominations were the 
Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, and Southern Baptists.  There were also 
non-denominational Christian organizations in China, the largest of which were the 
Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) and the China Inland Mission (CIM).  In 
major cities, there was often cooperation amongst the missionary groups even beyond 
the FMC and NCC.  In smaller cities and villages, each denomination operated 
autonomously.  There were no explicit territorial boundaries for what area was the 
province of which mission, but the FMC had helped coordinate between the 
denominations so that they would not compete with each other for converts.  China 
was much too large for missionaries to reach all of it, so when a new mission was to 
be founded there was no shortage of virgin area. 
The Presbyterians and Congregationalists had very similar backgrounds. Both 
came from the Reformed tradition and had strong Calvinist influences.  They also took 
a similar view of the world.  Both of these denominations arrived in China to 
evangelize the Chinese. Over time, however, providing service to the Chinese people 
took an increasingly large share of the resources.  This change was what might be 
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called “mission creep” in today’s military jargon.  For example, Protestants 
emphasized that Christians must be able to read and interpret the Bible, so 
missionaries established more schools for literacy.  Partly because Chinese parents 
would only send their children to a school that offered a practical education and partly 
because of the call for charity and service in Christianity, these schools were expanded 
to include more practical subjects, such as science, math and physical fitness. 
Providing medical assistance also fit a twofold purpose as it demonstrated the value of 
Christian knowledge while also showing the Christian commitment to love and 
helping all of God’s children. By the early 20th century, Presbyterians and 
Congregationalists had embraced the social gospel aspect of Christianity by devoting a 
much larger portion of their resources in China to schools and hospitals across China 
than to proselytization.46   
The Methodists came from a slightly different tradition than the Presbyterians 
and Congregationalists, but they took a similar view of the mission work.47  While 
many Methodists were full-time clergy, a large portion of Methodist resources went to 
services for the Chinese people, usually medical or educational. Their movement 
toward to social gospel was similar to the Reformed denominations.  By the end of the 
19
th
 century, they were the largest American Protestant missionary presence in China.  
However, by the 1930’s, they were surpassed by the Presbyterians.  Because of their 
similar approaches to missionary work, missionaries from all three denominations 
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tended to view themselves as collaborators rather than competitors in the missionary 
enterprise in China.48  
These three denominations also shared a long institutional memory in China 
(at least by American standards).  Children of missionaries in the nineteenth century 
would often return to China for their own mission work. There were even a few cases 
of third generation missionaries in China. Because of this long term view and some of 
the difficulties suffered by previous generations of missionaries, riding out the storm 
seemed like a natural response to any new crisis.  Their emphasis was to serve the 
Chinese people, regardless of who was ruling them.  
The only major American Protestant denomination that remained outside of 
these coordinating organizations was Southern Baptists.   There were several reasons 
for this self-imposed exclusion.  Southern Baptists had only rarely participated in 
ecumenical efforts.  While other American Protestants, as well as many American 
Orthodox Christians49, were working to form the World Council of Churches and its 
associated National Council of Churches of the United States, the Southern Baptist 
Convention charted a separate course.50  Southern Baptists rarely participated in the 
FMC and maintained only limited communications with it. In addition, Southern 
Baptist missions focused largely on evangelization, with only a small portion of their 
resources going to education even before the modernist-fundamentalist controversies 
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of the 1920s and 30s.  Their missionaries were rarely educated in seminary, instead 
being laymen dedicated to finding converts.51 
The non-denominational YMCA was founded as a service organization and 
cooperated with other groups to whom service was a priority.  It did have a strong 
proselytizing element, but it gave greater emphasis to providing a safe and wholesome 
environment for young men.  Within the NCC, it was one of the strongest champions 
of promoting the social gospel.  The structure of the YMCA was to keep control at the 
national level rather than at an international headquarters, but both the American and 
Chinese branches worked to some degree with the China Committee as well.52 
The China Inland Mission, although also non-denominational, took a different 
approach to its mission than the YMCA.53  The CIM actually had much stronger 
similarities to the Southern Baptists.  It was devoted mainly to evangelism with little 
attention to social gospel issues.  It preferred to recruit from the working class, 
meaning its missionaries were laymen.  It also kept its distance from the FMC and 
other coordinating organization.  The CIM’s organization was significantly different 
from those of other Protestant missionaries. Its headquarters were in Shanghai rather 
than abroad.54 Aside from the headquarters, its missionaries were located mainly in 
less populated cities and towns.  They dressed and lived like the Chinese they were 
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seeking to convert. They sought no funds from abroad to support their missionaries, 
instead making their own living in their parish. The remoteness of their missions 
combined with their missionaries’ self-reliance made coordination with other 
missionary groups impractical and unnecessary.55 
Anti-Missionary Violence 
Although each denomination had its own background and attitude towards 
missions, they shared similar experiences in China, particularly the difficulties.  
Besides their conspicuous lack of success in gaining converts, missionaries faced 
several severe challenges to their physical safety.  As Chinese nationalism grew in the 
late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, the injustices of the unequal treaties became a 
rallying point.  Missionaries were often the only foreigners that Chinese in the 
countryside would ever meet.  The heterodoxy they promoted, the protection given to 
them by local magistrates and their relatively luxurious lifestyle (although the 
missionaries considered themselves to be undergoing hardship) created strong 
resentment among most Chinese. Despite their pledge to help the Chinese people, they 
were an obvious symbol of foreign aggression and bore the brunt of movements 
against foreigners.   
The most striking example was the Boxer Rebellion of 1898-1900.  The Boxer 
uprising grew out of protests against the exemptions of churches and missionaries 
from certain laws and taxes.  Frequent violent incidents eventually turned into a full-
fledged rebellion in late 1898.  Boxer leaders advocated traditional Confucian 
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morality.56 They utilized Chinese anger towards foreigners and foreign ideas by 
directing attacks against missionaries and Chinese Christians.  The Qing government 
initially tried to crush the rebellion, but then reversed itself.  The Boxers’ success 
became an opportunity for the Qing to remove some foreign influence.  Officials 
began to aid the Boxers materially while persecuting, and occasionally executing, 
foreigners (missionaries and others) and Chinese Christians.  By the middle of 1900, 
the Boxers and their allies had completely surrounded the foreign legations of Beijing, 
hoping to drive them out.  Later that year, a combined force of European and 
American troops broke the siege and destroyed the Boxer army.57 During the uprising, 
missionaries and Chinese Christians bore the brunt of the violence, with almost 200 
missionaries (including their families) and as many as 33,000 Chinese Christians 
killed.58 
The Boxers were by far the largest and most dangerous movement directed 
against missionaries, but other nationalist movements targeted them as well. The May 
Fourth Movement that began in 1919 was an attempt for the Chinese to find new ways 
to strengthen their nation. The movement was sparked by news that the Treaty of 
Versailles transferred German concessions in China (Qingdao and Port Arthur) to the 
Japanese. Japan had used World War I as an opportunity to further exploit China’s 
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resources while Europe and America were too distracted to intervene.  The treaty did 
little more than recognize the already existing fact of Japan’s hegemony in China.  The 
Chinese, however, were shocked because Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric of national self-
determination promised a just peace governed by international law instead of force of 
arms.  When the treaty was announced on May fourth, students began rioting against 
foreigners.  It led to one of the most remarkable intellectual movements in China’s 
history. Chinese students questioned both traditional Chinese culture and the foreign 
models they had previously hoped would save China.  It was not a coherent ideology 
but a series of competing dialogues that hoped to find a new model for Chinese 
salvation.59 
The May Fourth Movement transformed an earlier popular effort against 
Confucian values into a larger program that confronted foreign influence as well.  
Again the most obvious face of the imperialists, missionaries became a prime target.  
The resulting Anti-Christian Movement of 1920-1922 blamed missionaries for 
undermining China.  Students protested in front of missionary schools and harassed 
Chinese Christians. There was some violence, but it was limited in scale.  Because the 
movement was based in large cities, it had only a small impact on missions overall.  
Missions in smaller cities and the countryside were largely unaffected during the 
movement.  The longer term effects for the missionaries, however, were more dire. 
The movement appears to have primed many Chinese people in cities to see 
missionaries as subversive influences who were working to keep China down. When 
the Guomindang (GMD) tried to reunify China by force of arms, anger towards 
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missionaries would no longer be restricted to protests, but would manifest itself in 
large-scale violence.60 
 In 1927, only five years after the end of the Anti-Christian Movement, the 
Guomindang launched the Northern Expedition to reunify China under its leadership. 
It marched from its base in the southern province of Guangdong to the central region 
of Jiangnan.61 The Guomindang, which translates roughly as “Nationalist Party”, used 
mass meetings to mobilize the Chinese people in its hyper-nationalist cause. When 
GMD forces conquered Nanjing and Shanghai, its followers began rioting against 
foreigners, particularly missionaries. Although Chiang had not yet converted to 
Christianity, he had already promised his new wife’s family that he would consider 
Christianity.  It is unlikely that he meant to put missionaries in danger, but having 
whipped his followers into an anti-foreign frenzy, missionaries became collateral 
damage for his movement, with dozens of missionaries being killed and many more 
fleeing the country.   
Part of the GMD’s agenda was to remold Chinese society and strengthen it into 
an image after its own ideal.62 Christianity was a hindrance to this. Although the GMD 
had to tolerate Christianity because of the unequal treaties and because some of its 
leaders were Christian, GMD policies tried to exploit mission work to further its 
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agenda. The GMD government also imposed new rules on missionaries, forcing them 
to teach GMD propaganda and accept government regulation. Some historians have 
referred to this crisis as the end of the Golden Age of missionaries in China. Many 
missionaries returned to China after the GMD had restored some order, but what had 
been a constant increase since the 1880’s leveled off and then declined.63 
Internal Crisis 
The 1927 attack on missionaries was not the only reason for the weakening 
missionary presence in China.  Also important was a crisis within the missionary 
movement that questioned the very basis of their missions.  Missionaries were at the 
forefront of a larger conflict within Christianity about how their faith aligned with 
reason and science. With the advances of science in the second half of the nineteenth 
century, most notably Charles Darwin’s publication of The Origin of the Species, 
Christians began to question the literal truth of the gospel.  If the Bible is by 
contradicted scientific evidence, it raised difficulties in believing its word-for-word 
accuracy.64  
This was compounded by a movement called “higher criticism” that 
questioned the authorship of the Bible.  Higher criticism gained strength in Germany 
in the late 18
th
 Century, but it was its work in the first half of the 19
th
 Century that had 
a profound impact on Christianity around the world.  Many scholars of higher 
criticism argued that the Bible had been written by multiple authors in different times 
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and was assembled centuries later. Even though many of these ideas were published 
decades before Darwin, few people in the English speaking world knew of them 
before they were published in English in the early 1860’s.  Once they became well-
known among the clergy of Britain and the United States, they caused a firestorm of 
controversy.  This went beyond the Darwinian challenge of the inerrancy of the Bible 
and questioned whether it was divinely inspired at all. When higher criticism came to 
the United States at almost the same time as The Origin of the Species, American 
Protestants began to reevaluate their fundamental beliefs about the Bible and how they 
understood Christianity.65 
As Christians (American and otherwise) reconsidered their religion in the late 
19
th
 century, they roughly divided into two groups.  Those who tried to find a common 
ground between religion and science were usually referred to as modernists. Others 
believed that if there was a conflict between the Bible and science, the Bible was the 
trusted source. Usually called fundamentalists, because they stuck to the fundamentals 
of Christianity (i.e. the Bible), they maintained their belief that the Bible was word-
for-word accurate. 
One unexpected effect of modernism in Christianity was a move toward a 
more ecumenical view of religion. If the literal accuracy of the Bible was 
questionable, there was no reason for Christians to fight over the finer points of the 
religion. Many Christian groups joined a worldwide ecumenical movement that sought 
to remove the divisions among Christian sects.  The idea of ecumenism had been 
around since the times of Constantine, but it only gained momentum in the early 20
th
 
century.  The 1910 World Missionary Council in Edinburgh, Scotland marked a 
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tangible move towards creating a unified church.  It was followed by the creation of 
the International Missionary Council (IMC) in 1921.  The IMC was dedicated to 
fostering cooperation between missionary organizations.  Other ecumenical councils 
followed, always with a large American presence and often American leadership.  The 
ecumenical movement encouraged creation of cross denominational organizations like 
the National Council of Churches, which were organized on national lines, and 
eventually the World Council of Churches, which would be established in 1948. 
Churches participating in the ecumenical movement generally accepted that 
the Bible might not be taken literally, but it held higher truths within it. They believed 
that unity within the Christian church was more important than fighting over the 
nuances of doctrine.  Baptists, Anglicans, Methodists, Congregationalists, 
Presbyterians, and Lutherans were among the many churches that participated.  The 
YMCA, having been founded on ecumenical principles in the middle of the 19
th
 
century, also enthusiastically participated.  Members of these groups were generally 
more liberal and often went so far as to question the uniqueness of Christ’s 
revelations.  As Stephen Niell writes: “The liberal [meaning an ecumenical] was by 
any means so sure that Jesus Christ was the last Word of God to man. He was repelled 
by the exclusive claim to salvation through Christ alone.”66  Niell also discusses how 
missionaries in the early 20
th
 century translated ecumenism into mission work: “The 
task of the missionary today, it was maintained, is to see the best in other religions, to 
help adherents of those religions to discover, or to rediscover all that is best in their 
own traditions…”67 John Nurser strikes a similar tone: “To be ‘ecumenical” was not 
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only to seek a reunited Christian church but also to see its gospel as requiring 
conservation of every human culture…”68 
This universalism did not sit well with more conservative religious groups.  
These groups generally refused to participate in ecumenical organizations, preferring 
to stand alone rather than compromise on doctrine.  In the United States, the Southern 
Baptist Convention was by far the largest religious organization that stood outside the 
ecumenical movement. 
Widening the Fundamentalist-Modernist Split 
The early 1930’s saw two events that, while trying to find common ground 
between modernists and fundamentalists, substantially worsened the split.  The first 
was a 1932 book titled Rethinking Missions: A Layman’s Enquiry after 100 Years. This 
book, initially organized by a few Baptist laymen who had concerns about missionary 
work and funded by J. D. Rockefeller, eventually became a large interdenominational 
research project that encompassed most mainline churches. The impetus for the study 
was the basic question of whether missions were performing a positive function.  
Some ecumenicals believed that it was arrogance to push western religion on Asians 
who had no history of it.  Others believed that spreading the gospel was important but 
ineffectively done.  
 The members of the commission went to study missionaries in India, China 
and Japan for the better part of a year and then returned home to compare notes and 
report their findings.  No one working on the study had been a missionary and only 
one commission member appears to have gone to seminary or worked directly for a 
church.  Most were prominent members of society, including the presidents of two 
universities, deans of two medical schools, and several businessmen.  The head of the 
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commission was a Harvard professor of philosophy.  The study was a book on 
religious activity written by educated people who were not, for the most part, educated 
in religion. As such, it should probably not be surprising that the book avoided any 
sort of theological detail, but instead focused more on the broader philosophical issues 
and their application in the field.  Missions provided a great opportunity to explore 
those issues because almost all Protestant denominations participated in missionary 
work.  The study’s goal appears to have been to find common ground between the 
modernists and fundamentalists, using missions as a way to bring the two sides 
together. If this was its goal, however, it failed spectacularly. 
The book tried not to take sides in the split, but almost all of its conclusions 
were on the modernist side. In an early chapter, in an effort to give the appearance of 
balance, it made a reference to “the folly of ‘modernism’, so-called”, but only in a 
footnote.  Its larger point was that missions needed to be rethought in a very 
fundamental (but not fundamentalist) way. It did not suggest ending missions. The 
missionary impulse was fundamental to Christianity so questioning whether missions 
should continue would be like questioning “whether good-will should continue”.69 But 
missions needed to be conducted on a different basis than they had been for the 
previous century.  
One of its most controversial arguments was that missionaries needed to open 
their minds to other religions. It was not suggesting abandonment of Christianity, but 
it was suggesting that other religions had some truth in them.  Rather than refuting 
everything from native religions, it would be more effective to find the aspects of 
those religions that would be compatible with Christianity.  It went so far as to say that 
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Christianity may not be the only legitimate revelation from God. It argued that the 
purpose of religion was to find ultimate truth. There may be many ways to find that 
truth.  It went on to say the value of a religion is in how clearly it could present that 
truth, which made Christianity the best option for western culture, but not necessarily 
for everyone.  “The final truth, whatever it may be, is the New Testament of every 
existing faith.” 
Although the authors clearly considered Christianity the preeminent religion, 
their suggestion that it may not be the only way to know God was a shocking assertion 
to many Christians. If Christianity was not unique, why were missionaries necessary at 
all?  Wouldn’t they be better served by staying home and letting Asians figure out the 
truth with their own religion?  The commission’s answer was twofold. First, 
Christianity provided the clearest message to people in the West, so it is likely that 
there were people in the East who could benefit from it as well.  Second, and more 
important from the commission’s perspective, missionaries fought against “non-
religion”.  The authors stated that other religions were not the enemy of Christianity.  
The real enemy to Christianity, as well as to Islam and Buddhism, was the trend of 
people drifting away from religion in favor of science and reason. The commission 
argued that science and religion were not only compatible but complimentary, but 
many people saw them as mutually exclusive and moved away from God in search of 
a worldly truth.  Missionaries should work to bring people back to God in all parts of 
the world.  In this work, other religions were allies, albeit imperfect ones.  Missionary 
work remained important in turning back the tide of secularism across the world. 
A third important, but less controversial point, was that missions should be 
limited in duration.  Missionaries were not eternally necessary to establish a church. 
They should plant the seeds rather than tend the plant as it grows.  The eventual end of 
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missions was necessary because of the rising tide of nationalism in Asia. As long as 
Christianity was seen as a foreign religion, it would be limited in its growth.  
Resentment by locals would cause harassment and prevent potential conversions.  
Missionaries should work to create a thriving church and then allow the local churches 
to work on their own. Once it was seen as an indigenous religion, it could thrive even 
in a nationalist environment. 
Rethinking Missions included many more specific conclusions, but these three 
were the most sweeping and had the largest repercussions. There was an explosion of 
criticism from the public and from religious groups, including some of the groups that 
had contributed to its findings.  It led to a reshuffling of membership among the 
various denominations, with some members of the contributing churches leaving to 
join more fundamentalist denominations, while others remained but fought against the 
liberal movement of their church.  Yet Rethinking Missions did not start this 
controversy. Most of its ideas had been discussed publicly in the previous decade, but 
the prestige of the commission’s members and having J. D. Rockefeller as its sponsor 
put publicity and clout behind these controversial conclusions.  It greatly exacerbated 
the widening gap between the two sides by bringing the debate into a public forum. 
In November 1932, less than a month after the release of the Rethinking 
Missions, famed missionary Pearl S. Buck gave a speech at New York City’s Hotel 
Astor called “Is There a Case for Foreign Missions?” that made many of the same 
points.  Buck had been an honored guest at the release of Rethinking Missions, sitting 
beside J. D. Rockefeller. It is unclear how much Buck was influenced by the report, 
but it is appears that her ideas had been building independently for more than a 
decade.  Buck had grown up in China as a child of missionaries with fundamentalist 
views and a strong admiration for American culture.  She returned to the United States 
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in 1911 to attend college, but returned to China immediately after completing her 
degree in 1914.  Somewhere in this period of her life, she began to change her views.  
She saw aspects of Chinese culture that she found admirable, while she became 
frustrated with American missionaries.  Because missionaries were the Americans she 
lived with, her attitude towards the United States as a whole soured. What bothered 
her most was their arrogance.  She said, “I have seen the missionary narrow, 
uncharitable, unappreciative, ignorant….I can never have done with my apologies to 
the Chinese people that in the name of a gentle Christ we have sent such people to 
them.”70 By the time of her speech in New York, she had begun to question the entire 
missionary enterprise, wondering why Americans felt that they had the right to insist 
American culture and religion was superior. 
Buck was by far the most famous American missionary in China or elsewhere. 
She had lived most of her life in China and wrote the best-selling novel The Good 
Earth only two years before.  Earlier in 1932, she had won the Pulitzer Prize for that 
book and published its sequel, Sons, which was also a best seller.  Both books tried to 
present a realistic view of the difficulties and nobility in Chinese society.  Between the 
books and her long-time service in China, she was a celebrity with a great deal of 
gravitas, so when she began questioning mission work, it generated a lot of attention. 
Buck’s speech demonstrated a sea-change in her approach to missionary work.  
While her overall answer to her question was yes, she qualified it so much that she 
appeared to be saying no.  She believed that missionaries and missions suffered from 
an abundance of problems.  She couched her language as politely as she could, but 
essentially said that missionaries were too arrogant in a field where humility was 
necessary. Missionaries should try to work out a dialogue with the Chinese instead of 
                                                        
70 Pearl S. Buck, “Is there a Case for Foreign Missions?” reprinted in Harpers Bazaar, Jan. 1933. 
50 
 
insisting that the Chinese way was backward and the American way was the only 
correct one.  She went on to suggest that just as Confucianism would not work in the 
United States, it was folly to assume that Christianity would work in China.  
Within the next year, her publisher had printed a pamphlet of the speech. Many 
newspapers and magazines published excerpts, with Harpers publishing it in its 
entirety.  The reaction was strong in both directions, with many editorials praising her, 
but many others condemning her, including the president of the Presbyterian Mission 
Board, which was her nominal sponsor in China.71  Many Americans, and a few 
Chinese in the United States, wanted her brought before the Presbyterian Mission 
Board for charges of heresy.  The Board tried a moderate course, hoping the storm 
would blow over. Buck made this impossible by continuing to defend her views in 
speeches and articles. In one interview, she said: “There may be humble Christians, 
but there never were humble missionaries or priests. It is a contradiction in terms.”72  
In late 1933, Buck resigned as a missionary. She returned to China briefly but then 
moved back permanently to the United States in 1934.  
Buck’s speech and Rethinking Missions had very similar themes and combined 
to create a massive controversy.  While the two had some differences in both 
substance and tone, historian Lian Xi has noted that they articulated a fundamental 
question that had been lying underneath the mission question since the beginning of 
the modernist-fundamentalist conflict.  Should missions be Christ-centric or God-
centric?  Christ-centric missions would be bringing a unique revelation for salvation.  
God-centric missions would try to implement God’s work on earth, helping foreign 
                                                        
71 Buck married another American in China in 1917 whose income initially supported them both more 
than her missionary salary. By 1932, the royalties from The Good Earth were her primary income, so 
she had not been dependent on her mission board for more than a decade. 
72 Grant Wacker. ”Waning of the Missionary Impulse: The Case of Pearl S. Buck”, The Foreign 
Missionary Enterprise at Home and Abroad, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2003) 198. 
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peoples raise themselves up both physically and spiritually. This question, as much as 
any other, would be the dividing line for missionaries in the coming decades.73  
Rethinking Missions and Buck’s speech threw gasoline on a fire that had been 
previously under control, causing both sides to begin focusing more and more on what 
they saw as their first priority.  The divide was neither sharp and nor quick.  
Missionaries from “mainline” 74  churches did not give up on Christ or stop seeking 
conversions.  Missionaries from fundamentalist churches did not focus exclusively on 
evangelism to the exclusion of good works. Yet the divide between the approaches 
grew wider and wider.  Fundamentalists often called modernist missionaries 
“accommodationists” because they were willing to dilute Christian beliefs to bring in 
more converts and were more interested in the social gospel than evangelization.75  
More liberal denominations, such as the Methodists, Congregationalists, Presbyterians 
and Baptists accepted the modernist view, but not without internal struggle. Many 
fundamentalist members of those groups withdrew from their denomination’s mission 
boards to promote a more fundamentalist approach to overseas missions. More 
conservative denominations, such as Southern Baptists, accepted the fundamentalist 
approach, but also had internal splits. By the early 1940’s most denominations had 
arrived at a rough internal consensus on how their missions would work, with many 
dissenters leaving for other churches.76 Fundamentalist denominations would enhance 
their commitment to proselytization while mainline churches would put an even 
                                                        
73 Lian Xi. The Conversion of the Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 
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74 The term “mainline church” was coined in this time period to differentiate liberal denominations 
from fundamentalist ones. Mainline churches include Presbyterians, Lutherans, Methodists, 
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75 This is another parallel to problems faced by early Jesuit missionaries.  They sought to accommodate 
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higher percentage of missionaries in service work. Those priorities would be reflected 
in the resources that mission boards applied to their task. 
The Sino-Japanese War 
Events in China continued to affect missions, usually negatively, even while 
the modernist-fundamentalist battle heated up.  The year before Buck made her 
speech, Japanese pressure on China turned from exploitation to outright aggression.  
Japan had been encroaching on China since the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.  In 1931, 
the Japanese manufactured an incident that they blamed on the Chinese so they would 
be “forced” to respond. That response was an invasion of the northern region of China 
known as Manchuria.  In 1937, the Japanese army fabricated a similar incident as a 
pretext for additional aggression, this time into China proper, initiating the Second 
Sino-Japanese War.77   
Foreign missionaries had three choices. The first was to stay where they were. 
The second was to flee to “Free China” under Guomindang control. The third was to 
leave China, usually for home. The majority of American missionaries preferred to 
stay where they had established missions, but early reports from Japanese occupied 
areas suggested that they would face difficult times there.  Missionaries were rarely 
directly assaulted, but the Japanese army made no attempt to accommodate them and 
often harassed them into leaving. As a result, most missionaries who were faced with 
the possibility of Japanese occupation chose to leave the area. There are no exact 
numbers for where the missionaries chose to go, but it appears that the majority 
returned to the United States or for reassignment outside of China. 
                                                        
77 Because the Manchurians were not Han Chinese, Manchuria was considered part of China, but also 
separate. This was reinforced by Chinese nationalism in the late 19
th
 century that portrayed the Qing 
Dynasty as foreign because it originated in Manchuria.  When the Japanese invaded Manchuria, Chiang 
Kai-shek ordered the armies there not to oppose the Japanese, hoping to avoid provoking them into an 
advance further into China.  In 1936, he was forced to change his policy, but did not actually declare 
war on Japan until the 1937 invasion into the rest of China. 
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Missionaries who stayed in Japanese territory had little protection except that 
they were citizens of a country that the Japanese did not want to antagonize needlessly. 
Japan’s aggressive moves in China had been successful in part because American 
support for China was almost completely rhetorical. No good could come from 
provoking the United States to action, so there was no orchestrated policy against 
missionaries.  Their lives were difficult under Japanese rule, but there was little 
danger. That changed dramatically on Dec. 7, 1941. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor 
and was at war with the United States, all Americans in Japanese occupied territory 
were sent to internment camps. Conditions were difficult, with limited clothing, food 
and fuel for warmth.  They were essentially prisoners of war. A few died and most saw 
their health deteriorate.   
The United States, along with many other western countries, did make one 
official change in missionary status in China during the war. As part of the war effort, 
the United States abrogated the unequal treaties in 1943, which meant that 
missionaries were subject to Chinese law for the first time in a century. This was 
meant to demonstrate the justice of the war while also boosting the morale of the 
Chinese army.  A side effect was that missionaries were no longer guaranteed access to 
China. This had no immediate effect, however. Because Japan controlled the entire 
Chinese coast, missionaries in Free China could not have left even if the Chinese 
government had wanted them out.  Missionaries and mission boards were aware that 
the protection provided by the unequal treaties was a double-edged sword. The 
protection of the treaties was comforting, but it undermined their claim to try to help 
China while giving support to the charge that they were imperialist agents. Many 
welcomed the change in status, hoping it would give a boost to the success of their 
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missions. Few, if any, thought that the Chinese government would ever use its 
regained authority to limit the access of Protestant missionaries. 
When the war ended in 1945, missionaries were released, but most did not 
immediately resume their missions.  Instead they returned to the United States for rest 
and rehabilitation.  Even missionaries who had gone to Free China wanted to return to 
the United States, having been cut off from it for almost eight years.  Because there 
were no immediate replacements for them, many had to wait another year or two for 
their furloughs.  It was not until late 1946 that missions began to return in large 
numbers to resume normal operations. 
Conclusion 
From the signing of the Treaty of Wanghia until World War II, American 
missionaries operated under the shield of the unequal treaties.  While they saw 
themselves as protectors of the Chinese people, their protected status and arrogance 
towards Chinese culture meant those they hoped to convert viewed them with 
suspicion. The small amount of converts and the occasional violent outburst against 
Christians is testament to the hostility missionaries faced.  They had the advantages of 
providing good education and medical services, but that was not enough to overcome 
the deep rooted distrust most Chinese held for them.   
Coupled with the hostility from the Chinese was the crisis of conviction among 
missionaries caused by the division between modernists and fundamentalists. This 
crisis was sparked by the publications of Darwin and of higher criticism of the Bible. 
It was exacerbated in the 1930’s by Pearl Buck’s speech and the publication of 
Rethinking Missions. Although most of the debate between modernists and 
fundamentalists took place in the United States, missions were at the heart of it.  
Churches and the missionaries they supported divided between focusing on 
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evangelizing to help the Chinese find salvation and serving their physical needs while 
helping them find God in a broader sense.   
The result was that after the end of WWII, missionaries were in a very 
vulnerable position. They were no longer protected under the unequal treaties but the 
resentment those treaties engendered had hardly lessened.  They were also divided 
amongst themselves by purpose, method and doctrine.  Nevertheless, they returned to 
China after the war in large numbers and with great optimism, not knowing that their 
most difficult trial was waiting just around the corner.  Chinese Communism would 
soon be on the march.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Protestants will be Protestants: The Split of Missionary Opinion on the 
 Chinese Civil War 
  
In the Kurt Vonnegut short story, a recently retired man reunites with a college 
friend who has just returned to the United States after spending forty years as a doctor 
in China.  The retired man, who had only ever left the United States for a cruise, says, 
“There’s nothing wrong with Asia that a little spunk and common sense and know-
how won’t cure.”  His friend replies, “I’m glad it’s that easy. I was afraid things were 
more complicated than that.”78 This story, published in 1952, illustrates the limited 
understanding that Americans at home had of China.  Americans in China saw a more 
complicated picture.   
The State Department claimed to control relations between the two countries, 
but it was the Americans on the ground in China who manned the front lines of that 
relationship.  Missionaries were most often the Americans on those front lines because 
of their presence across the countryside as well as the cities.  As such, they were the 
most frequent point of contact between the two cultures.  
Missionaries approached their relationship with the Chinese in a very different 
way than did the State Department.  Although some were interested in Chinese 
politics, their main goal was the expansion of Christianity in China and so their 
decision making process focused on promoting their missions.   
This chapter argues that from 1947 to 1949, missionaries split on how to 
choose sides in the Chinese Civil War with an eye to protecting the Christian 
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enterprise in China.  Siding with Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang (GMD), or 
Nationalist Party, seemed the obvious choice.  It was committed, at least rhetorically, 
to representative government.  During World War II, it had been closely allied with the 
United States because of its opposition to the Japanese during World War II.  Perhaps 
most important was the fact that many leaders of the GMD were Christian, including 
Chiang, his wife, and her entire family.  In contrast, the Chinese Communist Party was 
dogmatically atheist and was connected to the totalitarian Soviet Union.   
Despite the seemingly clear choice to support the GMD, many missionaries 
chose the risky strategy of seeking an accommodation with the CCP.  Their reasons 
were diverse, but usually fell in to one of three areas: pragmatism, frustration with 
GMD corruption, and optimistic views of how the Communists' egalitarianism would 
dovetail with the social gospel of Christianity. While backing the CCP might not seem 
to be pragmatic, continuing to back the GMD also carried substantial risk. If 
missionaries were to actively support it and then it were to collapse, as seemed 
probable, the CCP would likely become even more antagonistic towards missionaries. 
Finding accommodation with the CCP was the only way to avoid being driven from 
China.  In addition, because of the GMD’s endemic corruption and apparent apathy 
toward the welfare of its people, many missionaries saw the CCP as choosing the 
lesser evil.  Communist policies were at least trying to promote equality and the 
Chinese people’s well-being. 
Missionaries’ choice of whom to back tended to reflect the kind of work they 
did in China and their perception of their mission. Those whose primary work was 
gaining converts to Christianity continued their strong support for Chiang. Southern 
Baptists missionaries largely fell into this group, but missionaries doing evangelical 
work for other denominations joined them. On the other side, missionaries devoted to 
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the social gospel, meaning those doing service work for the Chinese people, were 
more willing to seek accommodation with the CCP.  Presbyterians, Congregationalists 
and Methodists were the largest groups that emphasized the social gospel, so their 
members were much more likely to view the Communists sympathetically. 
The Changing Crisis 
By the time Japan invaded China in 1937, American missionaries had been a 
presence in China for nearly a century.  They had weathered many crises, but none 
was as prolonged or wide-spread as the Second Sino-Japanese War. For eight years, 
missions withered from lack of personnel, resources and freedom to operate.  During 
the war, there was almost no mission work at all in the north and east.  After the 
Japanese surrender in World War II, American missionaries rushed back to China to 
resume their interrupted work.  By 1947, they were returning in large numbers, with 
an estimated 2,000 missionaries in China by the end of the year.  Although China had 
been devastated by the war, missionaries hoped that those hardships would offer an 
opportunity to greatly expand the Christian enterprise in China.79   
Missionaries’ letters back to their congregations had a remarkably consistent 
form for 1946 and most of 1947. They describe the enormous progress they had made 
in a terrible situation where more resources were desperately needed. One letter from a 
mission in the interior of China described, “New life, new energy, new hope come 
with the Spring.” It later described a sermon where the pastor “was cheered by the 
spirit of the loyal service on the part of all striving to carry on in the face of desperate 
handicaps.” The author goes on to suggest how additional resources could accomplish 
so much.  Quoting the pastor, he writes “Forgetting the things which are behind and 
                                                        
79 The cliché that the Chinese character for “crisis” is made up of the characters for “danger” and 
“opportunity” has been used ad nauseum in recent years.  That assertion is not correct, as 
“opportunity” is not included in the character for “crisis”. Nevertheless, the idea behind it is a 
popular one and is one that the American missionaries in China would have embraced. 
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stretching forward to the things which are before [let us] press on toward the goal to 
the prize of the high calling of God in Jesus Christ.”80 Dr. BJ Cauthen wrote to the 
Southern Baptist Convention that China had been so ravaged by the Japanese that if 
rebuilding China took only five years, “we shall be most grateful.” He then praised the 
Chinese Christians for assisting their fellow man, but called for more funds and 
manpower to ease their burden.81   
Members of the China Inland Mission (CIM), one of the most fundamentalist 
missions in China, took a similarly optimistic view. Its General Director, Frank 
Houghton, wrote a pamphlet called “Not Chaos but Opportunity.”  Houghton had been 
visiting the United States during the attack on Pearl Harbor and could only return to 
China in 1946.  The pamphlet, which he wrote immediately after returning to China, 
argued that while the political situation was unstable, it had been unstable for the 
previous thirty-five years. Most of China was more stable in 1946 than at any time in 
the 20
th
 century.  “I have just been reckoning that at least eighty percent of our work is 
unaffected by the political situation.”  He suggested that only the missionaries' efforts 
in northeast were affected by the civil war.  For the rest of China, the chaos of the war 
had reaffirmed the faith of Chinese Christians and opened many other Chinese up to 
hear the gospel.  Missionaries were presented with a great chance to bring more 
people to Christ. Houghton used his discussions with other missionaries as evidence. 
“'We have never had such opportunities’ is a phrase which constantly occurs in letters 
from missionaries in city and country, among men and women, literate and illiterate. It 
is not merely a time for seed-sowing; there is a harvest waiting to be reaped.”82 
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Two others members of the China Inland Mission working in Anhui province, 
Herbert and Winnifred Kane, gushed with joy upon their return to China at the 
beginning of 1947. Winnifred writes about a trip she made to the countryside where, 
“Everywhere we have gone, with one or two exceptions, the story is one of perennial 
revival.”  In the same letter she described a meeting. “The worship hall wouldn’t begin 
to hold the crowd that gathered; so we preached from a specially constructed platform 
in the open courtyard. Thinking most of the listeners were just curious onlookers, I 
gave a gospel message. Imagine my surprise when at the close of the service I 
discovered that they were all believers.”83  A few months later, the Kanes looked 
more at physical reconstruction, describing the terrible ravages of the last nine years. 
They also described the great work that was being done by missions to repair the 
damage. They wrote that six new day care centers had been opened and ten million 
dollars in direct aid was distributed.  They added, “Praise the Lord, the worst is 
over.”84 
The reconstruction work the Kanes described was done in cooperation between 
missions and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA).  
Founded in 1943, the UNRRA was a rebuilding fund for Allied countries devastated 
by invasion.85 It was largely funded and run by the United States Government 
although most Allied nations approved of it. Lacking sufficient personnel on the 
ground, the UNRRA usually worked with charitable organizations to distribute its aid. 
In China, which was the largest recipient of its aid, most of the charitable 
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organizations recognized by the UNRRA were missions, so missionaries worked 
closely with the UNRRA on reconstruction projects in 1946 and 1947.  The agency 
shut down for the most part at the end of 1947, with most of its funding being 
redirected into the Marshall Plan, so the alliance between missions and the UNRRA 
was short lived. The Kanes' optimism on rebuilding China was no doubt influenced by 
the extra resources they had through the agency's brief life.86 
Ruth and Wesley Day returned to China in 1947 after evacuating in 1941. Day 
was the son and grandson of Methodist ministers. He earned a bachelor’s degree in 
theology, but had not completed seminary before going to China as a missionary.  He 
and his wife worked primarily in evangelization, although both worked in education as 
well.  They were ecstatic to “be in our own home again” in northern China in the 
middle of 1947.  They were impressed that the church appeared to have thrived in 
their absence.  Chinese Christians and Norwegian missionaries who had remained in 
Kalgon87 had kept the church going and began expanding it after liberation from the 
Japanese.  They wrote “The Kalgan church, with excellent attendance and interest, and 
our Kalgan school, with over 300 students (more than ever before), speak of their 
industry and our mission hopes here.”88 Rather than needing to rebuild their mission, 
they could plan an immediate expansion of their church. 
However, with every silver lining comes a dark cloud. Japan’s surrender 
allowed missionaries to return to China, but also ended the truce between the CCP and 
GMD.  They had agreed to form a common front against the Japanese during the war. 
In reality, neither side did much major fighting against the Japanese because they were 
saving their strength for the post-war showdown.  One American adviser to GMD 
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leader Chiang Kai-shek said that he lost any desire to fight the Japanese on December 
7, 1941.  From then on, he was content to let the United States do the fighting so that 
he could focus on the Communist threat.  As almost everyone expected, the united 
front lasted exactly as long as the Japanese threat. By 1946, there was open fighting 
between the two sides. 
General George Marshall, President Franklin Roosevelt’s chief military adviser 
during World War II, tried to negotiate a coalition government between the two sides 
throughout 1946. Unfortunately for Marshall’s mission, the distrust between the two 
sides was too deeply engrained for any compromise or cooperation. In addition, each 
side thought that they had the upper hand in the impending conflict.  Marshall’s 
withdrawal from China in early 1947 was the last serious attempt to stop the Chinese 
Civil War from engulfing the country. 
The renewal of the conflict was a disaster for missionaries’ plans, but it was 
not a complete surprise, especially for missions in the northeast.  Frank Houghton’s 
publication, The Days, noted in their letters that most country churches were in 
Communist controlled territory.  It argued that China was mostly safe and stable, but 
he acknowledged that the Northeast was more dangerous.  Alice Reed, a Presbyterian 
missionary in Tungshien just outside of Peiping89, saw communist raids and 
destruction by the first week of 1947.90 From a more removed position, the 
Presbyterian Secretary in Hong Kong, E.E. Walline, wrote to the head of the 
Presbyterian Missions Board in New York to describe the situation across China.  In 
that May 1947 letter, he included a section on northern China: “…reports from 
communist held territories show an increasingly bad situation there.”91 Yet most of 
his reporting was on rebuilding missions and increased mission activity.  For returning 
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missionaries, the Communist insurrection was only a problem in one area, leaving the 
rest of China an open field for the expansion of Christianity. 
As of early 1947, their initial assessment that the worst was over seemed 
reasonable, but that image would not last long. The actual fighting was restricted to 
the northeast, but the ripples from the fighting were already being felt across the 
country.  By the end of 1948 the Civil War would devastate the country and destroy 
the stability that missionaries were counting on.  Some missionaries were quicker than 
others to understand the depth of the crisis, but even those who realized the danger 
early on had almost no way to influence it.  Most of them considered the missionary 
project in China to be so important that they could not withdraw to safety.  Instead, 
they tried to use their few levers of influence to find a feasible way to continue their 
work.   
This led many missionaries to support Chiang Kai-shek’s GMD.  Chiang had  
been a US ally against Japan and recipient of enormous U.S. aid during World War II.  
Although his war record was hardly covered in glory, he did tie up over a million 
Japanese soldiers in China, reducing the resistance the American military faced in the 
Pacific.  The fact that Chiang was a Christian made him much more appealing to 
missionaries. Several key members of Chiang’s leadership council, including two of 
his brother-in-laws, were also Christian.  The GMD’s Christian leadership was a 
powerful draw for missionary support. 
Yet the GMD did not live up to its promises.  Chiang professed a love for 
democracy, but did not tolerate any dissent among his lieutenants or expressions of 
anything but patriotism and loyalty from the Chinese people.  His commitment to 
Christianity was similarly lacking in application. He developed a relationship with 
Christian leaders, but seemed to care more about destroying the Communists than 
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about improving the lives of the Chinese people. Besides the crushing taxes, the 
brutality of his police force was amply documented. In one well-publicized episode, 
he buried six dissidents alive, to which his sister-in-law Soong Ching-ling said, “There 
is Chiang’s supposed Christianity.”92 
Many missionaries who were disheartened by Chiang still sought to support 
the GMD by condemning Communism.  They usually emphasized that Communism 
was antithetical to Christianity and therefore must be resisted at any cost. They 
preached against Communism to their congregations, but their main hope for influence 
was in writing home to their friends and families. The Christian presence in China was 
very small so its direct influence within the country was very limited.  However, 
missionaries could use their experience in China as a lever to encourage Americans 
back home to push the United States Government (USG) for a drastic increase in 
support for the GMD.   Missionaries’ views carried  weight because their presence on 
the ground gave them legitimacy while their charitable work gave them moral 
gravitas.  Missionaries hoped that their exhortations might influence American policy 
which could in turn affect the future of China.   
Even with seemingly clear reasons to support Chiang, many other missionaries 
believed that finding a way to work with the Communists was necessary.  These 
missionaries tended to be those in service fields, which had frequent encounters with 
the sweeping corruption of the GMD run government agencies.  They believed that the 
CCP had to be a better alternative than the massively corrupt and incompetent GMD.  
These missionaries grew in number as the tide of the war turned against the GMD.  By 
1947, missionaries in China knew that the CCP was unlikely to be eliminated in the 
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near future. Missionaries had to deal with them or give up on their vision of an 
established Christian community in north China.  By the end of 1948, it looked as 
though the CCP would soon control most, if not all of China, turning the question of 
continuing to support Chiang from a rhetorical issue to one with concrete 
repercussions.  Missionaries committed to the social gospel felt a sense of urgency to 
find an accommodation with the CCP, but they faced some serious obstacles.  
Rose Colored Glasses and/or Blind Spots 
Missionaries understood China better than most Americans, but there were two 
areas where they consistently underestimated the problems they would face: 1) the 
Chinese people generally associated them with imperialism. 2) The Chinese had no 
tradition of separation between church and state.  As Chapter One discusses, 
missionaries faced constant hostility from the Chinese people for being heterodox to 
traditional Chinese beliefs.  Missionaries recruited from the margins of society, while 
better off Chinese generally avoided them.  They were the face of imperialism 
attacking China.  They were the only westerners many Chinese would ever see, so 
they represented western aggression.  To the average Chinese citizen, nationalism 
aimed at restoring China’s strength, while missionaries represented China’s weakness.  
For many Chinese, missionaries were more than just symbols of imperialism. 
They were tools of foreign aggression, aiming to sap China’s strength from inside.  
CCP propaganda claimed that it would restore China to greatness, contrasting its 
strength to the weakness of the GMD.  Inadvertently supporting this message was the 
Christian credo, which preached love and peace.  Chinese nationalists viewed this as 
encouraging weakness and passivity.  If the Chinese adopted Christian values, foreign 
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powers could exploit China with no resistance. They argued that China could regain its 
place in the world only through forcefully evicting the foreign aggressors.93   
Missionaries always had trouble understanding how they stood in regard to 
Chinese nationalism. They viewed themselves as trying to help the Chinese people 
save themselves. The Chinese took advantage of their education where they could, but 
saw their presence and their religion as an obstacle to China’s greatness.  Five years of 
missionaries working without the safety of the unequal treaties could not make up for 
the resentment inspired by a century of gunboat-enforced protection. 
The second blind spot for missionaries was the assumption that the separation 
between church and state was a universal principle, despite the fact that it was unusual 
outside of North America. American missionaries took it as a given that this separation 
was applicable everywhere, not understanding how specific it was to the United 
States. European missionaries had a similar view.  Although many European nations 
had an official church, their missionaries came from a tradition of religious toleration, 
which they also assumed would be best for China.  
The Protestant Reformation itself was based on the primacy of the Bible over 
tradition, giving each person the right to interpret scripture for themselves. Implicit in 
that principle is that individuals, not the government, were responsible for their own 
salvation.  Government interference could put that salvation in jeopardy.  Most 
governments in Europe were very slow to give up power over religion, with a slow 
movement towards religious toleration over the course of several centuries.  England 
allowed freedom of conscience but still persecuted dissenters into the twentieth 
century.  Dissenters from the seventeenth century were the founders of American 
colonies.  The American identification with those colonists remains so strong that they 
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are celebrated on Thanksgiving, despite having arrived in North America over a 
decade after earlier colonists who immigrated for economic reasons.94 
In addition to the Protestant tradition of individual responsibility and 
conscience, American also inherited a philosophical tradition from England that 
reinforced the principle of church and state being separate.  Although many 
philosophers have mused on the role of religion in society, John Locke is often 
credited as the first in early modern Europe to articulate that the government has no 
role in religion. He was not alone, as many other European Enlightenment thinkers 
offered similar views.  Their influence was clear in the drafting of many of the United 
States’ founding documents.  Thomas Jefferson praised Locke as his inspiration when 
he wrote The Declaration of Independence and The Virginia Statue on Religious 
Freedom.  When the United States Constitution was written in 1787, its authors were 
strongly influenced by both Enlightenment and Reformation ideas, enshrining the 
separation of Church and State in the First Amendment.  That tradition has become so 
strong that American missionaries did not even question it.  Most believed that it was a 
basic human right that all good governments must respect.95   
Most missionaries did not realize that they carried this bias, just as they did not 
understand how they were viewed by the average Chinese person.  These blind spots 
would continue to hurt them in both gaining converts and dealing with the chaos of the 
coming war.  Even though missionaries in the 1940’s were much more sensitive to 
Chinese culture and the feelings of the Chinese people than their nineteenth century 
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predecessors had been, they still did not fully grasp their position in China.  As they 
mapped out strategies to keep the missions alive, they were operating from a 
fundamentally flawed assumption of how they fit into Chinese society. 
Guomindang Economic Policy 
Houghton’s assertion that the fighting was only in the northeast was true in 
1946, but the effects of the war rippled across China long before the fighting did.  By 
1947, the GMD was bringing in between fifteen and thirty percent of the funds that it 
spent, forcing it to print more and more money. Inflation was soon out of control.  The 
resulting economic crisis was a clear sign to all missionaries that the war would affect 
all of their missions and that the stability they hoped for in 1946 was fleeting.  
By the middle of 1947, inflation was devastating to the Chinese economy. The 
Nanking University price index showed that prices in July 1947 were one million 
percent above prewar levels.96 A year later prices had risen an additional 8500 
percent.97 All of China faced the problem of rising prices regardless of how close they 
were to the fighting.  Missionaries suffered less than the Chinese because they were 
usually paid in US dollars, but they saw the effects on the people they were trying to 
help.  One Southern Baptist missionary wrote that although “famine is no longer 
stalking the land”, inflation could cause starvation just as easily.98  Other missionaries 
wrote about how crushing inflation was to their workers, whom they could no longer 
pay a living wage.  Mary Reed Dewar, a Congregationalist working in the interior of 
China, commented: “One wonders how high inflation can go.”99 She later expressed 
guilt for being able to afford food when most Chinese could not.100  
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This economic crisis thoroughly undermined the GMD’s credibility with the 
Chinese people as well as many missionaries.  The government tried to stem inflation 
in July, 1948 by introducing a new currency, the “Golden Yuan”, but rampant printing 
quickly undermined it as well.  Two Methodist missionaries, Carol and Horace Dewey, 
complained that the government tried to halt inflation by setting prices, but then 
charged black market prices itself.101  This was not surprising because of the endemic 
corruption among GMD officials. They could not afford to use the official rates 
because it would cut into their personal profits.  With the failure of the Golden Yuan, 
the GMD financial system appeared doomed.102  Victor Hayward, a British Baptist 
writing from Shanghai to the FMC in the summer of 1948, observed: “The cost of 
living has almost doubled in the last two weeks…No one has any confidence in the 
ability of the Government to stop the inflationary process, or to avert the final 
economic collapse.”103  
Missionaries like the Dewey’s and Mary Dewar generally wrote back circular 
letters to friends and family to update them on their work. Their views on the Chinese 
economy would reach their home congregation, the sponsoring congregation, and a 
few others with whom the letters were shared.  Hayward’s carried a different weight to 
it.  As the Secretary of NCC in China, he was writing to the Foreign Missions Board 
of North America to give a report on the situation. The Board’s job was to use that 
information to plan for the future.  Hayward was trying to give as accurate an 
impression as possible so that the Board could make informed decisions.  His 
suggestion of an impending collapse was a large red flag for them. 
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E. E. Walline, the Presbyterian Secretary who was based in Shanghai in 1947, 
gave his board similar observations.  He related a conversation between Bruce 
Copeland and U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart. He said that Stuart “was not at 
all optimistic about the Nationalist cause and feared that there might be an economic 
collapse before many months unless large new factors entered into the picture.”104  
Walline became more flippant after a couple more months of inflation: “Today the 
exchange rate is approaching $100,000 to one cent UC and $100,000 notes are being 
put into circulation. Nuf sed!!”105 Throughout 1947, most reports to the United 
States, like those of Hayward and Walline, focused first on inflation. 
GMD taxes and conscription put an enormous burden on the average Chinese 
citizen.  In the inland province of Shanxi, governed by a warlord affiliated with the 
GMD, farmers were taxed all of their product in 1948 as well as being conscripted for 
manual labor for fortifications.106   Every person in the city of Taiku was forced to 
carry 50 bricks 5 miles each day to build fortifications for the city. Most people had to 
make the trip about 4 times a day because of the weight of the bricks.  They scarcely 
had time or energy for their own work. In addition, they had to go to educational 
meetings about the evils of communism where they had to confess any ties they had to 
communists.  Mary Reed Dewar, a Congregationalist, wrote that the warlord had 
“adopted so many of the Communists’ tactics that one hardly knows which is 
worse”.107 
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Support for GMD 
Even with the economic problems of GMD policies, many missionaries were 
committed to supporting Chiang against the CCP.  He was not ideal, but they remained 
convinced that he was better than the alternative.  Most missionaries returning to 
China believed that the GMD desperately needed to reform itself to better serve the 
Chinese people and to fight the Communist threat.  The NCC initiated a “Forward 
Movement” in 1947 that was aimed at the moral regeneration of the GMD and China. 
It planned to jump start that regeneration with an increase in evangelization. Christians 
in China were “to win men and women to Christ and to devoted membership of His 
Church, to purify and strengthen the moral life of the nation”.108  
Moral regeneration had to be accompanied by reform in the government.  
Expansion of Christianity in China would have little impact if the GMD did not do 
something to implement the Christian ideals of its leader and end its endemic 
corruption. Even Congressman Walter Judd, who was a former missionary to China 
and was rabidly anti-communist, admitted that “No true friend of China denies the 
need for administrative reform….”109 One China Committee report said that for the 
government to restore peace and prosperity to China it had to end corruption and 
special privileges and “demonstrate a genuine interest in the welfare of the people”, 
something it appeared to have no inclination to do.110  
In July 1947, Christians in China, both missionaries and Chinese, held a 
conference to discuss how best to expand Christianity in China despite the increasing 
chaos in the country.  Many of the speakers saw the primary impediment was not 
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Communism, but GMD corruption. Yet even as several of the speakers condemned 
GMD corruption, their aim was reform, not revolution.  One Chinese observer wrote, 
“Many of the criticisms of the government are offered by well-wishers, people who 
detest the Communists but who do want to see an improvement in the Government.” 
The ideal outcome was a better GMD, not its replacement.  He later wrote, “The 
people think the situation is hopeless… Yet some still cling to the faith that the 
government cause will prevail.”111 Given the GMD’s previous failures to reform and 
the consistently derisive tone of the conference, faith in the government may have 
been more hope than expectation. 
The one basis for hope, according to most of the speakers, was Chiang Kai-
shek.   Almost all of the calls for support for the GMD included effusive praise for 
Chiang.  Judd was particularly generous with his praise, saying that Chiang will 
eventually be known as “one of the greatest men of his age”.112  Many missionaries 
considered him China’s only hope.  He was a hero for his political work in reuniting 
China and for his faith.  His beautiful and charming wife, educated in the United 
States, helped him put on a remarkable front for Americans. 
Soong May-ling, commonly known as Madame Chiang Kai-shek, was a key 
factor in swaying missionary opinion towards Chiang.  Her father was a Chinese 
Christian educated at an American seminary before returning to work in China.  Her 
sister had married Sun Yat-sen, often known as “the Father of Modern China.” 
Madame Chiang grew into a star in the Christian community in the United States. She 
was beautiful, elegant and witty.  During World War II, she spoke on American radio 
shows and addressed a joint session of Congress to urge greater support for her 
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husband’s regime. Her sophisticated manner and often-expressed Christian faith made 
her an icon of China’s potential.  Both in China and in the United States, Madame 
Chiang became the most important spokesperson for the GMD. Even missionaries 
who thought less of Chiang Kai-shek generally spoke well Madame Chiang.113 
The perception of the Chiangs was at the heart of missionaries’ hope for a non-
communist China.  Their strength would regenerate China.  Only through their 
leadership was it possible for China to rebuild itself.  There was, however, an element 
of wishful thinking about Chiang Kai-shek.  Missionaries who were the most anti-
communist were usually those with the highest opinion of Chiang.  Given their 
commitment against the CCP, Chiang provided the only possible hope for success.  As 
such, they saw his qualities through rose-colored glasses. 
           Anti-Communism 
The fear of Communism was at the heart of many missionaries’ support for the 
GMD.  They dreaded what would become of the Christian enterprise in China if the 
CCP gained control.  They believed that they could not negotiate with the CCP 
because the party’s ideology was incompatible to Christianity. Even if the Communists 
said they were willing to allow them to continue their missionary work, they could not 
be trusted. The CCP believed only in force, not the rule of law or honoring its 
commitments.  This fear was particularly strong for missionaries in northern China 
who were close to the front lines but still in GMD lands.   
Frank Connelly had been a Southern Baptist missionary in China for over three 
decades.   He had worked through the disturbances of the 1920’s and evacuated during 
World War II, but he saw Communism as a much graver threat.  He wrote that as 
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“Communist bandits surround us. It is clear that there can be no compromise with 
them.” He went on to say that “Communists hate Americans and hate Christianity 
because they don’t like any ‘thought’ that considers the individual. Thus, while loudly 
professing democracy and freedom of religion, they deny it all in practice.”114 
Connelly’s fears were focused on the absolute incompatibility between Communism 
and religion, particularly Protestantism, where individual interpretation was so 
important.  
Horace Dewey, a Methodist minister who had also spent three decades in 
China, had similar fears, particularly about Communist fanaticism. He said, “These 
Communists don’t believe in God. They don’t believe in anything. They know.” He 
went on to say that you cannot reason with a Communist because they cannot 
conceive that their knowledge is wrong.  He finished with “You may theorize all you 
want about Communism from a distance, but when you contact Communists, you 
contact hatred and lies.”115 Dewey viewed Communism as the antithesis of Protestant 
Christianity.  There could be no faith or knowledge of God without independent 
thought. He feared his work with his congregation would be impossible under 
Communist rule. 
Winnifred Kane had first-hand experience with “the Reds.”  The Anhui 
province village, where she and her husband preached, was near the front lines in 
1947.  It changed hands repeatedly during the summer, with the CCP army taking it 
several times, but unable to hold it.  Most of the battles were outside of town, so they 
rarely saw much fighting, but they did hear gunfire from time to time.  After one 
Communist takeover in late June, she described the looting that occurred until the 
political officers arrived and promptly gave orders to shoot looters.  Rather than view 
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the looting as exceptional, she thought it was more likely the norm. The political 
officers were simply putting on a good show. After a public meeting in their chapel, 
Kane wrote, “Of course, it sounded good; but nobody expects them to live up to their 
promises once they gain possession.”116  
The stories of what the CCP was doing to churches in “liberated” territory 
were replete with beatings, property confiscation and occasionally murder.  Yet in 
typical rumor mill fashion, no one could quite say where the story came from or who 
said it. A report from Chefoo in CCP territory demonstrates this phenomenon.  The 
report says that things were difficult under CCP control because of heavy taxes (which 
the church had been exempt from under the GMD), but that they were managing to 
keep the church going.  Then it says that they are the exception and that rural churches 
were completely shut down.  The report seems to take this as fact despite earlier 
saying that communications between churches were quite difficult so he had not 
gotten any first hand reports.117 The unconfirmed stories always seemed to be worse 
than the reality, but that did not stop missionaries from accepting them as the 
Communists drew near. In reality, the majority of the rural parishes were, in fact, shut 
down, but some were left open.  The more senior and educated cadres were assigned 
to newly liberated cities, leaving less experienced cadres to the rural areas.  These 
more recent recruits to the CCP often had more enthusiasm than understanding of 
party policy, causing them to shut down Christian churches despite CCP calls for 
religious freedom.  Other churches were shut down inadvertently when restrictions on 
missionaries’ movements meant that there was no clergy available to minister to the 
more remote ones.  There are almost no cases of American missionaries being 
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physically abused until late 1950. Even then, direct abuse of missionaries was very 
rare.  
There were some more concrete stories, however.  One report described a 
Chinese Christian minister in Communist controlled territory who was hauled before 
the court for not producing his own food.  The CCP did not accept having dedicated 
clergy living off contributions from their parishioners.  The report quotes a cadre as 
saying, “You are not a productive worker. You have been living on the results of other 
peoples work. Now accounts must be reckoned. You must return to the church 
members what they have given you.”118 
Victor Hayward represented a more measured, but still firm, anti-communist 
pose.  Working in Shanghai, he was far from the front lines through most of 1948. He 
had no illusions about the GMD, but still considered them far superior to the CCP. In 
analyzing the immediate prospect for mission work in Shanghai, he wrote that despite 
“the ultimate collapse that seems increasingly inevitable”, the chaos of the situation is 
still better for Christian work “than would be likely under a stable communist 
regime.”119 
These missionaries represent a particular point of view in China that drew less 
from their specific denomination and more from their main work.  Connelly was a 
Southern Baptist, Heyward was a Baptist and Dewey was a Methodist.  What 
connected them, and many other fervent anti-Communist missionaries, was the 
primacy they placed on evangelization.  Although Heyward served in an 
administrative capacity as well as a minister, he, Connelly and Dewey believed that 
their primary goal in China was to convert Chinese to Christianity.  Their biggest 
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concern was the CCP gaining control over their area and curtailing their 
proselytization and preaching.   
They also shared another trait.  By writing letters to the United States, the 
missionaries hoped to influence American support for the GMD and therefore affect 
the course of China. Heyward makes an interesting case for this because he was 
British but he wrote relentlessly to the FMC as well as friends in the United States 
about the dangers that Communism posed to the missionary enterprise in China.  For 
most missionaries, their letters were read only by friends, family and members of their 
home churches. On occasion, letters would be circulated more widely and on a few 
occasions published.  Heyward, however, had a direct channel of communication with 
the FMC, which had connections in American politics.  Its members had personal 
relationships with several U.S. Senators and members of the House of 
Representatives.  On several occasions in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s members of 
the board met with the Secretary of State.  When Hayward wrote to the FMC, he was 
hoping to sway the board to use those connections.  His biggest fear, along with other 
evangelicals like Dewey and Connelly, was that Americans would decide that it was 
not worthwhile to continue support for Chiang Kai-Shek, cutting off a vital lifeline for 
his struggling regime and practically guaranteeing a CCP victory.   
Evangelical opinion on Chiang was mixed, but most of them believed he was 
the best hope for Christianity in China.  They wrote home to tell their friends about 
how terrible the CCP was. Some urged their friends to write to their congressmen and 
the President to get more aid for the GMD.  The Christian mission depended on 
Chiang and Chiang depended on the United States.  Their best hope to influence their 
chaotic environment was to get Americans to realize the danger Communism 
presented.  
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Democracy and Christianity 
Missionaries who supported the GMD also promoted the idea that Christianity 
and democracy were intricately linked together.  This idea was an obvious cultural 
import from the West but many missionaries regarded it as a natural connection.  
Democracy, like Christianity, valued the personal dignity of the individual.  
Democracy, in the American view, also allowed people a freedom of conscience and 
belief that was a prerequisite for any religious faith.  Promoting democracy was the 
only way to promote Christianity.   
Again using the rose colored glasses, some missionaries saw Chiang as the 
champion of Chinese democracy.  They were aware of his autocratic tendencies, but 
preferred to see that as a necessary evil for the challenges he was facing.  GMD 
corruption was not Chiang’s fault.  He was doing what he could to curtail it, but had to 
deal with political realities. U.S. promotion of democracy would not only assist an 
ally, but would also support the expansion of Christianity. 
In a very optimistic address called “But One Hope: An Appeal”, Christian 
leaders in Shanghai, mostly missionaries, called for peace as the only hope for China.  
Although claiming to favor neither side, the authors put much more blame on the CCP 
for its despotic tendencies.  They claimed to speak for the majority of Chinese, 
including non-Christians, in proclaiming that democracy was the way forward for 
China.  They said: “These measures have the approval of the public, for they embody 
what the people want: peace, unity, and democracy.”120  
“But One Hope” was not widely distributed outside of the Christian 
community.  It did, however, show some of the assumptions that missionaries brought 
with them as they tried to work in China, shared by both liberal and fundamentalist 
                                                        
120 “But One Hope, An Appeal”, CRP. RG8 Box 60 Folder 2, July 11, 1947.   
79 
 
missionaries. They assumed that there was a large liberal contingent among the 
Chinese who had remained silent, possibly out of timidity.  That contingent had to join 
the battle for China’s future.  “Liberals must struggle for the freedom of speech, press 
and assembly, because until these are won, democracy can have no sure foothold in 
China.”121 The authors assumed that China wanted and needed these freedoms. They 
did not bother to defend that assumption.  
While the missionary authors of “But One Hope” took the need for democracy 
as a given, Chinese Christians displayed more interest in proving the link between 
democracy and Christianity.  At a meeting in Nanking, one Chinese Christian said: 
“The gospels are a message proclaiming freedom. The Christian religion progresses 
where freedom flourishes.”122  He then discussed what those freedoms were, which 
combined some American ideals with those more popular in China.123  “China today 
especially needs freedom from disease, from ignorance, from superstition and from 
bad habits and customs.  The power of freedom is needed if China is to have 
reconstruction on a democratic basis.”124  
Another Chinese Christian emphasized that the moral regeneration of China 
could only come about with freedom and democracy.  He argued that to revive its 
morality and its fortunes, “freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were very 
necessary.” He provided a practical reason for this. He did not think the GMD plan of 
national mobilization against the CCP would work, so they must openly discuss the 
alternatives.  In addition, the process could prove an effective weapon against the 
Communists.  “Our best approach is to point out that the best answers to Communism 
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is something better.”125  These Christians accepted that democracy went along with 
Christianity. They also accepted that democracy was best for China, but they 
understood something that American missionaries were still struggling with; the 
Chinese people would not flock to Christianity or western ways simple because they 
were told to do so. They had shown indifference towards Christianity for centuries.  
Christianity and democracy must exhibit practical value if the Chinese were to 
embrace them.  By the late 1940’s, missionaries had spent decades trying to better 
understand the Chinese, but they still maintained some surprising blind spots. Chinese 
Christians were trying to help them get over that.   
Chiang Kai-shek was far from a paragon of democratic virtue, as the authors of 
“But One Hope” tacitly acknowledged.  Nevertheless, he was committed to 
democratic principles in theory, which was something that could not be said of the 
Communists.  Missionaries spent more time condemning the Communist system than 
they did praising the GMD.  These condemnations revolved around the CCP’s effort to 
suppress individuality and institute a group mentality.   After visiting a Communist 
controlled area in 1947, one missionary described Communism as antithetical to 
democracy as well as Christianity.  He wrote: “Communism is a religion – not just a 
political party. It is a Party dictatorship – men cease to be free-will agents.”126 Other 
missionaries made similar observations.  Missionaries in northern Hunan equated 
Communism with a lack of individuality.  “People are thus bereft of freedom of 
thought, speech and action. Personality is shattered and life is reduced to an 
acquiescence in Communist regimentation.”127 
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Social Gospel and Accommodation 
Not all missionaries were so vehemently anti-communist.  Those less involved 
in evangelism tended to view the CCP with less venom.  Few endorsed the CCP 
agenda or hoped for its victory, but they saw a possibility that the party would be 
better than the GMD. To these missionaries, the CCP was at least trying to improve the 
lives of the Chinese, while the GMD showed only contempt or indifference to the 
suffering of the masses.  Missionaries committed to the social gospel could see some 
similar goals in the CCP and hoped that some accommodation could be reached.  Even 
this sympathy with the CCP might have disappeared if the GMD did not appear on the 
brink of collapse.  With CCP victory imminent, many missionaries thought that 
resisting the CCP would not affect the outcome of the war, but would turn the CCP 
against Christianity when they finally took power.  
The clearest, and most powerful, example of this is John Leighton Stuart, long-
time missionary and educator in China who became the US Ambassador there in 1946.  
Stuart must have seemed like the perfect choice to the Truman Administration at the 
time, particularly for George Marshall who was trying to negotiate a coalition 
government between the GMD and CCP. Stuart was born in China and had spent most 
of this life there as a Christian educator. He eventually became the first president of 
Yenching University in Peiping. He had strong ties to the GMD and supported its 
attempts to strengthen China. He also had contacts with the CCP because some of its 
leaders had attended Yenching.  As such, he was ideally suited to help Marshall with 
his mission.128 
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Marshall’s mission would eventually fail because of mutual distrust between 
the two sides. The CCP accused him, with some validity, of supporting the GMD.  The 
United States continued to provide aid to the GMD during negotiations, hurting 
Marshall’s position as a neutral mediator.  In addition, one of Marshall’s motivations 
was GMD survival.   He was convinced that the GMD had little chance of victory in 
civil war.  He saw a negotiated settlement as the best hope for the GMD.  When it 
became clear that the negotiations had failed, Marshall returned to the United States 
believing that the GMD’s days were numbered.129  
When Marshall went back to Washington to become Secretary of State, Stuart 
was left as the American spokesman in China.  Stuart shared Marshall’s pessimistic 
view about the GMD and immediately began advocating a more conciliatory policy 
with the CCP.  Stuart was a second generation missionary in China, having been born 
there and spent most of his life there, so his knowledge of Chinese politics was not 
matched by his understanding of politics in the United States.  He continued to push 
for talks with the CCP with little regard for the growing anti-communist fervor in the 
United States or Truman’s sensitivity to looking weak.  Truman’s opponent for the 
1948 presidential election, Thomas Dewey, was lambasting Truman for his weak 
support of Chiang. Dewey promised massive aid when he became President130.  
Although most media outlets believed that Dewey would win easily, Truman edged 
him out in the election.  However, during the campaign, the last thing that Truman 
wanted was reports that his ambassador was negotiating with the enemy.  Had Stuart 
been better versed in American politics, or perhaps less committed to providing honest 
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council, he might have understood the futility in continuing to push for 
negotiation.131 
Stuart was not an admirer of the CCP, but he was a practical man.  He wanted 
to ensure missionary access to China if it came under CCP dominion.  His cables to 
Washington argued that the policy of small amounts of aid was the worst possible 
approach.  It would not save the GMD but would alienate the CCP.  Washington 
should either send massive aid, as suggested by Dewey and others, or cut it off entirely 
and start figuring out how to work with the CCP.  Neither was politically feasible in 
Washington, so Stuart’s advice was ignored.132  To add insult to injury, Stuart was 
then used as a scapegoat for the “loss of China” when the CCP finally established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
Stuart’s Presbyterian background is evident in his practical approach to dealing 
with the CCP. Of all Christian groups, they were the most uniformly interested in 
continuing their missionary work regardless of who controlled China.  A missionary 
briefing of the Presbyterian Mission Board on the political situation in China asked 
questions that got to the heart of Washington’s dilemma.  It asked: 
“a) is it really worthwhile to save the present Nanking Government?  
b) is the primary factor in the plans of the U.S. Government in relation to 
China the world struggle between the U.S. and Russia?  
c) if the State Department can decide upon what seems to be the best policy, 
can public support for such a policy be secure in view of the political 
maneuvering before the next election?”133  
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Writing to the Presbyterian Church Convention134 in late 1948, the Mission 
Board said: “Certainly it would be wrong to tie the fortunes of Christianity to any one 
political party or a particular national party.” The Presbyterian board had obviously 
recognized the new reality in China.135  
The Presbyterians were hardly monolithic in their world view, but they were 
remarkably consistent.  One very prominent Presbyterian appeared to break with the 
church’s philosophy.  John Foster Dulles became Secretary of State in 1953 with a 
decidedly anti-Communist vision. He would advocate rollback and massive retaliation 
against the Soviet Union and continued the American non-recognition of the PRC.136 
However, in the 1940’s, Dulles’s anti-communism was not so pronounced. He clearly 
had little sympathy for Communism, but he participated in several organizations 
dedicated to peace and ecumenism.  He was instrumental in founding the World 
Council of Churches, which was dedicated to Christian cooperation and ecumenism. 
He was also a member of the Committee for a Just and Durable Peace, which 
contributed to the writing of the UN Charter and UN Declaration on Human Rights.  
He consistently worked for organizations seeking to establish dialogue rather than 
confrontation.  The organizations placed a great emphasis on understanding reality and 
finding an accommodation with adversaries to prevent needless and destructive 
conflict.  The 1940s Dulles appears to be a different person than the 1950s Dulles.  
Several historians have argued, however, that Dulles did not radically change his 
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convictions. Rather, the aggressive spread of Communism made him realize there 
were limits to compromise, as did domestic political considerations.  While he was a 
private citizen, his views were for the most part consistent with those of his fellow 
Presbyterians.137 
 The China Weekly Review, a small English-language publication in China that 
was distributed mainly to missionaries, took a similar stance. In an editorial in 1948, 
they claimed that the Christian message was being disrupted by demands of the GMD.  
In their view, Christianity should be above politics.   The GMD demand for Christian 
schools to teach its propaganda undermined the Christian message.   After 
condemning GMD practices of “secret police” and “storm-trooper like Youth Corps”, 
it posed the rhetorical question: “Did any early Christian do something which he felt 
to be obviously contrary to Christ’s teaching, because it was Roman law?”138  Even if 
the GMD supported Christianity, it would be a corrupt version. 
That editorial also articulated the position of many missionaries in China. They 
wrote of the group of missionaries who, “while not exactly pro-communist, is 
certainly anti-Central Government.” It went on to discuss missionaries who 
collaborate with the GMD “who privately admit that they abhor the fascist tendencies 
of the present Government.” Its larger point was that even missionaries who worked 
with the GMD acknowledged its deficiencies. The China Weekly Review was non-
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denominational but was in accordance with the Presbyterian Board’s view that 
bending mission work to political ends undermined the Christian message.139 
Social gospel missionaries were quick to realize that the CCP was a growing 
force that must be dealt with.   In early 1947, one field supervisor of a hospital mission 
said, “I feel that if we are going to continue to work in China, either in relief or regular 
church work, we must learn to get along with these folk….So I say let us try to 
understand and if possible reach a working basis with the leaders of communist 
China.”140 In 1948, with the CCP gaining ground, YMCA Director Sherwood Eddy, 
wrote that the GMD was doomed but that Christianity will go on during CCP rule.  He 
even suggested that it was God’s will that Chiang be ousted because of his corrupt and 
wicked behavior. Even if the CCP was atheist and would restrict Christianity, its 
policies followed a more Christian path towards the welfare of the people.  He 
suggested that Christianity would end up thriving in China under Mao as it eventually 
did in Rome under Nero.141 At roughly the same time, Presbyterian missionary G. 
Gordon Maby wrote that medical and educational missionaries “will be welcomed by 
the communists and will do much to build back the goodwill which has been lost 
because of Communist misunderstanding of American plans in the past”. Maby did 
not say how he came to this conclusion, but seemed to be using his own common 
sense mixed with a healthy dose of optimism.  If missionaries provided services that 
the Communists needed but could not provide themselves, why wouldn’t they 
welcome missionary help?142  
One particularly interesting attempt at showing the compatibility of 
Christianity and Communism was a report to the International Mission Board, which 
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was a branch of the WCC and closely connected to the FMC.  In trying to show why 
there was no consensus among Christians about how to deal with Communism, the 
author argued that the two belief systems shared a similar world view.   “Christianity 
and Communism come from the same root, namely Judaism, and share a common 
passion for justice and a certain formal eschatological framework.” He went on to 
suggest that understanding Communism rather than opposing it would be a more 
beneficial plan for the advancement of Christianity.  “The character of the Chinese 
Communists is in dispute: are they full-blooded Marxists, under control from 
Moscow? Or are they liberal socialists taking Sun Yat Sen’s Three Principles a little 
further?” Understanding their character was essential to finding out if an 
accommodation could be reached.  Cooperation was much preferred to conflict, 
because when there had been conflict between Christianity and Communism, “the 
crisis has been resolved – against the Christian churches.”  He went on to say that 
because the issue was not black and white, Christians should make an effort to learn 
about the specific disagreements with Communism were and what possibility there 
was for finding compromises.143 
These missionaries had two things in common. Their work in China focused on 
the social gospel rather than evangelization and they believed that their work could 
continue under Communist rule.  Almost none of them believed that the CCP would 
allow them to continue their work unfettered, but it was definitely worth the attempt to 
try to find an accommodation with the Communists.  Their decision to find 
compromise with the CCP proved prophetic as by mid-1949, it had become apparent 
that if Christianity was to continue in China, it would be under Communism.  
Similarly to evangelical missionaries’ views of the GMD, social gospel missionaries 
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viewed the CCP with hopefulness based partly an assessment of the Communists' 
ideological stance and partly on desperation. As evangelicals glossed over the GMD’s 
failings, social gospel missionaries excused some of the CCP’s excesses.  Also like 
evangelicals' view of the GMD, they viewed the CCP as the only hope of continuing 
their work in China. The Communists were taking control of China. The only 
alternative to working with the Communists was to abandon the missions and their 
life’s work, something they were not prepared to do. 
Conclusion 
American Protestant missionaries were faced with difficult decisions during 
the Chinese civil war.  They sought a course that would allow them to continue the 
Christian mission in China, but, being from diverse Protestant churches, they could 
not reach agreement on how to proceed.  Missionaries split largely along their lines of 
work.  Evangelical missionaries essentially doubled down on the GMD.  Although 
Chiang and his party had difficulties and were far from ideal, Evangelicals believed 
that they had to back the GMD completely.  The survival of the GMD was the only 
hope for Christianity in China.  Evangelicals viewed Communism as a religion in 
itself with fanatical devotees.  It would not allow a rival to proselytize under its rule. 
Even the converts they had already gained would be in jeopardy under a Communist 
regime.  Evangelicals believed that a communist victory would be an absolute disaster 
for the Christian enterprise in China.    
On the other hand, missionaries emphasizing the social gospel took a much 
softer view of the CCP.  These missionaries usually had a more modern view of 
Christianity. They were more willing to accept other philosophies as being compatible 
with Christianity, not necessarily in competition with it. The Communists offered a 
good alternative to the GMD, which they saw as hopelessly corrupt and having no 
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interest in the welfare of the Chinese people.  The Communists were at least trying to 
improve the lives of the Chinese people and restore peace and prosperity to China as a 
whole.  Although it was avowedly atheist, CCP policies were more in line with the 
social teachings of the New Testament. On a more practical front, social gospel 
missionaries believed that GMD corruption had already doomed its rule, making a 
Communist victory inevitable.  If they wanted to continue their work, they would have 
to find an accommodation with the CCP.  They hoped that the CCP would welcome 
their work because of the useful services they provided. Missionaries and Chinese 
Christians might provide a moderating influence on the Communists after they gained 
power. 
Both sides were making decisions based as much on hope as on reason.  All 
paths were fraught with danger, so they made the decision that they felt gave them the 
best odds.  Their decisions were colored by how they viewed their missions and how 
they viewed the Chinese Communists.  Evangelicals were swayed by the spirituality 
of the GMD and CCP, rather than their actions, and so sided with a Christian in 
Chiang over the atheists led by Mao.  Missionaries devoted to the social gospel looked 
more at the practical policies of each side. They believed the CCP’s effectiveness in 
governing was their most likely path to continuing their missions.  The purpose of the 
mission ended up being the decisive factor in how missionaries understood and tried 
to navigate the Civil War in China. 
90 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Communist or Nationalist: Asking the Wrong Question 
 
Shortly after Shanghai was liberated, missionary leader Frank Price wrote: “A 
crucial question in whether the Communists will be more Communist or more 
Chinese.”144  This was the key question for missionaries in China.  They believed that 
if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were more Communist, it would proscribe 
Christianity as an “opiate of the masses”.  If the CCP put more emphasis on Chinese 
nationalism, they would probably want missionaries to stay because of the valuable 
services they provide. China had been destroyed by war with Japan and then the Civil 
War with the Guomindang. Missionaries provided medical services as well as 
education that would help return the country to prosperity and prominence.  The 
answer to this question was the key to whether the Christian missions in China could 
continue, or so they thought.   
These missionaries were swimming against the currents of the early Cold War 
on both sides of the Pacific.  While many Americans, particularly those who were 
strongly religious, saw communism as a dire threat to the United States, the 
missionaries working in Communist China were trying to find common ground so 
they could continue their work.  They acknowledged that the CCP had many failings, 
but they believed accommodation was the best way forward for Christianity in China.  
They were also fighting against the nationalist tide in China, which was raging against 
anything associated with imperialism.  The CCP was built on the promise to unite 
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China and restore its prominence in the world. Although the United States had been 
less aggressive than Europeans and Japan in encroaching on China during the previous 
century, its association with the corrupt GMD regime through the Chinese Civil War 
and its generous rebuilding of Japan had made it the primary foreign enemy in 
Communist eyes.  Missionaries were not only associated with imperialism, by 1949 
they were tied to what the CCP called the greatest imperialist enemy of China.   
Despite this, they continued to fight a losing cause.  Some of them maintained 
hope that missions would find a way survive in China. Others thought that missions 
were almost certainly doomed, but that they could not give up until defeat was certain.  
Some also hoped that the longer they stayed, the deeper Christian roots would go into 
Chinese society. Ultimately, missionaries were not officially expelled, but were 
constantly harassed by cadres and their followers.  They stayed as long as they could, 
with the final missionaries leaving when they realized their efforts were hurting the 
Chinese Christians they hoped to help.  
The Protestant missionary enterprise in China had lasted about a century and a 
quarter. Their successes had been on a small scale, making only limited impact on 
Chinese society as a whole, but they continued their struggle throughout. When the 
threat of communism loomed, they pinned their hopes on Chinese nationalism being a 
more powerful force in the CCP than was Marxism. As China fell under Communist 
control, missionaries realized that the CCP did have a strong nationalist streak, but it 
would prove to as much of a problem to missionaries as orthodox Marxism.  The 
presence of foreigners, particularly Americans, was unacceptable to a government 
whose legitimacy was based on overcoming imperialism and restoring China’s 
greatness. Those foreigners, particularly ones preaching a foreign religion that 
encouraged passivity in the face of aggression, were a constant reminder of what 
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China had suffered.  From 1949 to 1951 missionaries realized that they got the answer 
they wanted to Price’s question, but that answer forced them to leave China all the 
same. 
Initial Optimism 
As the CCP established control over most of China in 1948 and 1949, 
missionaries who had been completely against the CCP recognized the inevitable, with 
most choosing to leave the country. Some missionaries, however, decided that they 
had nothing to lose by trying to continue their missions under the Communists.   They 
thought the CCP was far from ideal and failed to live up to many of its principles, but 
working under its regime would be a far superior option to giving up the missionary 
enterprise in China altogether.   
There was significant optimism for many missionaries as they began work 
under Communist rule.  Their optimism was based on the Communist pledge to allow 
religious freedom as well as the valuable educational and medical services that 
missionaries provided.  Even with some rural cadres harassing Christians, many 
missionaries believed that their condition would improve as the CCP consolidated its 
power and enforced consistency in its ranks.  James McCallum, who had worked in 
China for nearly three decades, dismissed the problem as temporary: “Such is to be 
expected during the first days of the revolution and can be attributed to the 
misunderstanding of the lower ranks of the political workers who do not have a full 
grasp of the real government policy in regard to religious bodies.”145  McCallum was 
educated at two liberal divinity schools, Yale and University of Chicago, and had 
slowly transitioned from working on evangelization to working in medicine and 
administration.  Even more than most missionaries, he had seen terrible tragedies in 
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China.  He remained in Nanjing during the Japanese the infamous “Rape of Nanjing” 
in 1937, working to provide a safe zone for Chinese civilians.  Like other veteran 
missionaries, he probably believed that their missions had survived a lot already and 
would survive communism as well. 
Missionaries like McCallum were confident that they would be valued because 
of the services they provided to a shattered country.  The newly established People’s 
Republic of China was devastated by years of war. Even the limited facilities that 
remained were inadequately staffed.  They could not possibly meet the needs of all of 
the Chinese people.  Missionaries believed that the Communists needed them, which 
gave them some power over their situation.  They hoped that CCP pragmatism would 
allow missionaries some influence, which could temper Communist policies.  
McCallum believed that stability would naturally bring moderation.  “If they can ‘win 
the war’ and stabilize the economy in time, they may avoid any strong counter 
revolution and can proceed along the normal course of revolutions to become more 
mild and ‘constructive’ with time.”146   
Frank Price offered a more modest yet similar appraisal. “Many hundred 
missionaries have decided to stay on in Communist-occupied China….Our eyes are 
open to all the difficulties and dangers ahead, but we believe there will be many 
compensations – in new lessons to learn and new opportunities to meet.”147  Born in 
China, Price went to the United States and graduated from Yale Divinity School.  
When he returned to China, he was dedicated to evangelism, but, like McCallum, 
became more and more interested in raising China’s standard of living over the course 
of his decades there.  Price argued that spiritual growth could only occur if physical 
needs were being met.  Price became friends with the Chiangs in the 1930’s, 
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sometimes translating speeches for Chiang Kai-shek into English during the war.  He 
was part of the Chinese delegation to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, which 
would lead to the founding of the United Nations.  Unlike many of Chiang’s Chinese 
subordinates, Price would routinely urge the Generalissimo to reform his regime.  
Despite his closeness to the Chiangs, he remained focused on his overall goal, which 
was to promote Christianity in China. When it became clear that Chiang had lost 
control of the country, Price was among the loudest to call for working with the 
Communists.  His question that began this chapter and his assessment of the 
difficulties of working in Communist China show that he was driven by pragmatism 
much more than dogma.
148
 
Missionaries largely agreed that no matter how dogmatic the CCP was, it 
would not eschew help that it desperately needed, especially given its pledge of 
religious tolerance. Oswald Goulter had been a missionary in China for over 30 years.  
He believed: “Any missionary who has some specialized practical skills would be 
most welcome here and now.”149  James McCallum followed up his earlier letter with 
a similar bit of optimism: “All are agreed that things are better than we expected and 
seem to have a way of working out through rather tedious processes.”150   Another 
missionary wrote: “We have letters from all our friends in Mukden. The main news is 
that things have turned out better than the most optimistic dared to hope.”151   
Some missionaries believed that Christianity would not only be of service to 
China, but it could help moderate CCP practices.  The CCP required loyalty to the 
cause and to China over individualism or personal rights.  Missionaries hoped that the 
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work they were doing would temper these tendencies and introduce the Christian 
(meaning American Protestant) principle of the importance of the individual. A report 
from Yenching University in Beijing said: “They [Yenching] will serve as a means of 
softening and modifying the rigors of the Communist program.”152 The university was 
one of the first Christian institutions of higher learning in China. Its leadership was 
already mostly Chinese, but almost half of its faculty was still foreign.  As an 
institution, it had no choice but to stay. As a place of learning, it should be valued by 
the Communists for the technical skills it could provide. That would also provide an 
opportunity to open the minds of its communist students. Frank Price, writing from 
Shanghai at the time of its turnover in the spring of 1949, argued that Christianity 
would provide a strong voice for human rights in Communist China.  He said, 
“Christian groups will give strong support to the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Rights and work for the application of this in China.”153 After six months 
under Communism, Price’s hope had not diminished.  Perhaps from reading scripture, 
he was feeling a bit poetic: “As the streams flow together, they will modify each other. 
Let us hope that Christianity, though seemingly burring now in the new dough, will 
yet leaven it and bring about a truly democratic rural society in China.”154 
The chaos of the preceding decade may have given some extra optimism to 
missionaries and Chinese Christians.  The possibility of stability must have seemed 
too good to be true, even if it came with a potentially hostile government.  One 
missionary, writing from Manchuria three months after liberation, viewed the 
Communist victory as a grand opportunity for Christians.  “There are to be great 
changes here—tremendous expansion of the medical college to accommodate 
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thousands of students, medical students of all kinds, technicians, nurses, public health 
workers, etc.”   He later said, “there are wonderful opportunities here these days.”155  
Another missionary offered a similar view of Christianity under Communism.  He 
wrote: “I believe that a church with strong Chinese leadership and a well-planned 
social program has a bright future in China….We need a church of witness, not a 
church in retreat.”156   The 1950 Presbyterian Mission Board message to its convention 
had an even more optimistic tone saying, that there were little-to-no limits on religious 
freedom and that the only weakness of the church under the newly established PRC 
was from “timidity”.157 It implied that churches were limiting themselves in a 
groundless fear of CCP reprisals. 
H.W. Spillet saw the chaos as a golden opportunity for missionaries to prove 
their worth.  “It should be noted that a national educational policy has yet to be 
worked out. This is a transitional period. Hence the importance of Christian schools 
‘making good’ in this period.”158 He made a similar claim for hospitals.  “So, as in the 
case of schools, there is a ‘breathing space’ in which mission hospitals have an 
opportunity of demonstrating their value to the country.”159  Spillet suspected that the 
Communists might take a more hostile view to Christianity once its regime was 
consolidated. That made it more urgent to prove the usefulness of Christian missions 
before that consolidation took place.  A Chinese Christian, although less optimistic 
about the churches ability to rise to the occasion, believed that the church had an 
opportunity.  He wrote. “Dangers and unprecedented opportunities to demonstrate the 
power of the Gospel, both stare in the face of the churches. The very fact of religious 
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freedom promised and guaranteed means a great fighting chance for creative Christian 
living and witness bearing.”160 
Lewis and Margaret Smythe believed that the Communist interest in bettering 
the lives of the Chinese people dovetailed with Christian goals.  They wrote: “There is 
so much idealism for the welfare of the people in both Christianity and Chinese 
Communism, and both have so often fallen short of their respective ideals that we 
hope they will interstimulate each other to better service of the common people in the 
New China.”161 He had been educated at University of Chicago Divinity School, but 
they both worked primarily in education while in China. Their letters reflect a 
modernist view that accepts non-western views as potentially useful. Another 
missionary, Albert Stewart, working as a doctor and also showing some modernist 
tendencies, reported with great hope on the speech by a Chinese Christian doctor who 
had some contacts with the CCP: “Dr. Kiang says that in working out the relationships 
and problems between man and man we are on common ground with the Communists 
and should cooperate with them.”  Dr. Kiang also suggested that, “as Christians we 
have the relationship between man and God. This is to our advantage and should 
enable us to do better work in meeting human need than anybody else.”162  
Constance Buell had worked in education in northern China since 1919. She 
had been educated at Wellesley College, graduating a year before Soong Mei-ling 
would arrive.  Buell was skeptical of the Communists, but believed their goals were 
similar to those of Christians and were much more trustworthy than previous Chinese 
leaders.  In one letter she praised the Communists for carrying out at least some of 
their promises: “One thing they should be given credit for is the employment of 
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beggars, just where and how I don’t yet know, but there are practically none to be seen 
on the street.”163  Buell’s extensive diary shows that she was initially quite happy with 
CCP, but with reservations.
164
 
  Many missionaries believed that the CCP would accept Protestants because 
they worked for the good of China and had similar goals as the Communists.  H.W. 
Spillet, when writing a review of the newly established PRC, noted: “The methods of 
Christians and Communists are obviously very different, but it is clear that many of 
the aims of the Communists are admirable and the idealism and the devotion which 
Communists display are praiseworthy. Without compromising on essentials, Christians 
can and should do their part in the social changes that are taking place.”165  There was 
hope that the Communists would embrace Protestant missionaries in their efforts for 
change because, “Protestant Christianity is regarded as the most ‘progressive of 
religions and the most likely to be capable of “reform’.”166  James McCallum argued 
that Christianity “has won the reputation of being by and large a movement for the 
essential welfare of the Chinese people. Consequently, the Protestant phase of the 
movement is to have a number of representatives in the new People’s Political Council 
in Peiping this fall.”167 
The key issues for these missionaries were that the CCP shared similar goals 
for the people and that their desire to fulfill those goals would make them pragmatist 
instead of dogmatic Communists.  An observer in China in 1949 noted that “the 
writings of Mao-Tse-tung say that education should be conducted in a democratic 
spirit, with the scientific method and for the benefit of the masses.”  The author did 
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not believe that the benefit of the masses was the driving force. The inclusion of 
democracy and the scientific method, however, suggested that the CCP educational 
program would be less dogmatic than the missionaries had feared. The author later 
said: “Concerning the group who has taken charge in Shanghai, educators feel that 
they may be reasonable and open to suggestions insofar as these do not conflict with 
the fundamental objectives of the Chinese Communists.” (emphasis added)168 The 
ending phrase could be telling for what the observers, as well as many missionaries, 
were hoping for.  Were the “fundamental objectives” more Chinese or Communist?  If 
they were Chinese, there was much less chance that they would conflict with the 
“essentials” of Christianity that Spillet referred to.  If they were Communist, common 
ground was going to be much more difficult to find. 
The FMC tried to lay out guidelines for how missionaries should work under 
Communism in the short term.  A policy paper noted that missions “should carry on its 
institutional work as long as teachers, medical staff and other workers are not required 
to participate in unchristian teaching and propaganda.”169  They wanted missionaries 
to continue to work as best they can while remaining out of the political fray, hoping 
that the CCP would accept their non-political help.  Joseph Smith, a missionary 
associated with the Disciples of Christ who worked mainly with reconstruction in 
China, offered some hope in his assessment of the CCP. Smith was nominally a 
Presbyterian, but was strongly dedicated to ecumenism.
170
 After six months under 
Communist rule, he saw nationalism winning over Marxism. In a report on the state of 
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missions under Communism, he wrote “Mao Tze-tung has already broken from his 
Russian advisors and will do so again if expedient.”171 
Smith was somewhat unusual among the missionaries in China in that he 
believed that the CCP would be good for missions and for China, but he chose to leave 
China shortly after writing the report.  His wife and son had left the year before 
because of the Civil War and were not allowed to return, so he left for the United 
States at the end of 1949.  Upon returning to the US, he did not change his mind on 
the PRC. He became a very vocal proponent of recognition of the PRC throughout his 
career. Most missionaries who advocated working with the CCP stayed until the bitter 
end. 
Reevaluation of Christianity 
The Communist victory became a moment for reflection for missionaries in 
China.  The Communists had succeeded in building a national movement to save 
China in just twenty five years, while missionaries had failed to gain more than a 
toehold in over a century.  Even with the unequal treaties of the mid-nineteenth 
century giving them unfettered access across China, the number of Christians in China 
was negligible compared to the overall Chinese population.
172
  In addition 
missionaries had been the target of widespread violence on multiple occasions.  The 
contrast between missionary futility and Communist success forced many missionaries 
and Chinese Christians to look at what the church was doing in China and why it 
failed. Many came to the conclusion that Christian missions in China had deviated 
from a Christian path.  One report from Yenching University to the FMC said: “The 
chief effect of the new regime upon our religious life was to inspire a review of the 
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essentials of the Christian message in forms adequate to meet the challenge of 
communist ideology.  At the same time, Christians realized more clearly the need to 
revitalize the church in China.”173 
Individual missionaries also questioned what they were doing.  When one of 
her students became an ardent Communist after growing up in Church schools, 
Constance Buell wrote: “The question in my own mind was: “Where have we failed, 
that a boy of Christian (and especially Congregational) background can subscribe to 
such dictated policies?”174 Ellen Studley, long-time President of the Women’s Union 
Bible School in Beijing, wrote to a friend about a sermon she had recently heard that 
was both critical of the church and optimistic.  She whole-heartedly agreed with the 
preacher’s stance:  “His stand is, ‘I love the Church. There are many things wrong 
with it, but I want to help change it from within.” 175  
 One missionary journal published an article that offered a critical assessment 
of missionary endeavors.  It said, “If we are to scrutinize the Communist movement in 
China with the kind of objectivity just suggested, then we should be ready to 
scrutinize our own movement with the same degree of fearless objectivity.” It found 
that despite the good things missionaries had done in China, the missions had lost their 
way, saying “nevertheless, we have to admit that as the Christian movement has grown 
in magnitude, the old warmth of heart and zeal for the sacrificial service have 
degenerated into self-seeking.”  It added shortly afterwards: “We have allowed 
ourselves to be weaned away from the common man, and allied ourselves more and 
more closely with the bourgeoisie and vested interests.”  The article finished with: 
“We must recognize the nature of social revolution. Revolution comes when the needs 
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of the age are not being otherwise met.” The article was a very critical self-assessment 
of what had gone wrong with the Christian enterprise in China, trying to explain why 
the Communists had connected with the people in a way that Christianity never had. 
Its language shows an attempt to appeal to Communists or at least those who 
sympathize with them, offering a mea culpa for Christian failures possibly with an eye 
to finding an accommodation under Communist rule.
176
  
Frank Price had a very similar attitude, albeit in private correspondence.  He 
had no apparent ties to the publication, but he was so active in Chinese missions 
across the country that it is possible he had some connection.  In a letter to a fellow 
missionary, he voiced that the success of the Communists was an opportunity to learn: 
“Surely there are points of contact to be found between the Christian Church and this 
tremendous revolutionary movement.”177 Ever the pragmatist, Price sought the best 
way to advance Christianity, even taking a page from Communism. 
Spillet argued that the Communist victory in China was not unique, but 
showed the weaknesses of Christian missions worldwide.  He wrote: “Communism 
has exposed the weakness and the failures of the church. Churches in every land are 
failing in precisely the same way.” He noted the attitude of many Communists towards 
the Church: “Communists regard themselves as practicing their doctrines, in contrast 
with Christians who ‘only talk and do not practice’.”178 His larger argument was that 
the church had lost touch with the poor, in direct contrast to Jesus’s teachings.  He 
argued that the Christian church, and even the missionary segment of the church, “has 
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become predominantly middle class, and has little influence upon, or even contact 
with the workers. Communism is a ‘judgment’ on world Christianity.”179   
The problem was also noted in New York.  The FMC was asking the same 
questions from a more distant perspective.  The result was a January 1949 policy paper 
that suggested a new strategy to overcome that failure.  Its strategy paper suggested 
reaching out to industrial workers, “not only doing everything possible to alleviate 
conditions through Christian social service, but also enlisting and guiding Christian 
capitalists and managers in applying the principles of Christ to the conduct of their 
industries.”180 The policy paper was intended to help strengthen the missions’ support 
while undercutting the problems that made communism appealing. Unfortunately, it 
was sent too late. The CCP had already won the decisive battles and Chiang would 
retreat to Taiwan within a month.  It was difficult to transition this strategy under 
Communist rule because it involved working with capitalists, who were not welcome 
under Communist auspices.  Even had it been delivered in a timelier manner, it is 
unlikely to have had a significant impact, despite promoting what seems like a good 
strategy.  Protestant missionaries generally made decisions for themselves with only 
the broadest of guidance from their organizations. This sort of broad strategy was 
usually implemented only piecemeal, depending on the convictions of the individual 
missionaries involved. 
Chinese Christians were also concerned about the failure of Christianity.  Two 
Chinese leaders, T.C. Chao
181
 and Luther Shao
182
, wrote extensively on how the 
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Church of Christ in China
183
 should see this as an opportunity to reform itself.  Both 
were educated at seminaries of more liberal churches. Both were influenced by the 
ecumenical movement and saw the disunity of Protestants as a serious weakness.  Like 
many Chinese, they saw the differences between denominations as minor 
disagreements that obscured the larger truth of Christianity. They spent decades 
advocating both unifying the missionary movement and removing western trappings 
of Christianity to make the Church of Christ in China truly Chinese.  Shao actually 
saw the civil war as an opportunity for progress, writing: “Thank God for these crises. 
It is through crises that churches begin to learn to cooperate.”184 
Shao, being Chinese, was not a missionary in the traditional sense, but 
performed a very similar function. He was educated at a missionary school in 
Nanking, before going to the United States for college. He returned to China in the 
early 1930s to take a position as secretary of the NCC in Shanghai.  Shao was an 
example of the tension and cooperation between missionaries and Chinese Christians 
and missionaries. They did not always agree, but their views were often very similar.  
T.C. Chao also urged the CCC to become more Chinese.  When he returned to 
China, he became a professor and then the first Chinese Dean of Yenching University, 
replacing John Leighton Stuart who had just become US Ambassador to China.  Chao 
also believed that the Communist victory should be a time of reflection and reform in 
the Church. He wrote: “Communism is man’s challenge to Christianity, but it is also 
God’s judgement(sic) upon flabby churches.”185  Chao, like Shao, saw the disunity of 
the Church as one of its most serious weaknesses.  In a published sermon, Chao said: 
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“The various denominations have as yet not learned to co-operate with each other; 
they do not have much to do with one another, each being content to go on its own 
way. Any existing amount of self-criticism there is very small as compared with the 
need for it.  A united front has therefore yet to be achieved.”  He later writes: 
“Protestants may number above 600,000 and Catholics well above four million. 
Protestant divisions, for that tiny and scattered group, number about as many as in 
America, praise the devil!” Shao finished his sermon by suggesting that the 
Communists are doing God’s work and should be helped.  “O time! O day! Who are 
those that hear the call of God to have a change of heart, to take courage, and to work 
together with the Communists for the coming of a new heaven and a new earth? 
Blessed are they who hear, and who obey their visions.”186 
Shao and Chao were disillusioned with the complacency of Christians while 
China was being dismembered by foreigners and then by itself.  Communism offered a 
strong alternative.  One former Christian stated very blunting: “Formerly I believed 
that man can only change from evil to good with the power of Christ: but Christians 
can only talk and do not act. Now the Communist Army has truly done it.”187  Chao, 
while maintaining his Christianity, protested the gap between faith and action:  
“Nominally the Church is a fellowship of believers but when one tries to find it in the 
Church the thing is non-existent.” He went on to say: “The time calls for group 
service, while the Church drones its meaningless prayers and offers its objectless 
worship, bowing not before the Creator but revering idols that give false hopes and 
imaginary consolation.”188  Shao criticized the church on similar grounds.  He wrote: 
“The challenge of the present regime reflects the weakness of our Christian agencies. 
Let us confess our shortcomings and openly admit that we should put our theory of 
                                                        
186 Ibid. 
187 Christians under the Communist Chinese State, June 1949.. CRP. RG8 Box 60 Folder 6. 
188 T.C. Chao Letter, February 1, 1949. CRP. RG8 Box 60 Folder 6. 
106 
 
religion into practice unswervingly and immediately.  Let our Christian religion, the 
message and its manifestations, really go to the masses of the people.”189  
The January 1949 FMC policy paper again echoes the ideas of missionaries 
and Chinese Christians, from whom it got most of its information.  It said: 
“The Christian should approach the philosophy of communism with humility 
and confidence: humility because he must acknowledge repeated failures of 
Christians to live up to the teachings of Jesus; confidence because he is strong 
in the faith that Jesus Christ we have the wisdom of God and the power of God 
and that in God’s good time truth and love will prevail over untruth and hate. 
True Christianity has nothing to fear from Communism.”190 
The FMC was in a difficult position.  It was criticizing the practices of the 
missionaries it was trying to support at a time when they were in the midst of a crisis.  
The policy paper outlined a way to success based on spiritual renewal and 
rededication.  Christian failings had helped to open the door to Communist success, 
but if each missionary and the church as a whole began to live up to the ideals of 
Christianity, the negative ideology of Communism could be overcome.  It was an 
argument that appealed to those of strong faith while also maintained a modernist tint. 
It emphasized the principle that living according to the spirit of Christ’s teachings (e.g. 
loving your neighbor, working to help others) would lead to the ultimate victory for 
Christianity. 
The introspection of missionaries was sometimes dispiriting but it was also an 
opportunity to give the church some new vitality.  For the first time in living memory, 
China would be unified under a stable government.  It meant that, assuming they could 
work under the CCP, they would be able to expand and deepen the reach of missions 
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in China.  One missionary pamphlet discussed such an expansion, with an eye toward 
accepting CCP rules and demonstrating their usefulness.  “We have added an industrial 
department to the school, hoping that the students can make a little to help themselves 
in school, and have a trade later, so that they can help to support themselves while they 
are preaching.”  The CCP forbid full-time preachers in China, calling them leaches, 
making this approach necessary.  “The present regime insists that everyone produce 
something, and that none can be drones; so they quite approve such a program.”191   
Oswald Goutler implored his fellow missionaries to seize the opportunity 
presented by the Communist victory.  He acknowledged that many missionaries were 
interested primarily in saving souls. But he went on to say: 
“However, there are those who have a trend toward social and political 
liberalism and an interest in the economic equalization of society. If they are prepared 
to put their ideas into practice they would naturally feel more at home in a society with 
certain communist trends than those whose predilection is for a capitalist society. If 
one delights in associating with masses of common folk, like fishermen, carpenters, 
and tillers of the soil, the way Christ did, in spite of their ignorance, prejudice, disease 
and strong smell, and other distinguishing features, this is the place, the time and the 
need. ”192 
Some hope came from the Marxist analysis of religion. Spillet wrote: 
“Communists regard religion as a temporary phenomenon. It is the direct result of 
unsatisfactory economic conditions. When these are put right, religion will naturally 
die out.”193 Communists had no need to persecute religion because it would fade on its 
own as China prospered.  A March 3 report sent from Shanghai to the FMC saw the 
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situation as a chance to eliminate one of the banes of the missionary enterprise in 
China – association with imperialism.  The report, which appears to be a collaboration 
of several members of the NCC, argued that losing that privileged status would be to 
the benefit of Christianity. “We must, however, understand that with freedom of 
religion, there will also be freedom of opposing religion. But we may regard it as a 
blessing in disguise. Favouritism has made Christianity in China impotent to a very 
large extent.”194 
Gutting it out 
Many of those who seemed hopeful or saw opportunity were probably 
clutching at straws.  Some missionaries decided to stay, knowing that they would 
likely be forced out.  Since it was very unlikely that they would be permitted back into 
China if they left, they decided to stay and work as long as possible.  The March 3 
report to the FMC tried to balance hopefulness with realism.  It said, “So long as there 
is opportunity with which we can continue our work, it is our duty to carry on so far as 
we can.”195  It said that there was no point in unwarranted optimism, “but nor should 
we develop a kind of defeatism attitude by just inclining to hear bad reports.”196  The 
authors were clearly concerned about the missions’ future under Communism, but 
were also concerned that saying the missions were doomed would become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.   James McCallum, as eager as he usually was, acknowledged 
difficulties ahead: “The banner of Christ has never been easy to carry and it will not be 
easy in the new era in China.”197 He follows up in a later letter: “It is the feeling of the 
mission in the field and of the Foreign Division that we must stay in China as long as 
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we are permitted to stay.” He goes on to write, “If we are forced out by the 
Communists, that is a different matter, but to leave because the going is rough would 
not be understood by the Chinese Church and would be fatal for the future.”198  Oswalt 
Goulter echoes this when writing an open letter to his missionary brethren, “Certainly 
for the Christian Church to hesitate now unless forced out, would be a tragic 
confession of a lack of faith in Christ’s power to draw all men unto him.”199  
By 1949, most missionaries who had not already evacuated had decided to stay 
and take their chances.  Joseph Smith reported to the mission boards in October of that 
year: “Missionaries now in China almost unanimously want to stay on as long as they 
can.”200  Smith’s statement, perhaps ironically, was written within months of his 
departure from China. The certainty not being able to return to China drove Smith to 
leave, but it drove most other missionaries to stay.  In a report to the FMC, one 
missionary stated how logistics drove the decision: “I understand it’s not too hard to 
get a permit to leave the country but almost impossible to get one to come in—so 
we’ll just have to stay put till we decide to go for good.”201  Smith had only been in 
China for a year before World War II and two years after it.  Missionaries like Goulter, 
McCallum and Price had been there for decades.  They would not turn their back on 
their life’s work if they could possibly help it. 
The Church of Christ in China was in a crisis. While some missionaries hoped 
for a strong relationship between the church and the CCP, the threat of persecution by 
the Communist authorities loomed large. If it had any hope to survive and flourish, its 
members had to rise to the occasion.  Spillet saw the crisis: “It would seem that the 
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next ten years are of great importance to the future of the church.”202  He overstated 
the time-frame, but given the CCP’s initial statements of toleration, it would be hard to 
foresee how quickly things would go bad for missionaries.  Smith also saw a crisis, 
but acknowledged the limited influence church members could have on its outcome: 
“We can only wait and see what the good and bad results are, with our minds open and 
our methods of work flexible to meet changing conditions.”203 Luther Shao echoed the 
fears of many, but continued to have faith and hope.  Seeing the difficulties ahead, he 
said: “We know so well that we are going to face practical difficulties and even 
persecution in the days to come. No one could foretell that on the road to Damascus 
even the persecutor Saul was to be converted into the zealous Paul.”204 Pre-Christian 
Rome was a frequent reference, even among the most pessimistic Christians, because 
it demonstrated the resiliency of Christianity and gave hope that they might overcome 
persecution should it come. Albert Stewart took a psychological view of missionaries’ 
attitudes: “Some friends feel that my view is largely wishful thinking….It is, I think, 
better psychologically and emotionally for me to live and work on the first 
supposition, even though many of my hopes may not be realized.”205   
An Apolitical Christianity 
American missionaries, as well as their brethren from Canada and the United 
Kingdom, generally took freedom of religion for granted.  For Americans, the 
separation between church and state was part of the foundation of civil society, 
enshrined in the Constitution.  When missionaries went to China, they took with them 
the assumption that religion could exist outside of politics.  They knew that the CCP 
did not accept religion in any form, but assumed that it would not attack if Christianity 
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did not pose a challenge to its rule.  They believed that the good work done by 
missionaries would insulate them from criticism as long as they stayed out of politics.  
Frank Price wrote: “Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today and forever. The 
Christian message and mission is the same although in a very different setting.”206 
They failed to understand that the CCP program required all parts of life to be 
political.  If they had understood this, they would have realized that trying to get 
people to put Christianity in all parts of their life would be the very provocation they 
were trying to avoid. At a cross-denominational meeting in Shanghai, one participant 
said: “We think that religion and life should not be separated, and religion must 
permeate into our daily work. We must prove that the Y.M.C.A is for service and is not 
an agent of any group. We must also help the Church trying to be a bridge between 
church and society.”207 Another participant believed that the CCP would support 
missions because, “they realize that the Y.M.C.A. is progressive and is doing some 
practical work.”208 
Even as missionaries were trying to provide valuable educational services, they 
acknowledged that it was often a means to conversion to Christianity.  An FMC policy 
paper said bluntly: “Most strategic of all in the present emergency is the vigorous 
prosecution of literacy campaigns in which the cooperation of many governments can 
be enlisted. Literacy opens the door to the Bible and other Christian literature.”209  The 
CCP were happy to have missionaries teach Chinese people to read but did not want 
them converting anyone else.  A missionary in a liberated city demonstrated the 
fundamental disconnect between the Christian and CCP point of view.  He said: 
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“These Communist soldiers are Chinese, they love their country; surely they can be 
appealed to – some of them – by the Christian message and program.”210  This sort of 
appeal would run counter to Communist education programs, where independent 
thought took a backseat to orthodoxy.  Any attempt to counter the Communist Party 
line among the Chinese people would pose a threat to the Communist program.
211
 
Protestant Christianity and Communism overlapped on issues of social 
welfare, but diverged dramatically on the role of the individual and society.  An FMC 
strategy paper for China pushed the idea that Communist ideology was long on 
coercion but short on compassion.  Even though the PRC would probably be more 
stable than its predecessors, Communist practices meant that its people would still 
suffer spiritually.  The FMC wrote: “The Christian church must recognize that the 
people in such areas are usually in even greater need of Christian loving service and 
spiritual help than they were before the change of government.”212  
The hope for influence was given a boost with an August 1949 meeting of 
Christians in Shanghai to try to find a place for the church under Communist rule.  The 
speakers appear to have made contact with the CCP prior to the meeting. 
Unsurprisingly, they generally praised the Communists as liberators in their speeches. 
More telling, however, was the way in which the CCP was reaching out to Protestants 
through them.  One speaker said that “the Communist Party recognizes Protestant 
Christianity as a real social force, capable of cooperating in the new United Front, and 
therefore desires to win such cooperation.”  He went on to say that since Marxists 
believe that religion “will in the course of time die a natural death when the need for it 
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no longer exists, the Communist Party regards oppression of religion as such as a 
mistaken policy”.  This was as much a peace offering as the CCP would make, saying 
that although it disagreed with religion, it had no reason to act against it, especially 
since Protestant Christianity could be a useful and productive part of the PRC.
213
   
Another speaker made a similar appeal to Protestants.  He said that most other 
religions in China were easily ignored by the CCP as superstitious or, in the case of 
Catholics, “reactionaries taking orders from the Vatican”.  But they had higher hopes 
for Protestants, “for whom they gave a real respect, as being more liberal and capable 
of cooperation in the patterns of New Democracy”.  The message of the conference 
appeared clear. Protestants would be welcomed in the New Democracy of China so 
long as they operated within Communist rules.
214
 
Unfortunately, Christians in China did not understand those rules.  They 
continually professed the apolitical nature of Christianity, not realizing that nothing 
was apolitical in Communist China.  The CCP had sent enough mixed messages on 
Protestantism that some confusion was understandable.  McCallum displayed some of 
this confusion of the Communist point of view by writing: “We are here as Christian 
missionaries and not as the emissaries of any political or economic order. We are here 
with a gospel of love which requires us to love and serve even those with whom we 
may differ politically, economically and nationally.” (emphasis in original)215 Goulter 
wrote that Christians must demonstrate that their ideals of love and compassion can be 
applied in any political or economic situation: “That is we are not the slaves of 
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capitalism, or any other ism.”216 Both of them believed that if Christians showed 
themselves as separate from their home country and culture, the Communists might 
allow them to continue working. 
Even as they tried to show an apolitical church, some Christians spoke of 
wanting to influence CCP policies, apparently forgetting that involvement in politics 
was hazardous.  Luther Shao said: “We expect that new and moderate policies will be 
formulated after the coalition government is formed.” Shao went on to call for 
Christians to actively take part in the new regime. “Christian Churches throughout 
China should not be passive and defensive in their strategy at this time. We should 
take an active part and our opinions be expressed and our voices heard before 
government policies are finally shaped.”217 
The dangers to the missions in China should have been obvious at the end of 
the August meeting. During the question and answer session, the speakers made it 
clear that missionaries would not be allowed in leadership or management roles.  The 
image of missionaries as agents of imperialism was still strong among the Chinese.  If 
they were to remain in the PRC, they could not exert control over any Chinese people, 
meaning Chinese must be in charge of the church with missionaries working for 
them.
218
    This caveat would prove to be a crucial issue for missionaries in the coming 
years.  It seemed innocuous at the time, as the CCC had worked for decades at making 
itself independent of foreign support, but it indicated a distrust of missionaries as 
foreign agents.  In the next two years, CCP cadres would come to see any connection 
to foreigners as a lack of patriotism, forcing Chinese Christians to cut their ties. 
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Nevertheless, in the middle of 1949, the mood among Christians remained 
cautiously optimistic. In September 1949, the China Committee drew up a strategy 
paper for how to continue teaching in liberated areas. The challenge was to create a 
curriculum that was acceptable to the CCP but still maintained its Christian character.  
Their strategy was to teach Communist doctrine while highlighting the differences 
between Christianity and Communism.  Christianity, while valuing the common good, 
also values the individual.  Christianity and democracy went hand in hand because of 
the importance of individual dignity and the sanctity of life.  The FMC thought that 
this strategy could work because the CCP did not have nearly enough schools or 
teachers for the entire Chinese population.  Christian schools should demonstrate their 
value by producing highly educated and prepared graduates who would contribute to 
Chinese society.  They understood that there would be compromises on the curriculum 
but they still believed that there was room to present some Christian ideas within the 
Communist agenda.
219
 
Christian leaders also wanted to create “an atmosphere of love” that would 
contrast the Communist use of power and fear.  Communists made efforts to care for 
their fellow man, but they did not practice forgiveness or love for their enemies.  The 
China Committee wanted to show the Christian alternative.  It reflected the earlier 
strategy of a moral regeneration of China that was part of the Forward Movement 
created in 1947, but was now more surreptitious and directed towards the CCP.
220
    
The strategy was meant to spread Christian ideals in China in a non-
threatening way. For the CCP, however, it was the exact type of threat that they feared 
from Christians.  The Christian message would subvert the CCP’s efforts to politically 
mobilize the people.  The idea that any message contrary to the Communist Party line 
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would be acceptable appears in retrospect to be little short of fantasy.  At the time, 
however, missionaries and their boards thought they had an opening to exert some 
positive influence in a difficult situation.  Some moderate (non-Christian) Chinese 
thought the same thing as the CCP consolidated its power in 1949 and 1950.  It soon 
became apparent to both Chinese and missionaries that the CCP would not tolerate any 
influence other than its own.  Plans like those of the China Committee reinforced the 
Communist view that as Americans and as Christians, missionaries were a danger to 
the state they were building. 
Recognition 
One aspect which had nearly complete agreement among missionaries who 
stayed in China was the need for the United States to recognize the PRC as soon as 
possible.  There were two basic reasons for this, neither of which had much to do with 
geopolitics.  The first was that lack of recognition by the United States could only hurt 
mission work in China.  Missionaries were already accused of being imperialist 
agents. While trying to find a way to continue work under the CCP, they were still in a 
precarious position.  Tension with the United States could turn the CCP against 
missionaries and Christianity.  The second reason was that American aid, which had 
been squandered by Chiang, would be very useful in helping to rebuild China.  For 
both the success of the mission and the success of China, these missionaries wanted 
immediate recognition of the PRC. 
Most missionaries thought that it was absurd to even think about non-
recognition.  American enmity would strengthen the radical elements in the CCP and 
make it more totalitarian.  Friendship would help moderates and allow America to help 
China as it had in the past.  Frank Price wrote to a U.S. Government official to lobby 
for recognition and aid to the CCP at the beginning of 1949, before there was a PRC 
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but after the GMD had lost the decisive battles of the Civil War.  He wrote: “Events 
are forcing upon us a reorientation of attitudes and policy toward China. The change is 
not easy for American friends of China, particularly for those who have cherished 
hopes of liberalization and reform in the National Government and of a positive 
answer to the Communist challenge.”  He later says, “The Chinese people are here, 
whatever the government regime; their welfare is more important to us than the fate of 
any government.”  In a bid to show that the aid could be more than altruism, he later 
wrote: “There is still in China a warm friendship for the United States and a large 
reservoir of good will for the American people.”221 The FMC issued a public statement 
that also accentuated the perceived close bond between the peoples of the United 
States and China, saying: “the record of our nation, in the main, has been one of 
sincere friendship for the peoples of the Far East.”222  
There was a fear, however, that hostility by the U.S. Government towards the 
PRC would destroy that friendship.  Alice Margaret Huggins had been an educator in 
North China for most of her thirty-two years in China. She had a somewhat whimsical 
attitude in discussing the new Communist regime: She wrote: “It’s not a question of 
whether we choose to have the communists conquer China. They’ve done it. Then 
what? Do we allow ourselves to be driven into a cold war with them?”223  Another 
missionary followed the same line of thought.  She wondered if there “is room here for 
both Western Democracies and Communism. It seems to us there are just two ways to 
settle the question; one is by fighting and the other is by trying to understand each 
other and get along together. We are going to try to get along.”224  Price made a similar 
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plea in his letter to the USG: “Give the Chinese people time and they themselves will 
decide and act against extreme totalitarian forms of Communism. We cannot hurry this 
process.”225  
Price was also concerned that a cold war with the PRC would hurt the good 
work that the Communists were doing.  He wrote: “Our strategy in Eastern Asia 
should be democratic rather than military.”226  In advocating what would later be 
termed “soft power”227, he went on to say, “our long-range policy should be deep 
interest in the poor and underprivileged classes of China more than in the upper 
financial class of the cities. We should favor a socialistic approach to China’s 
problems.”228  The word “socialistic” was not unique to Price. Several missionaries 
used it when advocating a social gospel policy.  Their use of the word demonstrates 
how disconnected they were from public opinion in the United States.  Regardless of 
how accurate the term was or how much some books of the New Testament 
(particularly Acts of the Apostles) resembled socialism, anything connected to 
“socialism” was anathema.  Spillet wrote approvingly of a similar plan, although he 
used slightly less dangerous terminology: “Land reform is to be thoroughly carried 
out.  This is long overdue.”229  Spillet continued: “The Nationalist Party has been too 
long in power, divided, corrupt, feeble, spoilt by foreign aid.”230 Non-recognition 
seemed ridiculous, given the improvement in government with the Communist victory. 
Huggins even added in a bit of spite towards Chiang Kai-shek.  “We Americans here 
hope the United States will be the first to recognize this new government, for several 
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reasons, one of which is the not very pious one that it ought to put somebody’s nose 
out of joint. You can guess whose.”231  
The FMC was more vocal on the matter of recognition than they were prior to 
the CCP victory.  They issued a statement that was approved by all of its member 
churches that stated unequivocally that the United States should recognize the PRC.  It 
said that the President should address a joint session of Congress to give an 
unequivocal message to China that the United States offers its friendship.  Overall, the 
FMC was advocating a soft-power approach to dealing with Communism.  It said: 
“We believe that the further advance of Communism in China and Asia cannot 
permanently be stopped by military action.”232 Using more politically correct language 
than Price, but advocating the same ideas, the FMC statement said: “The real issue is 
whether or not our government is prepared to advance the greater welfare of the 
peoples of Asia, with higher standards of living, and with cultural, social, and political 
institutions which will accord with the free choice of the peoples directly 
concerned.”233  It finished with a call to promote human rights: “We believe the United 
States, in cooperation with the United Nations, should labor incessantly for the 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for the peoples of Asia.”234   
In this, the FMC was in step with the missionaries in China. They believed that 
both the United States and China would be better served by renewing their friendship 
and cooperation. Friendship would benefit American goals of liberty and human 
rights, while hostility would strengthen the CCP’s totalitarian tendencies.  Their pleas 
made little headway amid the increasingly hostile Cold War, foreshadowing their 
marginalization in the larger debate of the 1950s.  
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It’s all fun and games until someone loses human rights 
The initial optimism of liberation proved to be fairly short lived.  Missionaries 
were so fed up with the GMD that anything was preferable.  When CCP rule did not 
prove as harsh as was feared, their enthusiasm for the Communist regime grew. But as 
the CCP began to settle in and exert its control over society, missionaries quickly 
became disillusioned.  Missionaries who had felt that they could be fellow travelers 
with the CCP saw that the personal dignity and freedom essential to Protestantism was 
not only lacking under Communism, but were actively opposed. The government was 
taking control over all aspects of society, so while there was nominal freedom, the 
pressure for Chinese to conform was enormous.  One missionary showed his extreme 
ambivalence, saying: “If the lack of freedom and intolerance could be done away with 
this new ‘thought’ would certainly have much to recommend itself.”235 
For missionaries working in education, the indoctrination of the Chinese 
people was very upsetting.  Jane Leiper found the self-criticism meetings so absurd as 
to be entertaining. “These meetings are one of the more popular inventions of 
Communism. It assumes that by publicly announcing in a meeting that you’ve been 
naughty and forgot to brush your teeth, you will have some new power to correct your 
sin. Ah, how naïve is their understanding of the human will.”236 She would later write, 
“I think everyone after a while gets tired of it – you can’t help but run out of ideas and 
the deeper into the barrel one digs, the funnier the confessions and criticisms.”237 
Not everyone took such a relaxed view. More missionaries saw this as a 
dangerous move to destroy independent thought, which was a cornerstone of 
Protestantism.  In particular, there was a fear that Communism was being used as a 
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civil religion.  An FMC analyst clearly stated, “Communism is a type of ‘religion.’”238 
Earlier that year, E.E. Barnett made an address in which he warned: “In Communism 
we confront the articulate, organized and militant wing of that rival secular 
‘religion’.”239  Another missionary was dumbfounded by the devotion of the 
Communists: “There is something we can’t fathom about this Communist doctrine that 
gets these folks—and make them act as though it were a real religion.”240 
Missionaries in China echoed this fear after being liberated.  One report to the 
FMC said, “Communism is a religion – not just a political party. It is a party 
dictatorship – men cease to be free-will agents.”241 Another said: “People are thus 
bereft of freedom of thought, speech and action. Personality is shattered and life is 
reduced to an acquiescence in Communist regimentation.”242 In an eerily Orwellian 
scene, one wrote: “Family loyalty was suggested as an obstacle to the Com. Program. 
Against this obstacle, C-s [Communists] are depending on the indoctrination of 
youth.”243 Alice Huggins made similar observation: “The Communist first grade 
primers used in Honan have this for the first lesson: ‘I don’t love father. I don’t love 
mother. I love China!’”244  The FMC also recognized the dangers of Communism as a 
civil religion. In its policy paper on missions under Communist rule, it said: 
“Communism as a state power champions science as a successor to religion, godless 
humanism as a substitute for Christian ethics, and communist society on earth instead 
of the Christian hope in the kingdom of God.”245 
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 Alice Huggins’ sense of humor seemed to desert her in a letter to friends that 
said: “They [the CCP] are working literally day and night, frantically trying by every 
means they know to convince the whole population. They use very cleverly every 
method we Christians have ever had, especially songs, plays, meetings, and an appeal 
to idealism and self-sacrifice.”246  The similarities, however, were superficial.  
Protestantism was founded on individual thought and conscience, and had a 
particularly strong tradition of dissent.  Huggins lamented its lack in Communist 
education: “One of their most effective methods is repetition. If you hear a thing 
enough times it’s hard not to remember it, whether you started out by agreeing with it 
or not. And there is no place in the regime for an adverse opinion.”247 
There were also more direct causes for concern.  With the freedom to practice 
religions, there was also a freedom to oppose it.  This led to an unofficial harassment 
and persecution.  Constance Buell thought that it stemmed from the lack of education 
of the local cadres: “One cause for suspicion is the ignorance of the difference 
between Protestant and Roman Catholic beliefs and procedures, and the fact that the 
latter organization shares to some degree reliance on political power.”248  Catholics 
were particularly reviled by the CCP because of their allegiance to the Vatican and 
their large land holding in China. As such it was a greater political threat. Protestants 
missionaries were often indignant at being lumped in with them. 
The harassment would often take the form of disrupting meetings and 
persecuting clergy.  One missionary showed his frustration, writing: “We plan one 
thing after another and always the others [CCP] stick some meeting of theirs over the 
same time, so we have to call ours off. It’s certainly disheartening, though I feel we 
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still can help and we are glad to be on deck.”249  George Carlton Lacy, who would 
ultimately suffer more than almost any other missionary, was initially concerned about 
a Chinese pastor being much more directly harassed: “The letter he received, signed 
by the Assassination Committee, accused him of being a ‘running dog of American 
imperialism’ and demanded that he turn over the church properties to the people and 
himself find some productive employment within five days or his life would be 
forfeit.”250  Lacy would not try to leave China until the end of 1951, but he would be 
denied an exit permit.  He would die of a complication from heart disease while under 
house arrest in December of 1951. Yet in 1949, the threat to him seemed less than to 
his Chinese brethren. 
One report, written from Beijing shortly after liberation, got to the heart of the 
missionary dilemma.  It said, “I think that the present government has the wellbeing of 
the common people in mind to a far greater extent than any other previous government 
since I have been in China. But can a dictatorship and a police state by its very nature 
maintain such an attitude? Will they not soon be more concerned in their own 
perpetuation rather than the good of the whole?”251  The authors of this report argued 
that even though there was significant overlap between the social gospel and 
Communist social programs, long term cooperation was very problematic.  The 
Communist system was fundamentally flawed because of its dismissal of the value of 
the individual. Protestantism was destined to clash with it.  
Indoctrination in the educational system conflicted directly with Christian 
plans to subtly introduce Christian values into the curriculum.  Although the CCP was 
pragmatic about many things, it would not allow Christian education that countered its 
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own dogma. As such, Communists allowed very little leeway in its educational 
system.  They viewed religion as a relic of backward culture.  One Chinese Christian 
in a liberated area reported on some of the classes he had been forced to attend.  The 
cadre teacher said that religion was for primitive minds that could not accept life as it 
was.  They could not resist “the oppression of the upper classes. Hence, they invent 
religious solutions to their dilemma leading to an other-worldly escape.  Naturally, the 
upper classes encourage this process.”252 It was used by capitalists to keep the people 
happy with their position. The teacher went on to say that although Christianity 
appeared to be progressive, its implementation was actually very conservative and 
reactionary. 
This cadre’s lessons demonstrated several aspects of CCP attitude towards 
Christianity.  First, it differentiated between Christian doctrine and practice.  The cadre 
claimed that capitalists do not believe in God. If they did, “they would not oppress the 
people.” Christianity’s was a tool for capitalist control.  “The purpose of all this is to 
keep the people away from social thought and social change.” 253 
Secondly, the cadre demonstrated the disparity between western style 
education and that of China.  The Socratic method of asking questions and learning 
through dialogue is alien to Chinese culture.  The importance put on age and wisdom 
in China manifests itself in the classroom with the teacher (known as the “old master” 
regardless of his age) imparting his knowledge while the students absorb his wisdom.  
The student may question the teacher on points he does not fully grasp and the teacher 
then elaborates so the student better understands.  The CCP adopted this style with its 
Marxist theory as the ultimate authority.  Some Christian university students were held 
back from graduation, despite completing all requirements, because they continued to 
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question the correctness of Maoist thought.
254
  Another missionary recounted that she 
had to go to cadre-led information meetings that allowed the participants to speak 
freely. The cadres then corrected the participants on any deviation from the party line.  
The meetings would end when everyone agreed with the cadres’ position.255 In this 
environment of centralized indoctrination, the missionary hope of using education to 
promote Christian principles was doomed to failure.  
Third, the cadre’s lessons suggested the larger connection that Christianity, as 
preached in China, was actually a tool of foreign aggression. This would become a 
theme throughout CCP-missionary relations and would be the ultimate reason that 
missionaries would be driven from the PRC.  The CCP explicitly stated that the 
missionary message was designed to weaken China. Missionaries preached universal 
love and brotherhood, but Christians in the United States had been exploiting their 
Chinese brothers for a century.  Chinese Christians had to break ties with foreign 
missionary organizations or face persecution from PRC authorities.  By decrying 
foreign missions, Chinese Christians sought to earn the trust of cadres and the security 
that came with it.  One leader of the Church of Christ in China tried to prove that he 
was a patriot by claiming that the close friendship between the CCP and Chinese 
Christians has “caused the mission boards, those agents of imperialists, to be 
uncomfortable and jealous.”256 His goal was to show the Chinese Christians were 
willing to work with the CCP while acknowledging that mission boards had always 
been working to keep China down (which corresponded with CCP propaganda).  Even 
the Church’s attempt at maintaining an apolitical stance was viewed as an attempt to 
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weaken China’s ability to mobilize its people.  Collaboration with missionaries invited 
charges of assisting imperialist powers in undercutting China’s strength. 
The tone of Chinese Christians statements was clearly shifting to be more 
acceptable to the Communists.  After the CCP had consolidated its rule, most adopted 
the rhetoric of the CCP that linked Christianity with imperialism.  One Chinese 
Christian leader described missionaries’ non-political assertions as “brutal plots in the 
past 100 some years” whose results were “to dig out the hearts of the Chinese 
Christians, destroying our patriotic consciousness.”257 A letter to Foreign Mission 
Boards from a group of Chinese Christians said: “The new philosophy considers that 
all phases of life must necessarily come under the influence of politics in contradiction 
to the traditional Protestant view of the separation between church and state.”258 
Missionaries were aware that they were vulnerable to charges of imperialism 
but they did not seem to understand the depth of the connection. The majority of 
missionaries remaining in China were devoted to service more than proselytization, so 
they believed that their good works would overcome the assumption of imperialist 
connections.  One report to the International Missionary Council warned that missions 
were “in the areas of imperialism, of colonialism and foreign exploitation; in a word 
they represent that stage of the dialectic which was Lenin’s specific addition to the 
Marxist canon. They are in areas of insurgent nationalism which offers opportunity for 
Marxist exploitation.” The report demonstrates a blind spot that was shared by most 
missionaries in China.   While recognizing the danger of being connected to 
imperialism, it stops short of saying why missionaries in China were so easily 
perceived as imperialists by many Chinese.  Missionaries rarely acknowledged that 
their presence in China was a direct result of their countries’ gunboat diplomacy in the 
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th
 century.  They had taken advantage of the unequal treaties until the middle of 
World War II, when most western countries renounced the treaties as part of their 
support for China’s war effort against the Japanese.  After having lived under the 
treaties’ protection for nearly a century, missionaries seemed to think they could 
escape the treaties’ taint in less than a decade.   When the CCP began whipping up 
anti-missionary sentiment, the missionaries did not understand how ready the Chinese 
people were to believe them.
259
  
The CCP argued that the Christian message itself was meant to undermine 
China.  Marxist orthodoxy strongly condemned religion, but nationalist arguments 
offered a similar critique of religion as an opiate.  One missionary recognized how the 
CCP perceived Christianity. Christians had good intentions and an important message, 
“but such Christians must recognize certain facts about the social effects of 
Christianity, e.g. that it has been used in the past by exploiting classes to control the 
exploited, that it has prevented with other-worldly promises, the solution of this 
world’s promises, etc.”260 Albert Stewart heard a clear answer on the compatibility of 
Christianity and Communism. He asked a Chinese colleague, “Can one be a good 
Christian and a good Communist at the same time?”  His colleague responded: “No, if 
you are a real Christian the Communists do not want you.”261 
Anti-American Mobilization 
The question of whether the CCP was more nationalist or more Communist 
was still not settled, but missionaries were beginning to understand that the question 
was less important than they had thought.  Although the CCP demonstrated a strong 
nationalist streak, it did not help the missionary cause.  Part of CCP legitimacy was 
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built on their promise to make China strong again after the “Century of Humiliation” 
at the hands of imperialists. American missionaries became lightning rods for anti-
American activities. They were a convenient way to mobilize the Chinese people.  The 
PRC did not expel missionaries, but used them to focus the Chinese people into 
nationalist causes.  In this way, the missionaries provided a much greater value to the 
CCP than their educational and medical services ever could. 
Chinese, whether Christian or not, who worked with missionaries were subject 
to intense harassment as collaborators.  Joseph Smith described the urban isolation: 
“For the present, at least, the missionary can’t get into the country. If he could, his 
Chinese friends would not welcome him. It would present difficulties for them.”262  
One alternative was to send Chinese Christians instead of missionaries, but Smith 
showed that that would be much worse for the ones going: “But even when our 
Chinese go into the country they are asked who sent them, whether there are 
foreigners with them and if the foreigners pay them.”263  Another story that was 
related by a Chinese Christian about an American missionary said: “some church or 
churches have asked her not to visit, in order to avoid the necessity of making long 
explanations to the authorities after she has gone.”264 In a similar story, “the CIM 
[China Inland Mission] Chinese leaders in Kaifeng have advised the Guinnesses not to 
attempt to return to the hospital there, feeling that the hospital will get along better 
with the authorities if the foreigners are not present.”265 One Christian educator had a 
former student visit him surreptitiously: “He was coming frequently to our house 
merely to get our point of view. He has it, and now all students have been warned it 
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would be unwise for them to come to our home.”266Another missionary lamented: 
“Probably the most difficult of all the need for Chinese friends to cut off their contacts 
with foreigners. I think for me—tied down to the house—the hardest thing to adjust to 
is the knowledge that the best thing for our friends to do at this time is to ignore us.”267  
Because of the political difficulties faced by Christians, some Chinese 
Christians recanted their conversion, while others continued in the Church. Although 
no credible estimates exist for what percentage remained, those that did sought to 
make the church completely Chinese to overcome the political dangers of associating 
with foreigners.  This had been a goal of missions for decades, but with little result. 
Now, Chinese Christians were insisting on it. “We strongly admit that the Chinese 
Church must be self-supporting.”268 Foreigners were a dangerous liability, so the 
urgency to make the Church Chinese took precedence.  Another Chinese Christian’s 
public statements said that missionaries had a role to play, but must be circumspect in 
doing it: “Just as the future church should not follow the old patterns of the last 
century, so the new missionaries may not have to be those of the last century. They 
may have to play the role of being ‘behind the curtain’. Their counsel and guidance 
will always be needed by the Chinese workers.”269 A similar sentiment was expressed 
by Frank Price, who said that missionaries still had a significant role to play, “but the 
main responsibility will now pass to the shoulders of Chinese Christian leaders.”270  
None of the missionaries or Chinese Christians noted the irony that the Communists 
were achieving the missionary goal of making the church Chinese. 
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Missionaries almost universally agreed. If the Christian Church in China was 
to survive, it must be Chinese in more than name.  Joseph Smith urged his fellow 
missionaries to step aside: “The work must not be mission centric. It must be church 
centric and the church must be Christ centric. … We must increasingly think of the 
church in China not in terms of its missionaries but in terms of the Chinese churches 
and of their Chinese leaders.”271 H.W. Spillet noted: “The international connections of 
the Chinese Church have been misunderstood and misrepresented. The church has 
been attacked as the tool of imperialism and reactionary politics.”272 The FMC advice 
paper to missionaries from earlier in the year could see the problem coming in a way 
that missionaries on the ground rarely could.  It said: “It may be necessary for the 
Christian church in a given area to sever ties with churches in other lands and become 
entirely self-sufficient under God.”273  Missionaries did not understand that their good 
intentions and service could not erase a century of association with imperialism.  Even 
more importantly, they were an opportunity for the CCP, providing a focal point for 
new nationalist rage against foreign exploitation.  Nothing missionaries could do 
would overcome this. 
Another aspect of the Sinification was financial.  James McCallum, who 
handled the finances of the Nanjing missions, proposed: “An understanding needs to 
be reached between the Chinese church and the mission boards concerned, based upon 
the principle of self-support on the one hand and a realistic evaluation of the problem 
on the other.”274  This approach was based on experience that the Communists were 
more interested in foreign influences than in Christianity.  John Mott had noted earlier 
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that year that, “Church property acquired by Chinese churches with money raised in 
China is generally not interfered with by Communist authorities.”275 Removing 
foreign financing would help minimize the political vulnerability of Christians.  
Missionaries were the eyes and ears of America in 1949-1950 because most 
other foreigners had left.  Yet they were too close to the situation and too invested in 
finding a way to keep the missions alive to be accurate observers.  They had every 
chance to see the end of the missionary enterprise in China coming.  Even while some 
missionaries in liberated areas were sending messages about their relative freedom, 
other missionaries in China, and even more from Eastern Europe, reported a pattern 
that was consistent in any area where communists had taken over.  Communists would 
proclaim religious liberty while they were consolidating their power, but as they 
became more secure, religious freedom was curtailed and eventually ended. One 
memo prepared for the Foreign Mission Conference in 1948 outlined the pattern 
clearly.  “The first phase is one of tolerance and freedom….The second phase is one of 
toleration with control….The third phase is one of active opposition.”276  One 
International Missionary Council internal publication directly and presciently 
described CCP practices, “The facts, which are not perfectly consistent, appear to be 
that when the Communists enter a territory, they may be prepared to tolerate Christian 
activities for a time… Such limited toleration may not last long, if at all.”277 But 
missionaries wanted to believe there was a chance and they grabbed hold of every 
opportunity, even when the odds were extremely low. 
 
 
                                                        
275 John R. Mott, Report on Meeting with CCP in Shanghai, April 1949. CRP. RG8 Box 60 Folder 6. 
276 Flowers, Wilfred S. “Communist Attitudes Toward Missionaries and Christian Medical Work in 
China”, China Missionary Conference. 1948. CRP. RG8 Box 60 Folder 5. 
277 Bingle, E.J. “Communism and the Younger Churches”, International Missionary Council. CRP. RG8 
Box 60 Folder 4, Nov. 18, 1948. 
132 
 
Conclusion 
Missionaries knew that missions in China were on shaky ground under 
Communist rule. They knew that Marxist doctrine condemned religion. Yet in a 
combination of naiveté and desperation, they stuck to their work in the hope that it 
would somehow work itself out.  Some thought that long-term missions were possible, 
while others simply wanted to work as long as they could before being forced out.  For 
many, Christianity in China was their life’s work.  Their dedication to their mission 
precluded an early withdrawal.  Their main hope was that the CCP would want their 
educational and medical services to help restore China’s power and prominence in the 
world.  They were betting on the nationalist tendencies of the CCP to overcome its 
Marxist tendencies.  Although the nationalist streak did prove very strong, it did not 
save their missions.  Instead, it led to the missions’ termination.    
Missionaries were in the precarious position of being on the front lines of the 
tumultuous relationship between the United States and China but having very little 
control over how that relationship developed.  The Chinese involvement in the Korean 
War would be the final nail in the coffin of American missions in China, but the 
persecution of missionaries started the year before the war began.   Communist 
propaganda put a heavy emphasis on past humiliations of China by foreign powers, 
particularly the United States.  In the new retelling of that story missionaries took a 
much more prominent role as imperialist agents.  Although missionaries were only 
rarely directly assaulted under CCP rule, they were ostracized, forced to write self-
criticism and generally prevented from doing their work. Chinese Christians were 
forced to cut all ties with them, for fear of being branded as a foreign agent.  Because 
of this pressure, and because the missions had become counter-productive for the 
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Chinese they intended to help, almost all foreign missionaries left the country by the 
end of 1951. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Success or Failure: Missionaries Debate Their Legacy 
 
In the fall of 1953, an American correspondent for the Chicago Daily News in 
Hong Kong, Albert Ravenholt, wrote an article on Christianity in China.  In 
introducing his analysis, Ravenholt wrote: “The termination of an enterprise that has 
been described as the ‘most ambitious foreign missionary effort in the history of 
Christendom’ now leaves the Chinese churches on their own.”278 Written only 
months after the end of the Korean War, the article highlighted the separation between 
Chinese Christians and western Christians. The abrupt end of foreign missions in 
China in 1951 forced both groups to reevaluate  their past as well as their future.  
Christian missions to China were, depending on whom you asked, either a colossal 
failure or a great victory. On the one hand, there were no American missionaries279 in 
China for the first time in one hundred and thirty years.  In addition, most mission 
property had been seized and the new Communist government was hostile towards 
Christianity.  On the other hand, the purpose of the mission was, in theory, to plant the 
seed of Christianity, which would then grow under the care of native Chinese 
Christians. In this sense, the missionary exodus accomplished its aims. Chinese 
Christianity was surviving despite the enmity of the Communist government.   
These were issues of extreme importance to returned missionaries.  For many 
of them, their life’s work had been building the Chinese church.  They wanted to know 
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if that work had been in vain. If so, was it their fault that it failed?  This chapter looks 
at how missionaries tried to evaluate the end of missions in China.  It focuses on two 
key questions that missionaries were asking: 1) What happened to force missionaries 
out of China? 2) Where does Chinese Christianity go from here? Both of these 
questions were really about the relationship between Christianity and Chinese 
Communism.  They were investigating whether there was even any hope for missions 
under the CCP. If there was, what did they do to cause their expulsion?  The larger 
issue was the strength and direction of the Chinese Church once the removal of 
missionaries, as Ravenholt put it, “now leaves the Chinese churches on their own.” A 
strong and successful Chinese church would validate the time and effort spent on 
missions in China. It would also show that Christianity and Communism could 
coexist. On the other hand, the failure of the Chinese church would show the failure of 
those missions and strengthen the belief that Christianity could not survive under 
Communism. 
This chapter shows that missionaries and their organizations found very little 
consensus on where the blame lay for the end of missions. The discussions were more 
about how missionaries tried to make sense of the end of their life’s work. Given the 
conflicts between the United States and China during that time, the supporting 
organizations lacked much information beyond the anecdotal evidence of returned 
missionaries.  As a result, when the studies were initially conducted, most missionaries 
found the conclusions they were expecting.  The discussions show more about the 
assumptions of the people involved than they do about what actually happened in 
China.   
  When examining the direction of Chinese Christianity, however, there was a 
rough consensus, but it was a disappointing one.  Reports coming from China in the 
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1950’s showed that Chinese Christian leaders were increasingly aligned with the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which alarmed many missionaries.  Some 
missionaries had been sympathetic to the Communist cause while in China, but they 
were not expecting the establishment of a Chinese Church that allied with the 
Communist government.  Not only was this church more politically active than 
western churches, it adopted tactics of the CCP, many of which seemed in direct 
opposition to Christian philosophy. While some missionaries continued to believe and 
hope that the Chinese Church could survive as an independent entity ministering to the 
needs of its members, most missionaries were losing that hope by the end of the 
decade. It appeared that the Communists had subverted the missions for their own 
purposes, thereby signaling the failure of the Chinese missions. 
Post Mortem on the Missions 
Missionaries began asking what when wrong as soon as they returned.  Their 
intentions had been good and they were sure that their work had benefited the Chinese 
people.  So why, after over a century of Protestant missions in China, had the 
missionary enterprise in China collapsed?  Missionary organizations knew that many 
of the factors were out of their control, but they started asking what they could have 
done differently. 
This was particularly important for the Presbyterians, who had the largest 
American presence in China in 1950 and 51.280  A December 1951 meeting of the 
Presbyterian Committee on China policy began the discussion of what happened in 
China. The chairman of the committee, Dr. George B. Cressey, outlined the issues at 
hand.  The key questions were: 1) What had the Presbyterian Church done in China? 
2) What should it have done differently in hindsight? Cressey said that churches fell 
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into three categories. Some focused mainly on conversion, believing that the essence 
of mission work was to bring people to Christ. Other churches tried to build church 
infrastructure through seminaries and theological education. These churches took a 
longer approach, trying to build a Chinese clergy. Their assumptions were that a 
Chinese run church would be better received by the Chinese people and would 
promote greater long-term growth.  The third group, in which Cressey included the 
Presbyterians, had a broader approach that included evangelization and building the 
church but also looked to broader social needs.  He claimed that the third group gained 
twice as many converts per missionary and made a much larger impact on Chinese 
Christianity.281  
Cressey’s description of the third group seemed to spark some pride for him.  
Although the numbers are difficult to verify, it appears that churches like the 
Presbyterians that tried to meet social needs did gain more converts than did 
evangelicals.  But he did not mention a common concern among missionaries, which 
was the devotion of these converts.  Because many Chinese came for food or medical 
care that they could not get elsewhere, they were derisively called “rice Christians” by 
some missionaries who doubted the authenticity of their conversion.  In addition, 
many Presbyterians and Congregationalists did not push for strict adherence to 
Christian tradition, specifically in giving up the practice of ancestor worship. If the 
evaluation of the mission was to build a lasting church in China, the number of 
converts may have been a distorted indicator of success. 
The chairman’s report, while already having some conclusions, also called for 
more research. Other members of the committee agreed that more research was needed 
but questioned Cressey’s preliminary conclusions, which they believed were more 
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positive than the recent expulsion warranted. They noted that some reports from 
returned missionaries were more critical of the approaches used by mainstream 
churches. 
Cressey might have seemed an unlikely choice as chairman because his only 
religious experience was as a layman.  He had other qualifications that were useful, 
including PhDs in geography and geology, experience in China and political contacts 
in the United States. Those contacts came from consulting with the State Department 
and other government agencies throughout the 1940’s. Although the minutes did not 
indicate why he was selected, it is likely that he added gravitas to any report that 
would be produced, plus he was not biased toward any particular approach to missions 
because he had never served in one. 
Other missions took similar steps. The World Council of Churches (WCC) 
sponsored a study that focused on what was actually going on in China, trying to get 
to the truth behind the rumors.  The author of the report was a returned missionary 
whose name was withheld “in order that this statement may be more widely 
circulated”. Most likely, the WCC were concerned that if the report leaked to China, 
the Communists might take reprisals against his friends and congregation there.  The 
report itself focused mainly on Chinese society under CCP control.  It was 
exceptionally critical of the Communist regime, saying that “this Communist 
movement is blinded to social and economic facts, and to the evil in its own system, 
by the Marx-Leninist ideology which it believes.” It spent very little time on the state 
of the Chinese Church, although it suggested that there was no freedom and therefore 
no room for religion.  Only at the end of the report was there an optimistic tone. It 
noted that despite the repression, there were some Chinese people trying to live honest 
and honorable lives. “Often they are forced to participate in movements in which they 
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do not believe….But always they bargain for as much independence of action as they 
can get, and they find that Communists respect more this constructive courageous 
witness in a practical situation than any amount of servility.”282  
This fairly hopeful finish is at odds with the rest of the rather lengthy report, 
which gives the overall impression that the author despairs of the state of the Chinese 
Church. The incongruity is an example of the report's lack of structure and coherence.  
It reads more like an individual’s ruminations than an objective description. The 
author looked at the church by examining the oppressive system in which it operated, 
suggesting that the expulsion of missionaries was the fault of the Communists, not the 
missions.  The emotion of the report is clear, with the author appearing to still feel the 
wounds of the recent expulsion.   
The International Missionary Council launched its own analysis in late 1953. 
The agenda for the report had an incredibly broad scope. It started with a basic 
question for missionaries who had been expelled: “Was there too much or too little 
involvement in political matters?”283 Missionaries were split in their opinion of how 
they dealt with the Chinese Civil War, with some believing the problem was that they 
had not supported the Guomindang (GMD) completely.  Their opinion would seem to 
be supported by their eventual expulsion by the Chinese Communist Party.  But others 
thought the problem was getting involved in politics at all.  When the CCP took 
power, they accused missionaries of being either American or GMD spies because so 
many missionaries had supported the GMD.  Missionaries who had remained under 
the Communist regime in the early years of the PRC  argued that Christianity was 
apolitical, so they would be no threat to the new government or its agenda.  As would 
become obvious with their expulsion in 1951, the Communists did not accept that 
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argument.  The missionaries who supported the GMD publicly may have sown the 
seeds for the eventual expulsion of all the missionaries, according to some IMC 
members. The IMC report aimed to evaluate the validity of each of these views and 
see if there was anything that missionaries could have done to maintain the missionary 
enterprise in China.  
The study also asked another retrospective question about the relationship 
between missionaries and local Christians/Churches. What was the positive and what 
was the negative impact of missionaries in the field? Like the question on politics, this 
was aimed at reviewing experience in China with an eye toward other mission fields.  
Given the disastrous end to the missions in China, the IMC was trying not to repeat 
the same mistakes elsewhere. 
The study looked to the future in China as well. It asked basic questions about 
how western Protestant organizations would interact with the Chinese Church.  It 
wanted to know the organization of the Chinese Church as well as its theological 
content. It also looked at non-theological issues, such as how the church interacted 
with the state. Liberation had caused some drastic changes to the Church in China, 
with the removal of missionaries being only one part.  The study wanted to examine 
“the weakness and strength in the church laid bare by the revolutionary changes of the 
last few years.”  A particular focus was the Church of Christ in China.  The China it 
had developed in was chaotic with only limited control from the central government. 
While that government was not fond of Christianity, it accepted it because Christians 
were protected by the unequal treaties until World War II. Its situation had changed 
dramatically after the war, with a totalitarian government controlling the entire 
mainland and advocating atheism.  The IMC wanted to know how Chinese 
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Christianity had emerged from the revolution and what relationship it would have with 
its western brethren.284  
M. Searle Bates wrote a critique of the IMC lessons-learned study while it was 
still in progress.  Bates carried a great deal of weight among mission organizations, 
particularly in regards to China. He was a Rhodes Scholar who went on to earn a PhD 
in Chinese history from Yale. He served in China for the better part of thirty years, 
including being present for the “Rape of Nanjing”. Bates was prominent in the effort 
by international residents of Nanjing to create the Nanjing Safety Zone to protect 
Chinese civilians and would later testify in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials for the 
prosecution.285  After Pearl Harbor, Bates was imprisoned by the Japanese. After the 
war, he remained in China until 1950, when he returned to the United States to teach at 
the Union Theological Seminary. Because of his long and distinguished career, Bates’ 
opinions were influential in missionary organizations. 
While Bates supported the idea of analyzing the end of missions in China, he 
had some reservations.  Bates was clearly of the opinion that missions were successful 
in planting the seeds of Christianity in China and that the end of missions was due to 
circumstances that missionaries had little ability to affect.  His biggest concern was 
that the report would place the blame on missionaries, which he believed was unfair.  
He argued that missionaries may have made mistakes, but the situation was largely out 
of their control.  He wrote: “Possibly the feeling of crisis and catastrophic event was 
too easily equated with the judgment of failure.” Similar to the earlier WCC report, he 
wanted to put the emphasis of the examination on the Chinese, rather than on the 
missionaries. As he put it: “This Chinese human and total environment largely defined 
the problems for the Christian enterprise….” Bates claimed that the end of the 
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Christian mission was out of missionaries' hands. He suggested that western powers 
and missionaries could have done more, but that it is a “vulgar assumption that the 
conquest by the Communists and the establishment of a communist regime was due to 
Christian failure”.  He noted other Communist victories in countries that had far 
stronger Christian presences, such as Poland or Russia.286  
He then went on to argue that missions succeeded because of the continued 
presence of Christianity in China.  He wrote that for the missions to be considered 
failures is to accept “the ignorant assumption that interruption of work by overseas 
missions meant the disappearing of the Christian faith from China”.  This was a key 
point for missions as they looked back on their efforts.  Missions could be considered 
a success if they planted the seeds of the church, regardless of whether missionaries 
continued to be involved. In this light, the China mission was successful as long as the 
church survived.  The idea of failure, Bates suggested, comes from disappointment “in 
that apparent acceptance of the communist regime by the Chinese Christians, with 
more readiness or less protest than many Christians outside of China approve of.”  He 
later added, “Our terms of failure and success simply mean that some churches are 
relatively unsatisfactory, according to our poor lights. But satisfactory to whom and 
relative to what?”287  
Bates was building a case that the continued survival of the Christian Church 
demonstrated that missions in China had attained their goals. The removal of 
missionaries was not a failure, but a success in that it ended several of the mistakes the 
missions were making, and allowed the Chinese Church to build on the successes of 
missions without their weaknesses.  Removal of missionaries helped the Chinese 
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Church appear actually Chinese instead of western. It provided the Chinese Church 
with the self-government and self-support that was intended from the beginning.  
Bates argued “that missionaries did not adequately realize the unhappy position of 
their Chinese colleagues” who “felt the continual strain of needing the financial and 
other aid of missions,” while at the same time “resenting their dependence of foreign 
aid ultimately resting upon forces outside Chinese society.”  Moreover, the withdrawal 
of missionaries allowed Chinese Christian leaders to move the church so that it 
connected more to the Chinese people. Bates said of the missions, “They were too 
western in attitudes, practices, and forms. Negatively, this resulted in the charge of 
cultural imperialism and the lack of Christian morale through inability to deny or 
refute the charge.” He later added that missions should have separated themselves 
from the protection of the unequal treaties long before they did in 1943.288  
Bates's overall argument was that missionaries were ultimately successful 
despite their many missteps. A retrospective of the China missions needed more 
research and would provide many lessons to be learned, but he doubted the 
commission’s ability to be dispassionate on the subject. He was clearly speaking from 
experience, recognizing his own bias regarding the topic.  His life’s work had been in 
the China missions, so it should not be surprising that he came to a positive conclusion 
about its work.  He reinforced this point with the question: “Does the China 
experience speak to us or do we speak to the China experience?” His suggestion was 
that most people’s analysis of the end of the China mission was similar to their 
analysis when the mission was still in existence.  He was skeptical of any 
commission’s ability to evaluate China missions fully, ending with the statement: “We 
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can be certain that real knowledge of the whole and right judgment of any part belongs 
to God alone.”289 
Bates’s analysis, which was widely read by members of the IMC, got to the 
heart of the issues that had framed the debate over Chinese Christianity for most of the 
1950’s. The missions could only be considered a success if the Chinese Church was 
able to survive and thrive on its own.  If it was closely tied to the Communist Party in 
order to survive, was it still a viable church or simply an arm of the Party? These 
issues played into the larger Cold War discussion of whether it was possible to work 
with Communists, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. Many mission organizations 
still believed that was possible, while the public at large had already decided the 
answer was no. 
A British missionary, David Paton, added a voice to the conversation that was 
very sympathetic to the Chinese Church but critical of missions.  Paton had been a 
missionary in China for about ten years before leaving in 1950.  In 1953, he published 
a powerful critique of China missions in Christian Missions and the Judgment of God. 
Paton’s book argued that the missions were fundamentally flawed by being too 
bureaucratic and too arrogant, particularly about dismissing Chinese culture. He 
suggested that the expulsion of missionaries from China was God’s judgment on 
missions that were more concerned about financial statements and theological minutia 
than with carrying Christianity to the world.  He did not, however, think the missions 
in China were unique in this shortcoming, but their failures were the most obvious.  
He argued that, “God’s judgment today is being executed upon his church by political 
movements which are anti-Christian. Of this almost worldwide movement, the 
Communists are the spearhead.” For Paton, the failings of foreign missions, especially 
                                                        
289 M. Searle Bates. “Issues Arising in the International Missionary Council Study of the Christian 
Enterprise in China” 1957, CRP RG8 Box 56 Folder 11. 
145 
 
those in China, resulted in God using Communists to sweep them away. Only a 
response that corresponded to God’s will would reverse these losses.290 
Paton’s strong views were not out of the ordinary for him. He was known for 
expressing his opinions, which were increasingly unorthodox, in very brusque terms.  
After returning from China, Paton became Editor of the SMC Press, an academic press 
specializing in theology.  He had a great deal of sympathy for Chinese Christians, 
whom he heroicized for their efforts to keep their fledgling church alive under difficult 
circumstances. In a 1957 letter to members of the SCM Book Club, Paton wrote of his 
experience in China and speculated on its future.  As he had prepared for his departure 
from China, he remembered his students singing hymns of salvations: “So, like others, 
I came away sad but with reassurance.”  He later added, “Was my assurance then 
merely wishful thinking? Not at all.” He went on to explain, “It is not only or 
primarily that the number of Christians is slowly but steadily growing, or that the 
quantity and quality of ordination candidates is improving. What stands out is a new 
sureness of touch and sense of direction.” Paton was convinced, partly by reassurances 
from K. H. Ting, a prominent Chinese Christian leader, that the Chinese Church was 
healthier than ever and that its relations with the Communist government made it 
stronger, not weaker.  He said missionaries and other western Christians assumed that 
“when real discourse again becomes possible with the Chinese Church,” western 
Christians will express “that the Chinese Church had been unduly influence by the 
Communist Party and had over- obediently ‘toed the Party line’; and that the Chinese 
would have to admit this. I doubt it will be so simple.”291   
Paton was generally regarded as too radical for the mainstream, even for the 
United Kingdom which was more open to socialism than was the United States.  His 
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position would cost him his position as editor of the SCM Press in 1959. The 
conclusions of his letter are a good example of how his bluntly stated opinions went 
against the grain of public opinion. He said, “I think the Chinese are going to reply 
that the self-hood of the Church cannot be discovered [emphasis in the original] 
without the ready embracing of the people’s revolution under the leadership of the 
Communist Party.” Even more radically, he added, “And that where there is sterility 
and uncertainty in the Churches of Asia and Africa within the ambit of what we call 
the ‘free world’, this is because there has been no such Communist-led people’s 
democratic revolution.” Paton argued that Communist revolutions were revitalizing to 
Christianity, even suggesting that such a revolution might be beneficial in the “free 
world.” Needless to say, this attitude placed him a serious conflict with the majority 
views of westerners.292 
Paton and Bates offered differing but overlapping opinions on what happened 
in China. Bates thought that missionaries were not to blame for the end of missions, 
while Paton thought that their bureaucratic stagnation caused them to lose the true 
purpose of missions.  Both agreed, however, that the seeds of Christianity had been 
planted and that Chinese Christianity was surviving and possibly thriving.  Both 
continued this position even as events from China made optimism about the Chinese 
church increasingly difficult to maintain. 
The Three-Self Patriotic Movement 
The key question about the future of the Chinese church was whether it could 
find a way to work under the Communist regime.   The question of whether it was 
possible to find an accommodation with Communists would seem an odd one for 
missionaries. Many had tried to work with the Communists from 1948-51 and were 
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rewarded for their efforts by being driven out of China. So why was it being raised 
again?  The biggest difference was that the missionaries were no longer in China, 
which removed part of the foreign taint that imperialism had put on the church.  Many 
missionaries finally accepted that their good intentions had not washed away their 
association with the unequal treaties. Now that there was no foreign missionary 
presence in China, there was some hope that Christianity in China might grow as a 
Chinese institution.  
There was another school of thought in dealing with the Chinese church – one 
that believed that the PRC was irrevocably hostile to Christianity. Only the 
Communist regime’s collapse would protect the church.  The Chinese Church under 
Communism was no church at all. Its members had no freedom to practice and the 
little activity that was allowed bore only a passing resemblance of true Christianity. 
There was no way to deal with the PRC other than to isolate and hope for its collapse.   
The clearest sign regarding the direction of Christianity in China was the 
creation of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM).  The TSPM was an attempt by 
Chinese Christians to find a way to continue to do Christian work in Communist 
China. The PRC government had forced Christian churches to cut financial ties with 
foreign organizations saying that religious organizations could continue to operate as 
long as they were self-supporting. In 1950, several Chinese leaders, most prominently 
Y. T. Wu and T. C. Chao, met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to discuss the future of 
Christianity in the PRC. The result was the “Christian Manifesto”293, also known as 
the “Three-Self Manifesto”, which said that Christianity in China must be shorn of its 
imperialist trappings. It pledged to make the Chinese Church self-supporting, self-
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governing and self-propagating. These Three-Self principles had been put on paper as 
a goal of missions as early as 1892, but missionaries had been very slow to hand over 
control of the church to the Chinese.  Wu and Chao, with the help of other Chinese 
Christians, started this movement to demonstrate the loyalty of Chinese Christians to 
the newly established PRC.  Eventually they claimed that 400,000 Chinese Christians 
signed the manifesto, launching the TSPM (sometimes known as the Three-Self 
Patriotic Church).  
As the word “patriotic” in its name would suggest, the TSPM had a strong anti-
foreign tone.  While acknowledging that missionaries brought Christianity to China 
and made some contributions to Chinese society, the Manifesto stated that 
missionaries came from imperialist countries and their actions were forever tainted by 
imperialism.  Now that Communism had triumphed over imperialism, foreign powers 
would try to use Christianity “to forward their plot of stiffing internal dissension, and 
creating reactionary forces in this country.” The purpose of the manifesto was “to 
heighten our vigilance against imperialism, to make known the clear political stand of 
Christians in New China… and to indicate the responsibilities that should be taken up 
by Christians through the whole country in the national reconstruction of New 
China.”294 
The nationalist sentiments of the Manifesto were starker than Chinese 
Christians had used before, but the ideas had been articulated before, particularly by 
Wu. Wu had earned a master’s degree in philosophy from Union Theological 
Seminary in New York before returning to China in the late 1920s.  He worked with 
the YMCA, eventually rising to Secretary of the organization in China.  He had always 
been drawn to the social calling of Christianity rather than the mystical aspects.  Even 
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prior to the Communist victory over the GMD, Wu had shown sympathy for the 
Communist cause, including writing a scathing critique of Christianity in China in 
1948.  American missionary Frank Price called him an “‘Old Testament prophet’ 
whose ‘soul is seared by the social sins and injustices.’”295  
The 1948 article that Wu wrote was in the Protestant Journal Tian Feng (which 
translated roughly at Heavenly Wind) titled, “The Present-Day Tragedy of 
Christianity.”  Wu served as editor as well as an occasional contributor to the journal. 
The journal was generally quite liberal, but Wu’s article was several steps beyond its 
norm.  In it, Wu launched an assault on capitalism and Christianity’s association with 
it. He also accused the United States of subverting true Christianity in order to use it to 
fight communism. Using standard Marxist analysis, Wu asserted: “For thousands of 
years history has been a history of ‘man eating man’, a history of class struggle’.”  He 
went on to talk about the international Communist revolution saying that “Capitalism 
can no longer meet the needs of our time.”  He accused the United States of fighting a 
crusade that “is upholding not the good of mankind, not the saving gospel which the 
risen Jesus wants us to believe, but is only the special privilege of a few men.”296 
Even prior to the Communist victory in China, Wu was laying the groundwork 
for allying with the CCP.  He argued that true Christians should support the 
Communist movement.  His argument concluded that Christianity had lost its way in 
China, and “that in its history of the past hundred years it has unconsciously changed 
to become a conservative force. And now at the present stage it has become a 
reactionary force.” Yet he finished his article with a strong proclamation of his faith.  
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“In spite of our stupidity, weakness and selfishness, he [Jesus] forever stands before 
us, beckoning us forward to a rebirth of mind and soul.”297 
The article got Wu in of trouble among the Protestant community in China. 
Tian Feng was published initially through the YMCA, which was striving to avoid 
entanglement in Chinese politics.  Wu actually addressed that in his article, saying 
“There may be many who think naively that Christianity is above politics...”298 He 
did not specifically name the YMCA, but by implication he certainly included them. 
Even though Tian Feng represented the more liberal side of Christianity in China, the 
clearly pro-Communist argument did not go over well among its board and readers.  
As a result, Wu was removed as editor of Tian Feng. 
 By 1949, Wu had begun working with the CCP, particularly Zhou Enlai, to 
help Christians work with the Communist regime, which would eventually lead to the 
TSPM. When he and his colleagues approached Zhou about the Manifesto in 1950, 
they approached not as a group trying to influence a great movement, but as 
supplicants who were trying to get in line with that movement.  One of his colleagues 
outlined the meeting afterward in notes to American missionaries. He stated two goals 
of presenting the manifesto. The first was “to secure his [Zhou’s] help in meeting 
certain problems of the churches.” These included seizure of church property, 
intimidation of clergy and interference with church operations.  Secondly, they wanted 
Zhou’s help “to determine our own attitude and policy.” They were essentially asking 
what policy would be deemed correct by the CCP.  The implication was that Chinese 
Christians understood that the church’s continued existence depended on conforming 
to Communist standards.  They went on to say, “Most of our difficulties, we realize, 
are from within the church. We cannot shove responsibility off on the 
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government.”299 This attitude of penitence shows the Three-Self Church as largely a 
defensive creation that would allow Christianity to survive under Communism. Given 
Wu’s earlier embrace of Communism, he may have expected greater acceptance by the 
CCP. Yet by 1950, he and his colleagues were not feeling secure. They were at least 
wary enough to offer a mea culpa for supposed wrong doing as a means of protecting 
the church. 
The timing of the Christian Manifesto proved to be quite important.  It was 
first published about a month before the outbreak of the Korean War, but its authors 
had clearly been working on it for some time. When they approached Zhou looking for 
support and protection, Zhou’s initial reaction, according to the notes of one of the 
authors, was that he “may issue later an order for protection of the Christian church. 
But we must do our part first, to dissociate ourselves from all imperialism.”300 This 
lukewarm response did not give heart to Manifesto’s authors, but they went out to gain 
as many signatures as possible for the manifesto.  The beginning of the Korean War a 
little over a month later was most likely a decisive factor in the Manifesto gaining 
support from both Christians and the CCP.  The war added vigor to the anti-imperialist 
and anti-American rhetoric. Even before the Chinese army intervened in November of 
1950, the “Resist America, Support Korea” campaign began a mass mobilization of 
people and resources to assist in the war. Anyone not fully participating would be 
viewed as suspect. The TSPM was a great opportunity for Chinese Christians to 
demonstrate their loyalty to the cause, no doubt dramatically increasing its 
membership.  Equally important, it gave the Chinese government a means to control 
Protestant churches without violating its promise of religious freedom.  They could 
use the TSPM to mobilize Christians and give them direction that would coincide with 
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Communist programs.  As a result, Zhou’s initial mild response to the Christian 
Manifesto in spring changed to one of strong support for the TSPM by autumn. 
The TSPM supported the war effort enthusiastically. Its initial organizational 
meeting in 1951 was inelegantly named the “Preparatory Council of the China 
Christian Resist-America Help-Korea Three-Self Reform Movement.”  It urged 
patriotic mobilization to fight against the imperialism of the United States.  More 
concretely, the prominent TSPM leader T. C. Chao resigned his position as one of the 
Presidents of the World Council of Churches (he was one of six when it was founded 
in 1948) when the WCC Central Committee designated North Korea as the aggressor 
in the war. He said, “as a patriotic Chinese I must protest against the Toronto message 
[condemning North Korea], which sounds so much like the voice of Wall Street.”301  
Although it was not officially launched until 1954, the TSPM was already the 
dominant organization of Christianity by 1951. It quickly displaced the Church of 
Christ in China, which had been the largest umbrella Protestant church. Prior to the 
Communist takeover the CCC had the most influence among Christians and with the 
government, even though many denominations had never joined. After the 
establishment of the PRC, the CCC had initially worked with the new government, but 
was gradually being marginalized as the Communist regime solidified its power.  The 
publication of the Christian Manifesto, made in high-level consultation with Chinese 
government, demonstrated the shift in power among Chinese Christians.  As discussed 
in Chapter 3, attempts by Christians to be apolitical marked them as potential 
subversives. The Christian Manifesto’s demonstration of the loyalty and political 
awareness of Chinese Christians contrasted starkly with the CCC’s tepid embrace of 
the new order. In an effort to remain relevant against the rise of TSPM, the CCC sent 
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messages to foreign missionary societies that basically echoed the nationalist themes 
of the Christian Manifesto. It said, “All grades of church organization within the 
Church of Christ in China and all forms of work under them shall strive to attain the 
goal of autonomy – self-government, self-support and self-propagation – within the 
shortest possible time.” While this sounded good and would no doubt be appreciated 
by the authorities, the CCC undermined that message with a touch of moderation that 
deviated from the tone of the Christian Manifesto. It finished with, “You know, 
without our saying it again, how greatly we appreciate the contributions of your China 
Mission to the establishment of the Christian church in China. Christian memories and 
influences abide, and in Christ no thought or labour or prayer is ever lost.”302  The 
CCC attempted to ride the wave of nationalism, but still failed to understand how 
adversely any sign of affection for missionaries would be taken by the Chinese 
government.  The letter was written barely two months after the Chinese had 
intervened in the Korean War. The massive “Resist America, Aid Korea” campaign to 
mobilize the Chinese masses was already underway.  The inclusion of the caveat of 
appreciation was tantamount to a suicide note for the organization, which was quickly 
absorbed by the TSPM. It stopped having organized meetings later in 1951 and it 
leaders were soon absorbed into the TSPM or denounced as imperialist 
sympathizers.303 
The creation of the Three-Self Church and Chao’s resignation sent a clear 
signal to the Chinese government that Chinese Christians were loyal to China first.  
Western Christians saw that signal as well, although their information was spotty.  
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Tian Feng, which was sporadically received in Hong Kong and then sent to churches 
in the United States and Europe, was one of the few avenues for westerners to see the 
development of Chinese Christianity.  It had been founded as a YMCA journal, but 
was quickly absorbed into the TSPM. Wu no doubt found some satisfaction in 
reestablishing control of it only a few years after being forced to resign. As the main 
published work of the TSPM, Tien Feng was an important source of information on 
Christianity in China for the outside world.  It offered some insights in the TSPM’s 
own words. Tien Feng was geared towards a Chinese audience to show the patriotism 
of its members, but to foreigners it showed some of the key difficulties of Chinese 
Christians operating in the PRC.  In mid-1951, it detailed a speech by the Dr. H.H. 
Tsui, Secretary General of the Church of Christ in China, that showed an attempt at 
accommodating Christian and Communist dogma.  He talked about accusation 
meetings, which were a key part of the mobilization of the Chinese masses.  For 
missionaries, as well as most western Christians, accusation meetings seemed 
antithetical to the Christian ideals of forgiveness and toleration. Tsui, however, made 
them seem not only compatible but complementary.  He said that while he used to try 
to look on everyone’s good points, he was doing both them and himself a disservice.  
They should be made aware of their faults and he should let go of his resentment.  He 
seems to suggest that making an accusation, if done whole-heartedly, was like a 
catharsis.  After he made the accusations, the relief he felt as a Christian was like a 
“new birth,” a clear reference to the rite of baptism.304  
Tsui was trying to incorporate Communist methods into Christianity.  In 
addition to showing the utility of accusation meeting, he advocated a redirection of 
Christianity from personal salvation to collectively helping the Chinese people.  
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Rather than focusing on individual spiritual salvation, Chinese Christians should move 
closer to God by implementing Jesus’s teachings on earth. This would mean working 
for the betterment of the Chinese people as a whole, showing the generosity and 
selflessness Jesus illustrated in the Gospels.  In one respect, this was a traditional 
Christian approach.  Echoing the philosophy of social gospel missionaries, he said that 
Christians must stand with the people. But he quickly moved to a more combative 
tone. He said that if your internal feelings take you in a different direction, you must 
“struggle with yourself.” The word “struggle” was quite common in CCP doctrine. Its 
use here was another shift towards incorporating parts of Communism into 
Christianity.  He continued by arguing that Christians must draw clear lines between 
their friends and enemies. In conjunction with that, Christians should join the rest of 
China in opposing imperialism. This message appears to have had two meanings.  Tsui 
was telling Chinese Christians that missionaries were not their friends.  On the 
contrary, missionaries were imperialist agents who corrupted the gospel by using it to 
undermine China.  Chinese Christians should resist missionary attempts to resist the 
revolution.  The message was also a veiled threat to Chinese Christians to join the 
mass movements or be labeled an enemy.  Tsui emphasized where everyone’s first 
loyalty should be by saying, “I love the Church; much more do I love our great strong 
fatherland.” Love of China must be preeminent.   
Chinese Christians, who were already under suspicion for having divided 
loyalty and ties to foreigners, had to demonstrate their love of China even more than 
most Chinese.  Tsui left no doubts about that at the conclusion of his speech.  He said, 
“The Church still harbors agents of imperialism and the teeth and class of the running 
dogs.”305 Although this statement was undoubtedly meant as a warning to Chinese 
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Christian, it was most likely also a statement of his own loyalty for the government.  
In warning his Christian brethren that they were already under suspicion, he was also 
showing them how to prove their allegiance by demonstrating his own. 
Tsui’s speech, being published in Tian Feng, was another strong indicator of 
the direction of the TSPM.  Chinese Christian leaders were adapting Christianity to the 
new Communist environment that placed nationalism over religion.  Like missionaries 
before them, they were facing something new in the CCP.  The Communists had 
control over the entirety of mainland China and the ability to enforce its will on 
Chinese society.  The Qing Dynasty had been hostile to Christianity as a dangerous 
heterodoxy, but was forced to accept it because of the unequal treaties enforced by 
western weapons.  As an institution, the GMD was deeply suspicious of Christians, but 
it did not have the means to impose its control.  Chiang Kai-Shek, despite being a 
Christian himself (at least nominally), was still wary of Christian churches as socially 
destabilizing and as a potential rival source of power.  But since the GMD could not 
expunge Christianity, it tried to exploit it by using Christian schools to push its 
propaganda. It also promoted its connections to Christians in hopes of garnering more 
foreign aid.  The CCP, on the other hand, had the power to eradicate Christianity.  
When Christians began joining the TSPM, they were acknowledging the new reality in 
China.   
The creation of the TSPM and its strongly anti-foreign rhetoric gave pause to 
even the most optimistic western church leaders.  It did not explicitly replace the NCC 
and CCC, but both of those organizations were quickly withering. The mass support 
that the TSPM had garnered promised to accelerate that process. Chao’s resignation 
from the WCC cut another connection between the ecumenical movement and Chinese 
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Christianity.  Many American church leaders believed that a break between Chinese 
Christians and the WCC was imminent.306 
Despite these discouraging signs coming from China, many leaders in the 
American missionary community felt that they must try to keep in contact with the 
Chinese Church, even if support for the Church was impossible.  In March 1951, the 
General Secretary of the IMC said, “There is a universal conviction that everything 
possible must be done to maintain living ecumenical contact with the Church in 
China.”307 His feelings were echoed by many members of the IMC council, but they 
recognized the difficulties confronting them, greatest of which was simply the 
mechanics of communications. There was no direct way to contact anyone in China 
from the United States. All communications had to go through very convoluted back 
channels and were unreliable. Most messages were sent through either Hong Kong, 
where smuggling in and out of China was commonplace, or third parties in non-
aligned countries like India, which did not have the taint of imperialism. 
Even if communication could be sent, there were dangers to trying it.  Lloyd 
Ruland, Secretary of the Presbyterian Mission Board, highlighted the dangers to 
Chinese Christians who were in contact with foreigners.  He wrote, “It is unwise for 
Chinese to write to anyone in America, and it is a very serious embarrassment for 
them to receive any letters from anyone in this country.”308 This was a reflection on 
the experience of missionaries in the last year they were in China.  Their friends and 
congregations shunned them because any association with them would bring the 
attention of the local cadres.  One missionary said, “We wanted to stay and help the 
Chinese rebuild, but we realized our presence was hurting those we were trying to 
help.  For me, it was when I realized that our gardener was being physically assaulted 
                                                        
306 “China Protestants Cutting World Tie”, The New York Times, Oct. 14, 1951. 
307 Charles W. Ranson. IMC letter to missions. Mar. 2, 1951, CRP RG8 Box 56, Folder 6 
308 Lloyd S. Ruland. Letter to Elleroy M. Smith, Apr. 10, 1951, PHS RG82-68-6. 
158 
 
for working for the imperialists. I knew I needed to go.”309 Ruland was making a 
similar point when the Mission Board was accused of giving up.  He wrote, “It should 
be made clear that these withdrawals are not through any personal fear or 
unwillingness to suffer, but solely because of the missionaries’ consideration for their 
Chinese colleagues and the welfare of the work.”310 
He then returned to the issue of future communications with Chinese 
Christians, noting the difficulties they were facing. “All Christians are under extreme 
pressure to say something affirmative in connection with the present program of 
government, speaking adversely of anything pertaining to American and American 
imperialism.”311 He concluded that although the Mission Board had a strong interest 
in the health and growth of the Chinese Church, it was completely out of the hands of 
western churches.  “We must, during this period, trust these fellow Christians, for we 
believe that the Word has been grounded in their hearts and they will come through 
this testing period with a clear record.”312 Ruland was acknowledging that 
communications had been cut. Yet he was also offering the hope that if missionaries 
had done a good job of planting the seeds of Christianity in China, the church there 
would survive without assistance from westerners. 
First Hand Observers 
With the limited information coming from China, the few personal contacts 
between Chinese and western Christians took on much more importance.  No 
American clergy went to China in the 1950’s, but there were trips by European and 
Australian clergy. These were ostensibly fact finding missions, but rather than helping 
settle the question of what was going on with Christianity in China, they created more 
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controversy.  The trips served as a Rorschach test for westerners, inevitably 
confirming the opinions of the PRC for groups that condemned the TSPM, as well as 
the contrasting opinions of those that wanted better relations with it. 
The timing was also to follow up on trips, which had taken place in the 
previous few years, by clergy from other western countries. When the Korean War 
ended, western church leaders hoped that relations with the Chinese Church might 
slowly be reopened.  There was still almost no direct communication, but there were 
some grounds for optimism.  The PRC was looking to end its isolation, but on its own 
terms. By 1954 the PRC government began to invite some western Christians to 
China, albeit those that were already sympathetic towards the PRC.  
In early 1955, a delegation of British Quakers visited China and returned with 
a favorable image of the Church in China. At a mission conference later that year, one 
of its members, Janet Rees, presented a cautiously optimistic view of Christianity 
under Chinese Communism.  She started with a qualification: “First, it must be said 
that Christians have been carried along with the general tide of national life, feeling 
themselves as good patriots.” She moved on to say how the church was thriving under 
Communism. They had lost a substantial portion of “rice Christians”, meaning those 
who converted for material benefit, but “the church was stronger for their going.”  She 
also noted that because of government services, which the Chinese Christians 
described as having “brought in many Christian principles,” the churches only focused 
on direct Christian work, meaning witness meetings and proselytizing. Rees seemed to 
think this was an excellent use of resources that would strengthen the church 
further.313 
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Rees also had a positive spin on the isolation of the church from any non-
Chinese contacts.  “The acceptance of the patriotic movement has involved looking 
inwards rather than outwards.”314 She went on to say: “It was clear that the Churches 
are rather wrapped up in themselves, concentrating on Church activities – holding 
services, Bible study, Sunday schools, open meetings, but all associated with the 
internal life of the Church.” Her implication was that the isolation was self-imposed 
by the church and was a positive.315 
The did mention an interview with Chinese Church leaders, Y. T. Wu among 
them, where they hinted that there were political problems with foreign contacts.  The 
Chinese leaders said that the time was not right for contact with western churches. 
They suggested that contact could create problems for any Chinese who received 
letters from foreigners.  Her own observations confirmed this when she said that the 
Chinese “are not remembering very forcibly the people here [former missionaries to 
China]; when names are mentioned there was a response, but nothing was followed up 
after the first ‘How good’ and ‘Give him or her our greetings’.” Rather than attribute 
that to any political hazards that might arise from showing interest, she attributed the 
lack of interest to the fact that “they were absorbed in what they are doing in their own 
country and their Church.”316  
Perhaps most optimistic was a note near the end of her presentation.  Rees 
wrote: “It was not known if the Christian leaders would have to make a report of their 
meetings with the delegation.” 317  Rees gave the benefit of the doubt to Chinese 
Christians throughout her visit and in her subsequent report, but this was stretching 
credulity.  The PRC was avowedly isolationist and atheist. Christians were already 
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viewed with suspicion about foreign influence.  It is almost inconceivable that 
government officials would not have interviewed the Chinese Christians who met the 
foreigners.  This question, as much as anything, demonstrates how much Rees wanted 
to portray the Chinese Church as independent and thriving. 
It should not be surprising that Rees looked favorably on Chinese Christianity. 
She had lived in China for almost four decades before leaving in 1950.  She was born 
in China while her parents were serving as missionaries there.  So the Church of Christ 
in China was not only her life’s work, but that of her parents as well.  Her desire to see 
it succeed no doubt colored her opinion of it. 
Rees’s presentation was quickly communicated to Christian leaders in the 
United States, most of whom were encouraged by it.  Her report, however, 
demonstrated a bias that ran through first-hand reports from China.  Those who went 
to China to meet with Chinese Christians had a predisposition to give the benefit of 
the doubt to the Chinese Church, as well as the PRC as a whole.  The fact that they 
were invited to China and then made the effort to go, which was a very difficult task, 
demonstrated that they had some affinity towards finding common ground with the 
Chinese Church and that they were politically acceptable to the Chinese government. 
Those who were condemning the Chinese Church were not issued invitations and 
would likely not have taken them had they been issued. 
The report also came at a difficult time in US-China relations.  The Taiwan 
Straits crisis of 1954-5 had made many think there would soon be open war between 
the two powers.318 Britain was not directly involved in the standoff, but showed some 
concern for a potential general war.  For the American public, what appeared to be 
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reckless adventurism by China undermined the hope for better relations that had 
grown since the end of the Korea War.319 
With Sino-American relations on a continuing roller coaster, direct information 
about China continued to come from foreign sources.  A 1956 trip by Australian clergy 
demonstrated this inherent bias.  An issue of the American Christian weekly, The 
Church Herald, ran a series of articles that gave conflicting views of the trip. The first 
article argued that the Chinese Church was flourishing under Communism. That article 
was followed on the same page with an article calling the Chinese Church little more 
than a puppet of the Communist state.  The first was written from the report of Dr. W. 
K. Mowll, an Anglican Archbishop who headed a delegation of eight men to China. 
After stating that the church in China was thriving, Mowll said, “I suppose a priest 
could say what he liked in the pulpit and even criticize the government in China, but I 
never heard of anyone doing it. Perhaps it is because the people feel they have a real 
share in the government.”320  The second article was based on comments of Malcolm 
Mackay, a Methodist clergyman who took exception to Mowll’s remarks.  Although he 
had apparently not been to China to see firsthand, he argued vehemently that the 
Chinese Church was “playing its role in subverting men and women from the true 
Gospel of Jesus Christ.”  He went on to call Mowll’s statements and those like them 
“sentimental nonsense” and “high treason in an ideological war.”321  
A third article in the same issue reported on the statements of Dr. George L. 
Ford, who served as Executive Director of the National Association of Evangelicals 
(NAE). The NAE was founded in the 1940’s as a conservative counter to the Federal 
Council of Churches, which transformed into the National Council of Churches in 
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1949.  The NAE was a loose association of fundamentalist churches that believed that 
the NCC and its mainstream members were too liberal. It was made up of many 
smaller organizations, but by the late 1950’s, had a membership of over 1.5 million 
people from 32 denominations.  Speaking for the NAE, Ford saw the recent trips by 
the Australian Christian leaders and the proposed American delegation from the NCC 
to the PRC as worthless at best, and dangerous at worst. “Any such visit would be 
highly circumscribed by the Red China government thus preventing a realistic view of 
the church. Contact would be established, not with the true uncompromising 
Christians of China, but with those liberal churchmen who have sold out to the 
Communist regime.”322 Ford’s comments were probably meant as a not so veiled 
attack on the NCC, which his organization viewed as too secular.  He was also 
challenging any attempt to find compromise with the PRC, alluding to the lack of 
religious freedom under its rule.   
The visit by the Australian team received U.S. coverage from non-religious 
publications as well. The New York Times covered its departure, noting that it was “the 
first representative group of religious leaders from outside the Iron Curtain to visit 
China since the Communists took over the country in 1949,” apparently forgetting 
about the Quakers the year before.323 Newspapers across the country published 
articles about the disagreement between Mowll and Mackay.  One titled “Red China 
Religion Free, Says Australian Archbishop.”  Despite the title, the article spent more 
time discussing Mackay’s challenges, including the pithy quote: “The church in China 
is as free as a tiger in a cage.”324 
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There was one notable trip in the other direction. In 1956, K. H. Ting visited 
the UK to meet with church leaders. Ting was educated at mission schools in China, 
including getting two Bachelor’s degrees from St. John’s University in Shanghai. He 
received a Masters in theology from Union Theological Seminary in New York shortly 
after World War II.  After working for the World Council of Churches for three years 
in Switzerland, Ting returned to China in 1951 to take his place in the PRC. He was a 
surprising leader for the Chinese Church because he had spent the entire civil war in 
western countries. He had only limited personal contacts with Chinese Christians and 
his experience in the United States and Europe must have made him suspect to the 
Communist regime. Nevertheless, he rose quickly after returning to China and soon 
became one of the leaders of the TSPM.   
When he traveled to the United Kingdom, it was the first trip abroad by a 
major Chinese Christian leader since the revolution. The official reason for the 
meeting was preparation for the 1958 Lambeth Conference, which was a meeting of 
Anglican Communion that occurred every ten years, but Ting’s presence was 
something of a distraction from the business at hand. His visit was such a rare 
opportunity to speak with a Chinese Christian leader that he was given time to address 
the meeting.325   
Ting used his speech to promote the image of Chinese Christianity.  He spoke 
at length on the point that the Church’s mission, which was to bring the Chinese 
people to Christ, had not changed under Communism. He also offered an implied 
rebuke to the missionary movement in China.  A report of his speech said, “Christians 
in China had not been prepared for the events of 1949, and as all supporting agencies 
were withdrawn they were forced back to God alone…vague Christianity was no 
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help.” Ting later added a hint about the church floundering under missionaries but 
recovering after they left.  “The Church has surrendered its crutches one after the 
other. Judged by human standards the Church without its supporting medical and 
educational institutions looks weaker, but in reality is stronger.” He suggested that the 
Chinese Church was more streamlined and effective in its primary tasks by removing 
these services.  Ting spoke about the growth of the Church under the TSPM.  The 
TSPM itself was a rebuke to missionaries and westerners, and Ting used his platform 
to drive home the point. He noted, “In the past the Church had been too detached from 
the people. It had been too much like the elder brother in the story of the Prodigal Son, 
or like the Prophet Jonah. The Church has learned that it must love the people.” 326 
Ting finished by saying that the Chinese “are not antagonistic to evangelism, 
but feel that they must beware of Colonialism.” He supported increased contact with 
foreign Christians but suggested that personal visits to China would be best.  When 
asked if Christmas cards would be acceptable, Ting had no objection. Ting was not 
invited to the United States on this trip, nor would he likely have gone had he been 
invited. Had he been, it would be interesting to see if American Christmas cards would 
be as welcome.327 
Ting’s speech had a two-fold purpose. First, he was showing the strength of the 
TSPM behind the Communist regime.  Because the new PRC government provided 
the social services which had previously fallen to missionaries (education, health 
care), the TSPM was able to focus on living as Christians. He was vague on what this 
meant, particularly as he talked about serving the community, but also boasted that the 
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church no longer provided social services.  Nevertheless, he was making a case that 
Chinese Christianity was stronger under Communist rule. 
Coupled with that was a rebuke to missionaries for their role in imperialism.  
His speech was clearly trying to drive home the point that Chinese Christianity 
suffered because of missionary actions.  He implied an appreciation that missionaries 
brought Christianity to China, although he did not actually say it as the CCC had done 
in 1950, but he claimed that missionaries used an imperialist model of Christianity that 
actually undermined the strength of China. Only by removing foreign missionaries and 
creating a truly Chinese church could Christianity thrive and help build a new China. 
When Ting finished, the Anglican leaders initially responded to Ting’s speech 
with a prepared statement. With the clear Chinese association between missionaries 
and imperialism, the British leaders seemed keen to distance themselves from 
missions in China and establish relations between the Chinese and English churches as 
equals.  They started with a quick praise of the development of the Three-Self Church. 
“We rejoice to know of the continued life and witness of the Churches in China and of 
their self-government, self-support and self-propagation.”  After the Anglican leaders 
offered an assurance that they regarded “the Churches in China as Churches in the 
same sense as we regard Churches of this country…,” they added a further assurance 
that “we do not regard China as a ‘mission field’ in the sense that the re-establishment 
of missionary organization is contemplated or desired.”  As a final measure of 
ambivalence towards missions, they said, “that the present close association of the 
International Missionary Council with the World Council of Churches is a subject of 
constant searching and examination by both bodies….” It was a remarkable statement 
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by missionary leaders who seemed uncomfortable with the organizations they ran, at 
least in regards to China.328 
The Anglicans’ statement aimed to open the door for more visits to China. 
Ting’s visit, despite his anti-imperialist rhetoric, gave hope to both British and 
American Christians that relations with Chinese Christians could be reopened.   The 
NCC proposed sending a delegation shortly after they received a report of Ting’s visit 
to the UK. News of the proposal served conflicting purposes in the debate in the 
United States. Ecumenicals were optimistic that this was the opening they had been 
waiting for, while advocates of isolating China saw Ting’s statements as evidence of 
the subservience of Christianity in China to the CCP. 
The timing of the proposed trip was partly because Chinese society appeared to 
be opening more in 1956.  Towards the end of that year, the CCP launched the 
Hundred Flowers Campaign. This was a project where Mao Zedong wanted to open 
society to “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend.” 
This colorful language seemed to signal that the Chinese government felt secure 
enough to open itself to public criticism.  Although the details were scarce in the 
United States, the little information available encouraged those Americans who 
believed the PRC would moderate its behavior once it did not feel threatened. These 
groups hoped that this openness would allow Chinese Christians to finally be accepted 
in Chinese society.329 
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By this point the China Committee, the part of the missionary division of the 
NCC that dealt with China, had been put in an awkward position. It was responsible 
for all of China, but there were no missionaries in the mainland.  As a result its main 
purpose was to coordinate missionaries in Hong Kong, whose numbers had grown 
exponentially as a mission since 1950, and Taiwan. But it would also be responsible if 
the relations between the American and Chinese churches were to be reestablished.  
When missionaries had been expelled in 1951, it had taken the position that relations 
should be reestablished as soon as possible. But by 1957, it had to be careful that its 
attempts to do that would not unduly support the PRC’s hopes for international 
legitimacy. 
 In a 1957 meeting, the China Committee tried to address the issue of 
reestablishing communications between the two churches. It began by acknowledging 
that relations were essentially broken and it outlined the questions facing a renewal of 
those relations.  If there was a change in the Chinese government (a constant hope for 
most Americans), would there be a change in the leadership of the Christian Church in 
China? If they thought that was likely, why contact the current Chinese Church now? 
Implicit in this issue was the question of whether the Church had become an arm of 
the Communist Party.  Had the church so suborned itself to Communist policies that it 
was no longer a truly Christian organization?  “The general consensus has been that 
we agree on the desirability of resumption of communication with Chinese Christians 
but feel that a direct approach at this time would be premature and unwise.” 330 That 
it was considered premature might have been because of the continued hope that 
Communist China would collapse, but it was also because any communication to 
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Chinese Christians would only put them under suspicion at a time when Chinese 
society appeared to be opening slightly. 
The China Committee was also concerned with the politics of the situation.  
Some of its members were afraid that its efforts at ecumenism with the Three-Self 
Church would be taken as evidence that they accepted the legitimacy of the PRC 
government.  Its final resolutions included some very benign statements.  It held on to 
the responsibility “as a clearing house of information.” Later in the meeting it adopted 
a resolution that included the vague statement, “When the Committee feels that the 
time is probably right, it will communicate with other agencies of the NCC.”331 It 
finally got to a more concrete expression of its unease when it finished with the 
admonition, “that we must be alert to the Communist Government’s effort for support 
from all possible sources for admission to the United Nations and the danger that they 
might seek to work through American church leaders for such support.” While the 
minutes did not object to the PRC’s seating at the UN, it was concerned that support 
for the PRC might have “possible repercussions from the Chinese Government in 
Taiwan.” While the China Committee was inclined to improve relations with the PRC 
(see Chapter 5), it had an increased commitment to areas that the PRC claimed, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.  Renewed relations between American and mainland Chinese 
churches could not come if it supported the expansion of PRC power into areas that 
had churches independent of political pressure. The China Committee had altered its 
position to reflect the geo-political realities of the day.332  
Some individuals had a more hopeful view of the possibilities for a renewed 
relationship.  Wallace Merwin, a former missionary to China and a prolific writer on 
Chinese Christianity after returning to the United States, demonstrated a cautious 
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optimism in his 1958 address to the China Committee about the potential to 
reestablish the relationship between Chinese and American Christianity.  He said that, 
“In spite of this undeniable break in communications, prayers have continued to go up 
on both sides of the curtain for individual Christians and for the Church of Christ.”333  
His speech outlined the contacts between the westerners and Chinese Christians 
during the last decade.  He did not deny the paucity of those contacts (barely ten in ten 
years) but blamed them on the governments of the United States and China, while 
arguing that Christians on both sides wanted warmer relations.  
This was not Merwin’s first attempt to open discussion with the TSPM.  In 
1957, he had written to several mission boards to support the idea of an American 
delegation to China.  While it was received courteously, mission boards had 
reservations and ultimately the trip was shelved.  In one response to Merwin’s letter, 
the General Secretary of the Methodist Board of World Missions, Eugene Smith, said 
that such a trip would be “to act altogether too much from political grounds.”  He 
suggested that the situation in China and the “recent record of relationships between 
the two countries” would make any trip to establish ecumenical relations ultimately 
distorted and render any fact finding of very limited use.  Having recently spoken to 
Ting while he was in England, Smith said that he appreciated Ting’s positive reports 
“even with the strong feeling that I have as to the dependability of Ting’s 
interpretation of what has happened in China.” This polite language diluted what 
appears to be a significant distrust of Ting’s presentation of the direction of Chinese 
Christianity.  That distrust and the desire to stay out of the political battle precluded 
sending an American delegation to visit the PRC.334 
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Conclusion 
When missionaries returned to the United States from China in 1950 and 1951, 
they immediately began asking “what happened?”  Did they do something that 
contributed to the end of missions in China or was that result due to external factors?  
Ultimately they were concerned with whether the missions were successful or whether 
the expulsion of missionaries meant the failure of the Christian enterprise in China.  
Missionaries were heavily invested in the Chinese church, with many of them having 
been in China for decades. The health of the church was a judgment on their life’s 
work. 
The health of the Chinese church also had repercussions on politics.  If the 
church was surviving as an independent entity and meeting the spiritual needs of its 
members, it indicated that the CCP was allowed religious freedom once missionaries 
had been removed from the equation.  In that case, there was a good chance that the 
United States could find a working relationship with China. If, however, the church 
had been made into an appendage of the CCP to control Christians, it showed that 
Communist assurances of religious freedom were just more broken promises.   
Like most debates among missionaries, this one saw very little agreement.  
There was not much information available other than anecdotes from returned 
missionaries, so most analysis of why missionaries were expelled was very subjective.  
The more concrete discussion was on the strength of Chinese Christianity.  In 1951, 
there was cautious optimism among many missionaries that the Chinese church could 
survive, and potentially thrive, under Communism. The withdrawal of missionaries 
and the end of the unequal treaties removed some of the foreign taint of Christianity. 
These missionaries hoped that Chinese leadership of the church and the supposed 
172 
 
religious freedom that the PRC professed would help Christianity grow under the new 
regime.   
The outbreak of the Korean War 1950 was a huge blow to that hope.  Not only 
did it put anyone in the United States on the defensive if they spoke kindly of the 
Chinese, it also reinforced the need for Chinese Christians to prove their loyalty and 
distance themselves from the United States.  The creation of the Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement was a means to do that. It created some security for Christians by 
providing them an organization where they could profess their faith while also 
demonstrating their patriotism.  After the Korean War ended in 1953, relations opened 
somewhat, but the direction of the TSPM was not in doubt. Even with the slight 
opening of the PRC after the war, the TSPM had to continue to strongly profess its 
loyalty under a regime that disdained religion in general and Christianity specifically. 
 Over the course of the 1950’s, the development of the TSPM disheartened 
many missionaries. They came to believe that the TSPM was merely an adjunct of the 
CCP.  This conclusion implied that missions had failed because the Chinese church 
had turned its back on many of the most important aspects of Christianity.  Although 
very few missionaries actually came out and said that, there was general pall cast over 
any discussion of Chinese Christianity. When Wallace Merwin made his impassioned 
speech in 1958, he represented the liberal Christian groups that still believed in 
reestablishing relations with Chinese Christians.  By that point, however, those groups 
were becoming an ever smaller the minority.  
The debate among missionaries over religious freedom in China paralleled the 
debate over reestablishing relations with the PRC, but not precisely. The direction of 
the TSPM had disheartened many missionaries. Missionaries had long implied that 
religious freedom was a test of the new order in China.  Yet when the CCP failed that 
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test, many liberal missionaries did not abandon their call for better relations with 
China.  They would continue to advocate a less dogmatic view of Communism in the 
spirit of ecumenism even when it was very unpopular and they were being largely 
ignored. 
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Chapter 5 
 
“Losing to the Cold War Consensus: The Marginalization of Dissenting American 
Missionaries in China in the 1950s” 
 
Mary Reed Dewar was preparing to speak to an assembly of high school 
students in Boston about her years in China.  It was 1952 and the fear of Communism 
was palpable.  It was her first speaking experience after spending three years under the 
control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).  To make a good impression, she 
bought a new dress and had her hair done. Slightly nervous, she arrived at the school 
auditorium early. While waiting there, the usually outgoing missionary engaged some 
of the students in conversation. The students were surprised by her healthy and well-
groomed appearance, apparently expecting someone either emaciated or wearing rags.  
Dewar, who by her own description was “stout”, hardly fit the bill. They pressed her to 
describe the hardships she experienced under the Communists, only to find that life, 
by her account, was not that bad.  Although she disagreed with the CCP on a lot of 
issues, she thought life in China was better there than it had been under the Nationalist 
regime of Christian leader Chiang Kai-Shek.  One of the school administrators walked 
in on the middle of this conversation and was aghast at her words.  After asking Dewar 
to clarify her position, he canceled her speech.335 
Dewar’s story reflects a process that we normally associate with the State 
Department in the early 1950’s.  “China hands,” experts who had often worked on 
Chinese issues for decades, were dismissed from the State Department for supposedly 
being soft on Communism. They often condemned GMD incompetence or suggested 
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trying to work with the Communists, which made their loyalty appear suspect.  Their 
dismissals were not official policy, but the growing anti-Communist hysteria of the 
day made their removal politically expedient for their superiors to avoid similar 
charges.  The biggest symbol of that hysteria was Joseph McCarthy, who began his 
rise to fame with a list of State Department personnel who were supposed members of 
the Communist Party.  Because of the increasing frenzy of anti-communist feelings, 
many of the most knowledgeable China experts in the State Department were gone 
within a few years of the Communist victory in China, replaced by people with less 
understanding of China, but strong anti-communist feeling.336   
As Dewar’s story suggests, a similar process was happening with missionaries 
returning from China.  Those who were anti-communist found a receptive audience 
among Americans who wanted their anti-communist views confirmed.  In contrast, 
missionaries who acknowledged both the good and bad of the newly established 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) were viewed with suspicion.  These returned 
missionaries were trapped by the emerging Cold War consensus in which both major 
political parties and the vast majority of American society agreed that Communism 
was a threat to America and had to be resisted.337 
Many missionaries returning from China in the early 1950’s were largely 
disillusioned with the Communists, but they also remembered the terrible times that 
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preceded Communist rule.  The Guomindang government of Chiang Kai-shek had 
been brutal, corrupt, and incompetent.  Hyperinflation, brought on by economic 
mismanagement, had destroyed the lives of the average Chinese.  The Communists 
had much to answer for, specifically their restrictions on religion and their totalitarian 
tendencies, but many missionaries believed they  still represented an improvement.  
Yet when these missionaries returned from China, their pleas for recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China fell on deaf ears.  They were marginalized by an already 
established narrative that painted the Communists as brutally crushing individualism 
in favor of the collective.  
Returning missionaries seemed to be in a strong position to influence the 
public debate. Of all American citizens, they had the best first-hand knowledge of 
Communist China.  They should have had more credibility than other commentators.  
Missionaries generally held a position of esteem in American society because of their 
dedication to religion and service.  In addition, religion was becoming a major aspect 
of the Cold War consensus.  Communist antipathy towards religion was one of the 
main reasons for Americans to fight against them.338  Discussion of suppression of 
religious freedom was a major propaganda tool for the United States, giving 
missionaries a unique position to discuss China in terms of both politics and religion. 
Some missionaries were, in fact, listened to, but mainly those who went with the 
mainstream view.  Missionaries who dissented, meaning they did not automatically 
condemn the PRC, were marginalized as Mary Dewar was.  
This chapter looks at the political attitudes of returning missionaries towards 
Communist China. It reveals that there was a segment of returning missionaries who 
argued against the isolation of China.  They believed that only through engaging China 
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would the extremist tendencies of the CCP be moderated.  These missionaries had 
plenty of reasons to hate the Chinese Communists, but instead wanted to develop an 
understanding with them.  This position required nuance that went against the stark 
black/white, good/evil dichotomy that mainstream Americans accepted as a means to 
understand the early Cold War.  As a result, their voices were lost in the anti-
communist feelings of the time and further drowned out by several provocative actions 
by the CCP.  The American public would ignore these missionaries’ ideas but use their 
stories of hardship to support the policy of isolating China.  
Denationalized Missionaries 
Missionaries who returned to the United States were in an unusual position.  
They could be classified as “Third Culture Kids”. This was a term coined in 1950’s by 
sociologist Ruth Hill Useem to describe children who are raised in a foreign country 
but inherit some of the culture of their native country from their parents.  As a result, 
they form a hybrid culture that can communicate with the cultures of both their 
homeland and their host country, but that is not fully a part of either.  Second and third 
generation missionaries clearly fit this profile as they were born in China to 
missionary parents. Others, who were born in the United States, had been in China for 
so long (often for decades), that they were clearly out of touch with American culture. 
So even though they were not technically third culture kids, they exhibited some of the 
same symptoms, including limited identification with their homeland and lack of 
knowledge of their home culture.  At the same time, they had difficulty fully 
understanding Chinese culture.339   
National identity was less important to missionaries whose life’s work had 
been in China. They did not cease to be Americans, but they identified themselves as 
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Christians as much as Americans. They had dedicated their lives to serving the 
Chinese people, either spiritually or physically.340  The weakened nationalism 
became obvious during the Chinese Civil War, when many missionaries argued for an 
apolitical Christianity that could work under Communism.341 Many missionaries had 
difficulty understanding why their foreignness hurt their cause and why they were 
associated with imperialism by the Chinese. The anti-foreign feeling became worse 
under the Communists, but missionaries continued to try to demonstrate that they 
wanted to serve regardless of their nationality.  The outbreak of the Korean War in 
1950 meant that American missionaries became enemy nationals in China. Even then, 
some missionaries tried to stay and work. It took until 1951 for these missionaries to 
realize that their nationality precluded further service in China. 
The limits of their nationalism manifested itself again when they returned to 
the United States.  Having been overseas as the Cold War consensus against 
communism was forming, they were not caught up in the national emotion about of 
the Communist threat.  They had great reason to be emotional about Chinese 
Communism, yet many missionaries did not share the growing national hostility 
towards the Chinese and the Communism.  Instead, they tried to use their experience 
and expertise to help Americans understand Communist China. These missionaries 
rarely painted a rosy picture, but they did give a more nuanced analysis. In particular, 
they were concerned for Chinese Christians.  Continuing to believe that religion can 
be separated from politics, they advocated Christian understanding of the Chinese 
Communists rather than condemnation and hatred. Victor Hayward, the Anglican 
secretary of the National Council of Churches in China, wrote to the North American 
                                                        
340 Lian Xi. The Conversion of the Missionaries: Liberalism in American Protestant Missions in China, 
1907-1932 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998). 
341 See Chapter 2. 
179 
 
Board of Foreign Missions to argue that maintaining ecumenical contacts was 
essential not only for the church, but as a means to avoid another world war:   
“Viewed from China, there thus appears nothing more important in the world 
today than taking of every step possible, while there is yet time, for the 
bridging by the Churches, on Christian principles and for Christian reasons 
alone, of the ever deepening political chasm which threatens human existence 
itself.”342  
It should not be too surprising that Hayward advocating reaching out. Even 
had he been living in his home country, the British were less dogmatic than 
Americans. Yet his nationality is less telling than his ecumenical philosophy. He 
shared a more universal outlook that looked to protect “human existence.” In this, he 
was representative of many ecumenicals, including American missionaries.  For them, 
ecumenical contacts and reducing tensions seemed logical and consistent with their 
faith. For the larger American public, however, Christianity was inseparably connected 
to nationalism. Christianity was a reason to fight Communism and to make no 
compromises with it.  These missionaries’ separation from American nationalism led 
them to advocate views that were untenable in the political climate of 1950’s America. 
The Recognition Issue and the China Lobby 
By 1949, when it was clear that Communist victory was imminent in China, 
many missionaries and their organizations called for recognition of the PRC. Most of 
the missionaries who wanted recognition, however, stayed in China to try to continue 
their work under Communist rule.  Even after the PRC had forced most missionaries 
to leave in 1951, there was still a feeling among many of them that recognition of the 
PRC was the best course of action.  This demonstrated how out of touch the 
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missionaries were with American public opinion. When they returned to the United 
States, the Korean War was still being fought. The war had hardened American 
opinion against China even while the missionaries were trying to find an 
accommodation with the Communists.   So while missionaries who could claim 
authority from both personal knowledge of China and their religious devotion, they 
found almost no support for their calls for better relations with the PRC.  On the 
contrary, while these missionaries’ views were ignored, anti-Communist groups 
claimed the support of American Christianity for their position of condemning Red 
China. 
The Korean War was the primary catalyst for the solidifying American opinion 
against Communist China.  In June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea and 
overran most of South Korea.  In September, large American reinforcements arrived 
under the banner of the United Nations to drive the North Koreans into the far north of 
the peninsula. The American government had been wary of Chinese intervention but 
believed that because they had only recently vanquished Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, 
the PRC was in too weak of a position to risk war with the United States.  General 
Douglas MacArthur had assured President Harry Truman that the Chinese would stay 
out and that the troops would “be home by Christmas.”  When the Chinese launched a 
devastating counter-offensive in November 1950, both the American government and 
the American people were shocked.  When General Omar Bradley called Truman 
about the Chinese attack, he said he had received “a terrible message” from 
MacArthur that had changed the entire complexion of the war.343 
The war itself was indecisive, at least on the battlefield.  It settled into a 
stalemate by the summer of 1951, but continued until July 1953. The result was to 
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formalize the division of Korea at almost the exact point as before the war. It also 
pushed American policy towards China into a near complete reversal.  Prior to the 
outbreak of the war, the Truman Administration had accepted that Chiang Kai-shek’s 
regime on Taiwan would soon be overrun by the CCP.  After the North Korean 
Invasion, the United States Government moved the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan 
Straits to “neutralize” them. Although it was ostensibly to prevent the PRC from 
attacking Taiwan, but was also to prevent Chiang Kai-Shek from taking advantage of 
the situation to launch an ill-advised attack on the mainland.  
In terms of the American public, the most important result was the 
approximately 40,000 Americans killed or missing.344 The human losses in the war 
solidified American opinion against Communism in general, but specifically against 
the Chinese.  The Chinese army was well-disciplined but poorly armed. They used 
innovative tactics to compensate for their lack of equipment. To the American troops 
and the reporters embedded with them, those tactics looked like a human wave tactic 
where the individual Chinese soldier sacrificed their life in a suicidal charge. They 
would eventually overrun the American positions while accepting huge numbers of 
casualties.  These attacks reinforced the stereotype of the Chinese as a yellow hoard 
with little regard for individual life. Anti-Chinese news stories and political comics 
were very common, often with racial allusions involving collectives and mob 
mentality.345   
The hatred that many Americans felt towards the Chinese obliterated any early 
attempts to suggest moderation with China. Even after the war was over, its legacy 
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would continue to undermine any advocates of engagement for decades.  More than 
anything, the Korean War set the tone of the next two decades of Sino-American 
relations. While the war was going on, talk of recognizing China was almost 
impossible. After the war, it was possible, but got very little traction.  The American 
people did not easily get over their fear of Communism, nor did they forget the 
casualties the Communist Chinese inflicted.  Missionaries returned to an environment 
completely tainted by the war, making their position of moderation a very difficult one 
to defend. 
The most important faction in discussions on China was the China Lobby, 
which was an informal group of political, religious and business leaders who 
advocated very forcefully for a hard line against Red China.  The China Lobby 
dominated the debate on China, targeting any politicians who supported recognition of 
the PRC as potential communist supporters. Although this charge did not always stick, 
the threat was enough to cut off most debate before it started. The Lobby’s most 
prominent spokesman was Senator William Knowland, a Republican from California, 
but many of its members had religious connections, which is not surprising given the 
use of religion in attacks on the PRC.   
Congressman Walter Judd had been a Methodist missionary in China prior to 
World War II. He returned to the United States in 1938 to lobby for more American 
support for Chiang Kai-shek.  Having witnessed the atrocities of the Japanese invasion 
of China a year earlier, he urged the United States Government to end its policy of 
isolation to help the besieged Chinese.  In 1943, he was elected to the U.S. House of 
Representatives and became known for his advocacy of China.  After World War II, 
Judd would become even more vocal for support of China, including taking multiple 
trips to China for fact-finding missions.  His conclusions remained the same after each 
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visit: China needed American help for both moral and practical reasons.  In one speech 
in the House, having just returned from China, Judd quoted another missionary: 
“When the history of our age is assessed, the present leader of China will stand 
revealed as one of its greatest men…A man of the people, he knows their needs and 
has nothing so much at heart as the promotion of their true welfare.”346 This 
assessment of Chiang was, at a minimum, very forgiving.  It was originally made by 
Catholic Bishop James E. Walsh.  Like most Catholics priests in China, Walsh was 
very anti-communist, which made them by necessity pro-Chiang as the only 
alternative in China.   
As the Chinese Civil War tilted decisively against Chiang, Judd shifted his 
speeches. After the Guomindang retreat to Taiwan in early 1949, Judd looked for 
someone to blame. If the reports of Chiang’s greatness were to be believed, the only 
explanation was treachery.  Judd, like most of the China Lobby, believed that the State 
Department had sold Chiang out. In a futile attempt to combat these charges in the 
summer of 1949, the Truman Administration published United States Relations with 
China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, commonly known as the 
“China White Paper.” This was a collection of government papers on its China policy. 
It included a summary which argued that Chiang’s regime was incompetent and 
corrupt. The United States tried to help Chiang but nothing short of direct and massive 
intervention with American troops could save him.   
Rather than placating the China Lobby, the White Paper had the effect of blood 
in shark-filled waters.  Judd was one of many to accuse the Truman Administration of 
covering up the State Department’s betrayal of Chiang.  Immediately after its 
publication, Judd claimed that a World War II report was left out because it said that 
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the CCP was Soviet-dominated and a Communist controlled China would be a disaster 
for the United States.  Judd used the report to show that the White Paper was little 
more than propaganda to defend a failed policy.347  In October 1949, Judd used the 
House floor to accuse the State Department of “conniving” against Chiang at the end 
of World War II.348 He made repeated speeches decrying the betrayal of Chiang, 
using similar language and often referring to World War II as the defining point.  The 
decisions made to support the Soviet Union, particularly at the Yalta Conference in 
1945, undermined Chiang’s position after the war, eventually leading to his defeat.  In 
a 1951 speech, Judd bemoaned the “sacrifice of China in a vain attempt to get 
Communist friendship.”349 Judd would continue this theme throughout the 1950’s. In 
1954, in a speech discussing policy for all of East Asia, Judd called for increased 
support to counter the Communist plan for “the overthrow of the free world.” He went 
on to say that China had already been lost after Yalta, which was “the first of a series 
of concessions that some people thought would satisfy the Communists.”350  For 
Judd, Yalta became the equivalent of the appeasement of Hitler at Munich.  It was the 
great betrayal that only encouraged an implacable aggressor. 
Another vocal member of the China Lobby was William Johnson. Like Judd, 
he had been a missionary to China.  Johnson had served thirty-six years in China, 
refusing to leave during the Japanese occupation.  He was put in an internment camp 
by the Japanese in 1941 and was repatriated to the United States the next year. Upon 
returning to the United States, he worked as a minister, but really wanted to return to 
China. He had been in China most of his adult life and considered it his home. After 
World War II ended, he applied for any position that would take him back. His age 
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(almost 70 at war’s end) meant that neither mission boards nor private agencies would 
hire him.351   
Being stuck in the United States, Johnson became a full-time lobbyist for 
China.  He began a speaking tour on China while the war was still going. After the 
war, he continued at a vigorous pace despite his age, but changed from an anti-
Japanese theme to an anti-Communist one.  He believed that the Communists would 
destroy China’s integrity at the very moment when Chiang Kai-shek was restoring her 
greatness.  He was convinced, and sought to convince others, that Mao was simply a 
pawn for the Soviet Union. Like Judd, he believed that assisting Chiang was both the 
moral and practical thing to do.  Aside from helping a traditional friend (meaning both 
China as a whole and Chiang specifically), assisting China would weaken Moscow 
and protect the United States.352 
The term indefatigable would be an understatement for Johnson’s efforts on 
China’s behalf.  In 1946 alone, he reportedly made 361 speeches across the country. 
353 He  wrote dozens of articles about China and the need to fight Communism.  He 
also kept up a staggering correspondence with members of Congress and their staffers.  
Using money from his pension as well as donations from like-minded supporters, 
Johnson would take trips to Washington to lobby in person.  On one ten-day trip to 
Washington at the end of 1947, he met with over 60 Senators and Representatives and 
over 250 of their staff.354   
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Like Judd, when the Communists came to power in China, he began looking 
for someone to blame. Also like Judd, he believed the State Department had stabbed 
Chiang in the back.  In repeated speeches and articles, Johnson accused the State 
Department of duplicity and/or incompetence.  In one speech in 1951, he said, “Were 
Secretary Acheson performing his duties as a member of the Communist sabotage 
group under Kremlin direction, it is difficult to discover how he could have done 
more, or left more undone, than he has to serve the Kremlin’s purpose.”355 In 1952, 
he was called to a Senate hearing where he said that a recently finished treaty with 
Japan would continue the Truman Administration's policy that favored the Chinese 
Communists to the detriment of Taiwan.356   
 Also important in the China Lobby was Henry Luce, the founder and publisher 
of the magazines Time, Life and Fortune.  Luce had been born in China to missionary 
parents and had developed a strong admiration for Chiang Kai-Shek.  As a result, Time 
became one of the loudest voices supporting Chiang, putting him the cover a total of 
ten times from the 1920’s to the 1950’s. He and his wife visited Chiang’s wartime 
capital of Chongqing in 1941 and began urging for increased aid to Chiang’s regime.   
He returned to China in 1945, only three months after the war had ended, and 
stepped up his calls for aid to Chiang against his new/old enemy, the Communists.  
His tour of China reinforced his opinions of Chiang’s abilities and “invincible effort.”  
Luce’s tour of China was colored not only by his own admiration of Chiang, but also 
because there was no counter-voice.  He was accompanied by two ardently anti-
Communist editors from Time Inc. (which included Fortune and Life), Roy Alexander 
and Charles V. Murphy. His support staff was well-aware of his dislike of criticism, so 
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they offered no dissent to his conclusions. And, of course, his GMD hosts were not 
about to temper his enthusiasm for their cause.357 
 When Luce returned to the United States, he threw himself into Chiang’s 
cause.  He went so far as to censor his chief China correspondent, Theodore White, 
because of what Luce perceived as his sympathy towards the Communists.  Luce and 
his Foreign Editor would rewrite White’s dispatches, without White’s consent, to give 
a more pro-Chiang tone. In the process, they dramatically changed the point of most of 
his articles. As a result, Time became a mouthpiece for the Chiang regime, despite the 
findings of the magazine’s most senior correspondent there. 
After the Communist victory, Luce, like Judd and Johnson, threw the blame on 
the Truman Administration. He used both his magazines and his personal fame to 
attack Truman and the State Department as often as possible.  In an interview in 1966, 
Luce said that even after more than a decade, he was not able to “excuse the American 
government.” Although Luce was interested in many political and economic issues, 
the ties he felt towards China through his parents and his personal relationship with 
Chiang Kai-shek gave the issue of China a passion that drove him throughout his 
life.358 
The China Lobby was too diverse a group to generalize its membership, but 
they had at least one thing in common: China was their primary issue. They feared and 
hated Communist China while wanting to support Chiang Kai-shek’s “Free China” in 
Taiwan.  After the Communist victory, they all asked “Who lost China?” They would 
name various people, all of whom were associated with the Roosevelt and Truman 
Administrations.  Some undoubtedly did this for political gain, but many others felt 
very strong ties to China and felt that the United States had betrayed it by not backing 
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Chiang fully.   Some, such as Judd, Johnson and Luce, also shared a connection to 
Christian missions there and so mixed in religious issues as well.   
Judd, Johnson and Luce also had one other thing in common. They formed 
their opinions prior to World War II and only returned to China briefly, if at all.  There 
is no question that Chiang Kai-shek mismanaged the war against the Japanese.  Once 
the United States was at war with Japan, Chiang looked content to let the Americans 
beat the Japanese while he saved his own forces for the coming fight with the 
Communists.  He valued loyalty over competence and allowed rampant corruption in 
his government. His dismal performance during the war was in stark contrast to his 
campaign to unify China in the 1920’s and his successful campaigns against the 
Communists in the early 1930’s. Judd, Johnson and Luce formed their opinions of 
Chiang when he was in his heyday. They did not adjust their opinions of him despite 
growing evidence that Chiang had proven himself to be a terrible war-time leader 
(including both World War II and the Chinese Civil War). Instead, they clung to him as 
the hero of China and used every available avenue to advance his cause in the United 
States.  
With strong voices like Judd, Johnson and Luce, the China Lobby dominated 
discussion of China in the 1950’s. They took advantage of the growing fear of 
communism and the threat it posed to intimidate many of their opponents into silence.  
The political beating they had given Truman for the “loss of China” made other 
politicians wary of crossing them.  For instance, when Dwight D. Eisenhower came to 
the Presidency in 1953, he made no moves to recognize the PRC despite his view that 
non-recognition was ridiculous.  His Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, shared this 
view but kept up the outward appearance of a staunch support of Chiang Kai-shek.  
Both felt recognition was an obvious policy. They believed that trade with China was a 
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positive thing for the US economy and for its allies. They also believed that 
recognition did not imply approval of a government, but was the acknowledgment of 
that government's control over its country.  To not recognize the PRC was to deny 
reality. Yet they did not feel strongly enough about recognition to pay the political 
price for crossing the China Lobby. Both Eisenhower and Dulles were focused on 
Europe and felt that Asia was a distraction, so they gave lip service to the ideas of the 
China Lobby while Eisenhower privately referred to Knowland as “extraordinarily 
stupid.” Eisenhower’s popularity gave him the clout to push back against the China 
Lobby had he wanted to, but chose not to.  The White House’s refusal to engage in the 
debate meant that the China Lobby’s voice was able to dictate discussion of China.359 
The China Lobby’s position was reinforced by the rising power and 
aggressiveness of Joseph McCarthy, another person that Eisenhower viewed with 
disdain but declined to resist.  McCarthy had risen from obscurity as a crusader 
against communist infiltration in American government and society. Although the term 
“McCarthyism” was coined because of him, he was not the cause of the anti-
communist hysteria, but was its most visible representative. His attacks on suspected 
communists, which were often televised, were both a manifestation of that hysteria 
and fuel for it to grow further.  The visibility of McCarthy and other anti-Communist 
crusaders strengthened the atmosphere of fear of the 1950’s while also reinforcing the 
Cold War consensus.360  
While McCarthy and the China Lobby were fellow travelers in their hatred of 
international Communism, they had different priorities.  McCarthy was ostensibly 
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trying to root out communist agents and sympathizers in the United States.361  The 
China Lobby, on the other hand, was obsessed with protecting Taiwan while attacking 
Red China.  In their policy prescriptions for China, they emphasized human rights and 
religion. For example, when a political organization affiliated with the China Lobby 
petitioned President Truman not to recognize the PRC in 1950, part of its argument 
referred to attacks on missionaries and Chinese Christians. This group, which had the 
cumbersome title of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist 
China, was made up of American businessmen, politicians and some clergy, including 
several former missionaries.  The petition said that recognition would be a “political 
mistake.”  It used the argument that the PRC did not represent its people and was 
morally reprehensible. It accused the PRC of having missionaries killed, although it 
did not offer specifics for who or how many. It concluded with “we see no greater 
hope for freedom in China than in other satellite countries.”362 
Another group in the China Lobby, the Committee of One Million Against the 
Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, also claimed wide ranging 
religious support.  This committee was formed in 1953 and became a vociferous 
advocate for Taiwan.  It sent many petitions to the White House for that purpose, 
couching its arguments in “decency” and “civilization.”363 The committee actively 
recruited clergy for its cause, so that by the end of the decade it had over 7,000 signing 
its petitions.364 
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Both of these committees were clearly associated with the China Lobby and 
both were associated with large groups of Christians, but their claim to be the voice 
for American Christianity was misleading. Religious leaders made up one of the only 
segments of American society in which there was no clear consensus on how to deal 
with Communism.  They were much more likely to be in favor of recognizing the PRC 
than were leaders from other fields of work. A 1955 Gallup poll on recognizing the 
PRC questioned the leaders of various fields of work including business/industry, law, 
medicine, journalism, science, government and education/religion. While the overall 
poll was 34% in favor of recognition and 61% against, 48% of the leaders of 
education/religion were in favor of recognition with 46% against. This was 
significantly higher than any other field and showed that, while there was no large 
agreement among religious leaders, they were much less likely to view the PRC with 
open hostility.365 
Among religious leaders, mission boards were the most likely to want 
recognition of Communist China.  They believed that improved relations with China 
would probably help the cause of Chinese Christians.  Former missionaries and 
mission boards were among the most vocal segments of American society to advocate 
recognition.  They often tried to mitigate the criticisms they heard of the PRC to give a 
more accurate view.  In one case the Secretary for the Presbyterian Church Mission 
Board, Lloyd Ruland, replied to a church leader to dispel a complaint made against the 
Communist regime. “There seems to be a general belief that our Board has lost its 
property to the Communists and that large sums of money have gone into the hands of 
the Communists. This is entirely untrue.” He went on to show the legality and 
reasonableness of the seizures, despite the fact that the church suffered for it. He 
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added, “The action of the Communist Government in taking over all American 
properties was a formal procedure in retaliation for a similar action taken by the 
American Government in connection with Chinese funds and properties held in this 
country.” The charge of confiscation of property, so important to the Anglo-American 
legal system, was a common refrain against Communist countries.  When that 
property was owned by the church, the violation became even more damning in 
American eyes.  The fact that a church official would defend the action as a simple 
quid-pro-quo demonstrates how the mission board was trying to give a more balanced 
view of China. This was even more remarkable because Ruland’s letter was written in 
1951, while the Korean War was still going.366 
Religious groups made several direct petitions to the White House for 
recognition of the PRC, beginning as early as 1950. They stopped during the Korean 
War but got more direct in their advocacy of recognition as the decade progressed. 
These petitions were invariably dismissed, but raised the ire of other Americans.  A 
1955 petition to the White House drew fire from supporters of Chiang’s regime in 
“Free China” as appeasement. One letter from a Chinese-American who fled China 
after the Communist victory used religious persecution as his first argument: “They 
[mainline churches] should realize that while their attitude is so beneficent to Red 
China, they themselves could not enjoy freedom of religion or thought or action in the 
China mainland, nor can the Christian churches avoid persecution.” The image of 
religious persecution and an atheist government made for a very strong argument for 
most Americans.367 In 1958, prominent rabbi Dr. William F. Rosenblum challenged 
another such petition to recognize the PRC.  He said that recognition would only aid 
plans of advancing world communism. Communist leaders’ “avowed purpose is so 
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palpably to destroy the very religions upon which the clergymen draw for their 
ideals.”368 
Among the most consistent advocates of better ties with the PRC was the 
National Council of Churches. Ernest Gross, the NCC’s head of the Department of 
International Affairs in the mid-1950’s, made a strong but nuanced address at the end 
of 1956 about the politics of dealing with China.  His address to the American 
Assembly, a non-partisan public policy forum started by Eisenhower when he was 
President of Columbia University, tried to balance two issues. The first was that 
Communism was anathema to the American way of life.  But he went on to say that 
China was too important to be ignored. His overall argument was that even though 
Communism was something to be resisted, logic dictated that only through negotiation 
and direct contact could the United States engage and potentially moderate “their 
present lawless course of behavior.”369  He did not advocate recognition, but asked 
those present at the conference to acknowledge that China was too important to leave 
negotiations to intermediaries.  He argued for direct contacts between the United 
States and China in the hopes that engagement would curb the extremist tendencies of 
the Communist regime.370 
The tone of his speech left little room for doubt about his opinion of 
Communism. At one point Gross said, “It is clear also that the vast majority on Taiwan 
reject communism and could be enslaved only against their will.”371  He later added, 
“The Red Chinese regime may well fall for lack of support or for other cause. We 
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must hope that it will, if it persists in flouting the civilized code.” Trained as a lawyer, 
Gross had worked in the U.S. Government in several capacities, including having been 
on the UN delegation that negotiated the end of the Korean War. He used the 
importance of law and democracy as the basis for his opposition to Communism.  He 
contrasted that with Taiwan, which was a bastion for freedom and democracy in 
China.  He said, “Taiwan is a repository of political and professional leadership of 
Free China. It is a fact which tends to be submerged by the more newsworthy items of 
military personalities and activities.”372  Yet he also advocated admitting the PRC 
into the UN, believing that subjecting it to international law would bring it into the 
norms of the “civilized world.” Gross was clearly critical of American policy under 
President Eisenhower, but did not suggest that Communism was posed no danger.  He 
felt that engagement with the PRC would show it the benefits of tempering its 
behavior, while isolation would only reinforce its xenophobia and extremism.373 
The NCC consistently pushed for recognition after the Korean War. One of its 
most vocal leaders, John A. Mackay, shared the views of many former missionaries to 
China even though he had never traveled there.  MacKay had been a missionary to 
Latin America and shared an ecumenical outlook common to many missionaries. As a 
Presbyterian raised in Scotland but having been educated at Princeton before his 
mission work and then returning to teach at Yale, MacKay had a very broad 
worldview. That attitude led him to join many returned missionaries from China in 
campaigning for recognition of the PRC.  Through his leadership positions in the NCC 
or as the Chairman of the International Missionary Council, he was one of the best 
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known advocates of recognition. His leadership in the ecumenical movement, whose 
members were often advocates of better relations with the PRC, probably influenced 
his opinion on opening relations with China.  Mackay used similar terms as Gross. 
Communism was dangerous but only through discussions could the United States 
bring Communists around to more reasonable behavior. In 1952, while the United 
States was fighting the Chinese in Korea, McKay authored a statement that was 
adopted by the NCC that called for “the United States to persevere in ‘honest 
negotiation’ to solve world tensions ‘in the face of the most aggravating opposition’.” 
After the war ended, so did MacKay’s position.  Once the armistice was signed, he 
soon joined other former missionaries in calling for full relations with the PRC.374  
 In 1957, Mackay was instrumental in proposing a trip by American clergymen 
to China to meet with Chinese Christians. The trip did not materialize, but it did 
provoke an outcry among the American press. One newspaper wrote, “American 
clergymen actually propose to drive a breach into our nation’s boycott of Red China.” 
It added that the boycott was put in place because of “the murderous attack of the Red 
Chinese on our American troops at the Yalu River in November, 1950.”375 Another 
paper wrote, “We always are amazed and more than a little puzzled when clergymen 
find it impossible to understand that communism today is just as anti-God as it was 
when Marx and Engels, founders of modern communism, made their historic 
pronouncement that religion is the ‘opium of the people’.”376 
Overwhelming Mainstream Opposition to Red China: 
While some Christians hoped that Chinese Churches would soon rejoin the 
world communion, they were essentially voices in the wilderness. Driven by their 
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ecumenism, these Christians wanted to reach out to those they disagreed with to 
engage them in discussion and hopefully change their mind.  Even if such a change of 
mind was not forthcoming, the dialogue would create a greater understanding between 
the two sides and, hopefully, a greater acceptance of the other’s position.377 A clearer 
picture of the PRC might dispel some of the fear and paranoia that was rampant in the 
early Cold War. Of course, the call for this dialogue was based on the assumption that 
the Chinese Communists were not as dangerous as was popularly assumed. Most 
Americans, however, were satisfied with the consensus that Red China was the enemy.  
While these ecumenical Christians were trying to find a way to engage with China, the 
mainstream American discussion of China echoed the ideas of the China Lobby. 
Debate was limited to what China was doing wrong and what could be done to stop it.  
Not only would those ecumenical Christians be ignored, but their religion and in some 
cases their stories would play a large part in crafting the narrative that they opposed. 
The most consistent portrayal of the PRC was the general oppression by the 
Communist government, with religion taking a prominent place. The abuse of 
Christians and church property was reported quite often by the American press. While 
it no doubt made for good press and a strong readership, it also served to highlight the 
evils of Communism and the moral nature of resisting it.  These stories reinforced the 
popular view of Red China as a malevolent force in the world.  
Some stories about Communist abuse of religion occurred while missionaries 
were still in China. For instance, in October 1950 the New York Times reported the 
new PRC government was enacting a policy to end all mission schools.  The PRC 
spokesman said that it was to attain “educational sovereignty.”  They stressed that 
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teachers’ and students’ beliefs would be safeguarded by China’s religious freedom, but 
that the institutions would lose their Christian character.  According to the article, 
Zhou Enlai thought that the United States would use religious organizations to spy on 
and disrupt the political movements of the Chinese people under the CCP.378  
That story, unlike many, was verifiable because it dealt with published 
government policies. It was less dramatic than others, but showed the Communist 
animosity toward religion.  Other stories with similar themes were based on little more 
than rumor.  In March 1951, The New York Times published another article about 
nineteen Chinese Christians who were arrested in Tientsin as spies for the 
Guomindang.  One missionary was reportedly executed and another apparently died 
while in captivity. They were accused by a Tientsin newspaper of “abusing religion.” 
The difficulty with cases like this is that there was no way to verify the details at the 
time.  Most of the information was rumors that could have been distorted or picked up 
as CCP propaganda through newspaper and radio. Nevertheless, major newspapers 
across the country repeatedly printed even the most dramatic and improbable 
accounts, often with no verification whatsoever.  One missionary in Hong Kong tried 
to confirm the story of the executed missionary in Tientsin but could find no 
information on the report.379  Nevertheless, stories condemning Red China made for 
good press and good sales, even if they might be exaggerated or false.380 
While missionaries were in China, their stories were often covered by 
newspapers. Once the last missionaries left China, they could provide their own first-
hand accounts. Some missionaries would tell harrowing tales of their time under 
Communism. They would give interviews, write articles or occasionally memoirs 
which seldom put Communist China in a good light.  A few missionaries were 
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forbidden to leave the PRC, facing imprisonment for a variety of charges, usually 
relating to espionage.  These stories were frequently carried by religious publications 
and sometimes made it to the mainstream press. 
Missionaries who had been detained started trickling out of China in 1952 a 
few at a time, but only to limited public attention. Missionary organizations and 
church newsletters would carry the news, but the mainstream press only gave them 
short mentions.  In October 1952, three missionaries were released with more fanfare.  
Part of that extra attention was undoubtedly timing.  The Korean War was in a 
stalemate. The biggest issue in the negotiations was the return of POWs. After World 
War II, Soviet soldiers who had been captured by Germany had been repatriated to the 
Soviet Union.  Upon their return, many of them were arrested, imprisoned and/or 
executed by the Soviet government as German collaborators. President Truman felt 
this was a stain on American honor and refused to conclude a peace with North 
Korea/China until he was assured that prisoners of war would not be forced to return 
to their home country against their will. It should not be surprising that the return of 
these missionaries, as prisoners during the war, received more interest.381    
An additional factor was the notoriety of two of the missionaries, Frank and 
Esther Price.  Both had been in China for more than thirty years. Frank was a second 
generation missionary to China who was known for his dedication to his work and 
friendly demeanor. He had chosen to stay in China during World War II and then again 
after the Communist victory.  During the war and immediately afterwards, Price had 
advised Chiang Kai-shek on a variety of issues, including how to deal with the United 
States. His friendship with Chiang made him something of a celebrity among 
missionaries, but it also made him a target for the Communists.  His capture and 
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imprisonment was more noted in the press than most others at the time. When he was 
captured, a GMD source put out the report that he was being detained for espionage 
and tortured.382  A month later the story was challenged, saying that Price was 
“unmolested” by the Communists.383 After still another month, he was confirmed as 
arrested and accused of spying.384 He and his wife were released in late 1952 to some 
public note.385 The reason for their release was never made public. They had been 
subjected to repeated accusation meetings against them with innumerable charges, but 
were eventually released without explanation.  Curiously, they had a fairly 
comfortable captivity despite their supposed crimes. They were well fed and had some 
freedom of movement.  Their treatment, according to Ed Walline who moved to 
become the Presbyterian administrator in Hong Kong, “constitutes another of the 
paradoxes of official procedure in the Peoples’ China that the ordinary mind cannot 
understand.”386    
By coincidence of timing, the Prices left China with John Hayes. Hayes was 
less well-known upon his release, but he would become much better known after 
returning to the United States.  Hayes was born in China to missionary parents. After 
receiving degrees in divinity and theology in the United States, he returned to China to 
work in education and development. Hayes had a much worse time under Communist 
rule than did the Prices. He was kept in prison and put on trial as a spy.  When he 
returned to the United States, he described his treatment in a lengthy article in U.S. 
News and World Report. He said that the Chinese did not beat him, but they did 
deprive him of food and disrupt his sleep for weeks or months at a time.  Despite his 
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treatment, he offered a  matter of fact account that had very little emotional language.  
Even without strong language, his description strongly condemned the Communist 
system. He talked about trying to live in the PRC as a teacher before being arrested.  
He then got more graphic with descriptions of “death carts” that carried the corpses of 
those that had been executed that day to a mass grave. When asked about 
brainwashing, he said, “It should be called ‘brain-wringing’” because they did not 
convince him that Communism was right, but did confuse him enough that he began 
to question reality. Yet he also maintained a typical American trope – that Communist 
governments may hate the United States, but the people still wanted their freedom.  
“Despite all this, friendship built up during the war years and the memory of 
philanthropic and missionary effort over many years cannot be erased.” He later said, 
“Even when I was marched across the public drill ground after 10 months in prison, a 
little youngster saw me and raised up his thumbs calling out, ‘America tops!’ The 
guard smiled.”387   There is no way to verify the validity of Hayes’s story, but he was 
saying all the things that American people were receptive to hearing.   
Two years later, ABC would make a television episode about his confinement 
called “The Brainwashing of John Hayes” starring Vincent Price. The show was 
classic propaganda, showing the Communists trying to dehumanize him and make him 
confess. Even though Hayes eventually did sign a confession while in China, in the 
show he remained unbroken. After a Chinese friend accused him in court of spying, 
Hayes told him that the Communists would betray him too.  When he was exiled 
instead of executed388, the judge explains that they let Hayes go because he had the 
“friendship of the people.”  Then, of course, his friend realized his mistake in 
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attacking Hayes, denounced the Communists and was executed on the orders of Soviet 
officer.  The show ended with a boy saying “America tops!” and then the narrator 
saying that Hayes was given new hope because “for as Christians think, so in the end 
must their captors.”389 
There are very few reports on Hayes after that, probably because as much as he 
disliked the PRC, he believed that the United States should work with China, 
especially to reunite with Chinese Christians. He only gave the one interview to a 
major media outlet.  Most of his public speaking was to small church groups on the 
subject of ecumenism rather than anti-communism.  He did make the news briefly in 
1954, when he administered communion to President Eisenhower and his wife at the 
National Presbyterian Church, before walking the President to the door at the end of 
the service. The reports of the service did not include any statements by Hayes, but did 
include a summary of the sermon, which was delivered by a more senior minister. It 
alluded to the fallacies of communism as a substitute for religion, saying, “mankind 
was divided into two categories, the lords and the slaves, the rulers and the ruled, the 
free and the unfree.”390 It appears that for the purposes of anti-communism, Hayes 
made a better symbol than a speaker.391 
When Hayes later returned to mission work in Indonesia, his wife, Barbara, 
could not accompany him for health reasons.  While she remained in the United 
States, she took over his role of public speaking, but also focused on promoting the 
ecumenical movement rather than anti-Communism. Her approach seemed out of step 
with mainstream America and, like her husband, she spoke almost exclusively to 
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church groups.  Part of her standard talk was to suggest that Americans stop viewing 
the world through the bi-polar Cold War lens.  She suggested that most peoples in Asia 
and Africa wanted independence and “hope for peace,” making an analogy between 
their independence movements and those of the American colonies in 1776.  While 
she disliked Communism, particularly for its suppression of Christianity, she showed 
her ecumenical beliefs by saying, “We all need to pray more for the Communists and 
hate them less. That’s the Christian way.”392 Like many ecumenical Christians, she 
wanted to engage rather than condemn those with whom she disagreed.  Barbara 
Hayes had returned to the United States in 1950, while her husband remained working 
in China and was later imprisoned. Even while he was imprisoned, she spoke 
favorably of the CCP in comparison to Chiang Kai-shek’s rule.  With the 
incompetence of Chiang’s regime, it was only natural that the Chinese turn to 
something that addressed the concerns of the masses.  Even though she understood 
why the Chinese looked to Communism for salvation, she said that “Communism isn’t 
the answer for China.”393 She was continuing her husband’s work, which was to 
disdain communism but still recognize that the communist government was a reality 
and must be worked with.  
The story of John Hayes was one of many that made for good anti-Communist 
press. The Communist attacks on religion in China made for a powerful story across 
American media.  In 1953, prominent journalist Fred Sparks wrote a scathing article 
called, “How Commies Crush Religion in China” that was carried in newspapers 
across the country. Sparks was well-known for his coverage of the Korean War, for 
which he won the Pulitzer Prize in 1951.  After the war, he continued to work in East 
Asia, including reporting on what information he could obtain on China.  He started 
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this article with a couple of vivid anecdotes about religious persecutions. “They led 
the Catholic priest through the public square by a ring placed in his nose like a cow. 
They tossed the Protestant minister into a pit of filth and made him dig his way out 
with chopsticks as the newsreel cameras turned.”  Sparks depicted a China that was 
full of vigor after the end of the Korean War and was flexing its muscles.  It wanted to 
push missionaries out, but not actually use force to make them to go.  If missionaries 
opted to stay, as in one example he cited, the Chinese Communists would find ways to 
make their lives intolerable.  He described Father Caouette, who was assigned to street 
sweeping duty starting at 4am. Then they interrupted his church services, eventually 
forcing the congregation to meet outside. When none of that worked and Caouette 
remained, the authorities started harassing his Chinese flock and then led him around 
naked as depicted in the opening vignette.  Sparks’ article was one of many that 
depicted Red China as full of heathens who attack good God-fearing men. His 
depiction of the Communist Chinese society and its “religious freedom” was more 
graphic than most, but its theme of Communism attacking religion was common.394 
Another example was a story in Newsweek earlier that year. It described an 
American Catholic priest who had been put on trial for spying for the United States.  
The article reported that Robert W. Greene “saw his mission compound turn into a 
Red hell. His church was dismantled, a picture of Mao Tse-tung395 replaced the 
crucifix, and the church was used as a jail from which poured the screams of those 
strung up by their thumbs.”  The article painted the Communists as profaning religion, 
but it also showed their larger political agenda. According to the article, when Greene 
was being released, the judge told him, “We have had our benefit from you – our 
purpose has been achieved.” The implication is that the trial was for propaganda, 
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probably for both domestic and international audiences.  But the judge went on, “You 
are now 40 years of age, but remember, you will never see 50. Do you know why? 
Because in ten years we shall have America. The Communists in America will take 
care of you.” Not only was Red China attacking religion in China, but it had targeted 
the United States. 396 
Another story that year highlighted the fear of godlessness that most 
Americans associated with communism.  Albert Ravenholt, an American 
correspondent for the Chicago Daily News who had covered China since the 
beginning of World War II, wrote a report from Hong Kong on Christianity in China in 
the autumn of 1953. The report was published as a series in papers across the country.  
His lengthy account starts with the first introduction of Christianity to China in the 7
th
 
century CE but quickly goes into an analysis that was critical of both missionaries and 
Communists.397 Ravenholt’s articles were not particularly inflammatory but their 
reception shows one problem that missionaries faced when they returned to the United 
States. The response to the articles was rage against the PRC.  For example, one reader 
responded, “If anyone ever needed any further arguments against communism and its 
ungodly aims, these articles were it.”398 The balance in Ravenholt’s reporting was 
lost to an American public that was already settling into the early Cold War. The press 
largely fed the public fear, making reporters like Ravenwood, who did not 
automatically condemn Communists and their actions, a minority.  
Raging against communism was well-received, while more nuanced views 
were ignored or attacked. For instance, a teacher in Colorado argued against a former 
missionary’s idea to be open to China. He made a speech that continually referred to 
Communism as fundamentally antagonistic to religion. He referenced China directly 
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by arguing that the Three-Self Church was merely a smokescreen that covered the 
attack on religion.  Ultimately it distorted Christian faith to support the 
government.399 
A regional paper in Iowa, The Mason City Globe Gazette, published an 
editorial that had a similar view. Red China only tolerated religion when it could be 
used for the needs of the state.  When discussing religion, the editor, W. Earle Hall, 
quoted a statement by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai: “It is ridiculous to separate 
religion from politics.” Hall commented, “That was the first tip-off to the fact that in 
Red China religion must serve political purposes.” He continued by citing an 
observation by a student member of the Australian team that visited the PRC.  The 
student said that the purpose of religion in the PRC was “the complete and final 
eradication of real religion.”400 Hall’s editorial was also broadcast on the radio. Even 
though his reading and listening audience was small, his point by point condemnation 
of Communist China and his use of religion was typical of the mainstream press at the 
time.  
One missionary, although not American, became a totem for anti-Communism.  
Ambrose Poletti, an Italian Catholic priest, had been expelled from China in 1950. He 
was reassigned to Kowloon, which was the part of Hong Kong on the mainland and 
was where most refugees left the PRC.  He claimed to have greeted thousands of 
missionaries as they escaped China. He also detailed the suffering he had seen from 
missionaries who had been detained in China.  In an October 1955 article in Time, 
there were pictures of him helping to carry an elderly Italian bishop who had been 
tortured by the Chinese. The article served the double purpose of condemning the 
Chinese while also showing the indomitability of Christian faith. The bishop, Alfonso 
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Ferrari, was described as “a beriberi-ridden 70-pound skeleton.” Time reported the 
defiant words of the bishop that sounded very similar to those of the televised John 
Hayes: “Despite their threats and torture, I would never change my mind. They wanted 
to put a Communist brain into mine. They failed.”401 
Poletti was profiled the next year by the New York Times in an article that 
served the same dual purpose.  It showed him as a jovial man who helped long-
suffering escaping missionaries finish their journey to freedom. It also took the 
opportunity to mention the injustice of the PRC and its treatment of religion, while 
praising the virtuous missionaries.  The Communists had “virtually completed the 
liquidation of a century and a half and more of foreign missionary works in China.”  It 
mentioned the good work the missionaries had done, which “included education, 
medicine and public health, orphan care, youth activity and relief as well as religion.” 
It also included a list of missionaries being held in prison in China as well as the three 
that had died while being detained.402 
The inclusion of Catholics in the mainstream narrative was something new for 
Americans of the 1950’s.  Catholics as a group had been viewed with suspicion by 
Protestant America throughout American history.  The massive influx of Catholic 
immigrants in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries exacerbated this feeling dramatically.  
The advent of the Cold War, however, began the process of bringing Catholics into 
mainstream civic life.    The Catholic Church, both in the United States and 
internationally, was strongly anti-communist.  As the Cold War consensus formed in 
the early 1950’s, Catholics went from being suspect members of society to solidly 
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anti-Communist Americans.  They began to be included in the larger depiction of the 
fight against Communism.403 
Memoirs 
Newspapers and magazines were happy to tell stories of missionary suffering, 
but former missionaries sometimes took a more direct route to getting their stories 
across – memoirs. They produced a plethora of them, most of which had similar 
themes. The story went that they had done good work before the Communist takeover 
but then suffered greatly under the new regime.  These were mostly Protestant 
missionaries, but a few American Catholic memoirs came out as well.  Few made the 
bestseller list, but there were enough anti-communist memoirs to suggest that there 
was a market for them. There was a distinct lack of memoirs sympathetic to the PRC, 
despite the fact that many missionaries did not condemn Communist China.  
One memoir in particular stands out.  John Leighton Stuart had been a 
missionary, an educator and then the final U.S. Ambassador to China during the 
Chinese Civil War and the establishment of the PRC.  His memoir, Fifty Years in 
China, followed the formula of reminiscing about his good work before condemning 
the Communists. What was curious about Stuart’s work was that he only wrote about 
two-thirds of it.   He was incapacitated by a stroke before finishing his manuscript, so 
members of the State Department (who do not appear to have known Stuart 
personally) finished the manuscript without direct input from Stuart.  While the first 
two-thirds of the book speak of the glowing work missionaries had done and his 
strong ties to the Chinese people, the final section of the book, which includes his 
interactions with the Communists, is much more angry and condemning. This seems 
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to go against Stuart’s personality and his writings while in China.  He was generally 
regarded as very friendly and slow to criticize anyone publicly, but his State 
Department ghost writers did not share those traits. While it is possible that Stuart 
would have finished with a more angry tone because of his treatment by the 
Communists, it seems to go against his affable personality.  As historian Yu-Ming 
Shaw suggests, it is more likely that his ghost writers used the book to promote their 
political agenda.404 
Of the many other memoirs, most had the same themes. Yet they also shared an 
unintentional theme that they would never have admitted.  One book reviewer noticed 
this theme. Kenneth Latourette, a former missionary to China who had become a 
Professor at Yale, recognized a consistency among three memoirs he reviewed, which 
included Calvary in China, by Robert C. Greene. The publication of Greene’s book 
coincided with the previously discussed article about him in Newsweek. Latourette 
also reviewed Dororthy S. McCammon’s We Tried to Stay and  F. Olin Stockwell’s 
With God in Red China: The Story of Two Years in Chinese Communist Prisons.  
Although Greene came from a different religious tradition (Catholic) than did 
Stockwell and McCammon (Methodist), their overall stories hit many very similar 
points.  Although they strongly resented their treatment by the Communists, they 
remembered their work prior to Liberation as hard and desperately needed.  Latourette 
pointed out that in showing the dire straits of Chinese society, “without intending to do 
so, it shows why Communist ‘liberation’ was so easy.”  It was impossible to show the 
importance of missionary work without implicitly showing the injustices of Chinese 
society under GMD rule.  All three of the memoirs that Latourette reviewed had very 
                                                        
404 John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in China: the Memoirs of John Leighton Stuart, Missionary and 
Ambassador, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1954); Yu-ming Shaw. An American 
Missionary in China: John Leighton Stuart and Chinese-American Relations, (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992). 
209 
 
negative views of Communist rule, particularly in terms of religion, but they also 
carried an implication that the GMD had also been a disaster as well, albeit for 
different reasons.405  
Most Americans were not as critical as Latourette.  The American public 
generally viewed missionary accounts as unequivocal condemnations of Red China. A 
1954 letter to the editor about a memoir shows something of the consensus being built 
about Red China.  Martin T. Gilligan, a Catholic priest and former Vatican diplomat to 
China wrote a disapproving letter to the New York Times in response to a book review.  
The book, Nun in Red China, was a memoir of a Catholic nun that detailed the 
hardships she and her Catholic brethren faced under the CCP.  Gilligan took exception 
to the reviewer’s statement that Catholics were persecuted because of “that vast surge 
of anti-foreign feeling which accompanied the Communists to power.” Gilligan 
believed that there was something distinctly anti-Catholic about Communism, as 
shown by the continued vigorous and often violent persecutions of Chinese Catholics.  
Although the breadth of the persecution of Catholics may have been exaggerated as 
rumors escaped through the Bamboo Curtain, the reviewer and Gilligan accepted the 
specifics of the persecutions uncritically.  For them, as for most Americans, the 
Chinese Communists attacking religion was beyond question. They only differed on 
the motivations behind those attacks.406 
One problem in understanding what was really going on in China was the 
limited information available to Americans. The rumors were often worse than the 
actual conditions on the ground, but were much easier to believe. One report was that 
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29 Chinese Christian leaders were executed in early 1954.  Ed Walline investigated the 
case and found no substantiation for the report, even though it was carried in several 
newspapers. Walline was able to speak with a family member of one of those who was 
supposedly executed but was apparently alive and well.407 
As a major reinforcement to the portrayal of Communist China as evil and 
anti-religious, westerners got word in 1958 that the Hundred Flowers Campaign had 
been halted. Mao had reversed himself and ordered an “Anti-Rightist Campaign.”  The 
Hundred Flowers Campaign had unleashed a torrent of criticism of the CCP. Mao had 
not expected that level of antipathy towards his regime and so declared that critics 
were “poisonous weeds” that had invaded the “fragrant flowers.” He implied that the 
whole campaign was designed to draw out these weeds, whom he labeled “Rightists.”  
Rightist became the label for anyone who had questionable political attitudes, meaning 
dissent from the CCP line and/or sympathy for Chiang Kai-shek.  When Mao declared 
that ten percent of the Chinese people were rightists, local cadres had to find ten 
percent of the people to accuse.  Christians made easy targets for those accusations 
because of their heterodox beliefs.  Persecutions of Christians continued during the 
Great Leap Forward, a forced industrialization of the rural economy, which began the 
next year. It was a wildly ambitious undertaking that required all Chinese to be eager 
political participants.408 The New York Times reported that Christians were being 
purged as “‘imperialist running dogs’ who ‘hide under the cloak of religion’.”409  
American Christians who had wanted to reach out to China for religious reasons found 
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that the issue of religious persecution was being used very effectively by Americans 
who wanted to keep the PRC isolated. 
Conclusions 
When missionaries returned to the United States after being driven from the 
People’s Republic of China, most were discouraged with their experience and 
thoroughly disillusioned with the Chinese Communist Party.  They had been harassed 
and their life’s work had been attacked. Yet many of them kept some hope for China. 
They believed that the Chinese Communists would moderate their behavior once they 
believed themselves secure from internal and external attack.  The Communists’ 
persecution of missionaries was aimed at eliminating any potential source of 
resistance to their agenda. With missionaries gone, a dangerous foreign presence on 
their soil was removed. When the Korean War ended, these missionaries and their 
organizations hoped the CCP might feel secure enough to reach out and end its 
isolation. In particular, they hoped that they could reunite with their Chinese Christian 
brethren.  
In promoting these hopes, these church leaders and former missions tried to 
sway American opinion to show that the CCP was doing what any nationalist party 
would do – protect and strengthen its country. They argued that although there was no 
question that Chinese policies on religion and personal freedom were flawed, but they 
could only be changed through engagement. Isolation prevented any sort of 
compromise being reached.  In addition, maintaining a hostile relationship with China 
would only increase its sense of insecurity, leading to a continued need for persecution 
of Christians. 
Ecumenism was clearly a driving factor for most of these American Christians. 
They were devoted to reuniting world-wide Christianity, which included China. 
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Ecumenism also came from a world-view that was less about bipolar right and wrong 
and more about accepting alternative points of view that were various shades of 
gray410 that could be discussed. Those with this world view disagreed strongly with 
Communism, but accepted that Communism might be a short term answer to the 
problems facing China.  As a result, the ecumenical movement overlapped very 
strongly with efforts to moderate hostility to the PRC. 
All of this was for naught, however. While missionaries were trying to find 
accommodation with the CCP in the early years of the Cold War, American public 
opinion was coalescing into a consensus that Communism was a threat to the United 
States and must be fought.  The coercive communist state crushed all the freedoms 
that Americans held dear. Religion was the most threatened because of the doctrinal 
atheism of Marxist ideology.  Newspapers, magazines and TV all ran stories about 
persecution of Christians and the way in which Communists degraded their people. 
The result was that ecumenical religious leaders found themselves to be largely 
marginalized in their calls for better relations with China, while stories of persecuted 
missionaries and oppressed Chinese Christians were published in mainstream media. 
Ironically, some of those stories were about missionaries who, like Frank Price and 
John Hayes, actually favored ecumenism and engagement with the PRC.  Their 
hardship was being used to sell newspapers and magazine, while at the same time 
reinforcing the consensus that Red China was a godless and evil force that must be 
fought. 
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Conclusion 
 
What can be learned about US-China relations from the experiences of 
missionaries in the early Cold War?  There was clearly a vocal segment of 
missionaries that objected to the dogmatic condemnation of Communism, particularly. 
It is difficult to determine how strong this segment was numerically, but they were 
most likely a minority.  The reasons for their position appear to have come from their 
ecumenical world-view and their absence from the United States. This brings out a 
second issue, which was that missionaries show some of the conflict between 
nationalism and Christianity. They maintained their American identity, but their 
religious calling made their attitudes more welcoming to outsiders than the exclusivity 
of nationalism generally allowed. 
The level of dissent in the early Cold War is only recently being explored by 
historians.  A common narrative of Sino-American relations in the early Cold War 
focuses on domestic politics in the United States and how China fit neatly into the 
Cold War consensus to fight Communism.  There has been considerable scholarship 
that shows how the 1950’s saw a growing agreement among Americans that fighting 
Communism was imperative to the American way of life. Lary May calls the early 
1950’s a “paradigm shift of major proportions.”411 That shift was caused by the threat 
of Communism and the fear it generated. According to May, Americans 
overwhelmingly conformed to the attitudes of anti-communism. Media reinforced that 
conformity with consistent anti-communist messages and by providing positive 
examples of the American way of life. Stephen J. Whitfield similarly argues that 
Americans' fear of Communism affected all aspects of American life to some 
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degree.
412
  He shows the shadow cast by the aggressive red hunting of the FBI and 
how that shadow would lead many Americans to self-censor their behavior to avoid 
appearing as communist sympathizers. Jonathan P. Herzog includes religion as one of 
the key tools used in the creation of this consensus, arguing that political and religious 
leaders aggressively pushed religion as a means to combat Communism.
413
 Elaine 
Tyler May looks at a different aspect of early Cold War culture, focusing mainly on 
how it affected the home.
414
 She attributes the baby boom of the 1950’s in part to Cold 
War anxieties. She argues that the home became a refuge from the fears of 
Communism, which led to the idealization of domesticity and a refocus on the home 
and family. These books, and works like them, show that the Cold War created and 
then reinforced a consensus about foreign relations that severely circumscribed the 
possibilities of dissent within society.  
That narrative is fine as far as it goes, but it omits the fact that the Cold War 
consensus was not absolute. New scholarship on the American consensus shows that 
many Americans either resisted the fear of Communism or were apathetic about it.  
Andrew Falk argues that mass media actually resisted that consensus and maintained 
some degree of moderation.  He admits that the immense anti-Communist movement 
inside and outside of government could wield a great deal of intimidation, but he 
contends that mass media did not always cave to those pressures. Most interestingly, 
he argues that Hollywood’s resistance came not so much from idealism as from 
business decisions based on the belief that audiences did not always want anti-
Communist propaganda.  Falk’s argument is supported by Thomas Doherty who 
focuses on television, arguing that it was much more tolerant and open in the 1950’s 
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than was commonly held. He cites the verbal sparring between Edward R. Murrow 
and McCarthy as well as sit-coms like I Love Lucy that turned traditional domesticity 
on its head. Moving away from mass media, Bruce E. Field looks at the political 
dissent from an agricultural union.  His work argues that the leaders of the National 
Farmers Union criticized Truman for supporting colonialism. They eventually relented 
when accused of being communist sympathizers during the Korean War, but a 
minority of the organization split off and maintained its opposition to US policy. 
These works are part of a growing literature that shows that despite the strength of the 
consensus against Communism, dissent did not disappear. They show that there was 
always a minority that did not accept that they must be unquestioningly anti-
communist. 
None of those works, however, spend much time on religion, which is still 
largely assumed to have accepted anti-Communism unquestioningly. Scholarship on 
dissent among the various religious communities within the United States is just 
beginning.  David E. Settje has used Lutherans as a window into “average America” 
by examining how they viewed the Vietnam War. He argues that there was a “silent 
majority” of Americans who neither approved, nor dissented, of US policy in 
Vietnam.
415
  Another recent work edited by Dianne Kirby looks at the active role that 
religious leaders played in the Cold War. Rather than focusing on the United States, 
the essays look at global religious leaders and show that the role of religion was not 
consistently anti-Communist.
416
 These books make excellent contributions, but are 
only the beginning of understanding religious dissent in the Cold War. Neither focuses 
on the early Cold War in the United States, when the Cold War consensus was being 
formed.  
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This project works to fill that gap, showing how missionaries unexpectedly 
provided a voice that disagreed with the Cold war consensus, particularly on the issue 
of China.  Many American missionaries in China refused to condemn Communism out 
of hand. These missionaries wanted to give the Communists a chance, hoping that 
they could find some modus vivendi.  More surprising was that even after the attempts 
at cooperation failed disastrously, many of these missionaries still refused to denounce 
the Communists as evil, preferring to look at both the good and bad aspects of the 
Party and its members. They supported rapprochement with China and recognition of 
the communist government well before the majority of Americans came to these 
opinions.  They tried to escape the dichotomy that the Cold War consensus had 
constructed, e.g. Us vs. Them, Good vs. Evil. Their dissent was even more remarkable 
because of the key place religion held as a reason to fight Communism. 
Even as these missionaries resisted seeing the world as simply bipolar, they 
existed within their own dichotomy. Nationalism and Christianity were two important 
aspects of American society and the American identity.  Nationalism defines an 
identity that is separate from those outside the nation.  American nationalism is among 
the most inclusive, partly based on the multi-ethnic makeup of the United States and 
partly because of the  principles of human rights and dignity embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence.  Even with that inclusive ideal, there are still dividing 
lines between Americans and the rest of the world. In fact, the belief that those 
principles are universal is one of those lines. Christianity, on the other hand, is based 
on the principle that Jesus died for all people, so therefore Christianity is universal and 
for everyone.  
American missionaries demonstrate the tension that can exist between these 
two forces.    In the 1966 film The Sand Pebbles, an American missionary makes a 
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passionate speech renouncing his citizenship and claiming that all nationalism is a 
crime against God because it separates man from his fellow man. As Hollywood tends 
to do, this was an over dramatized depiction of a real issue. Without question, 
missionaries’ nationality hindered their work. They were foreigners and were treated 
with suspicion. They tried to become close to the Chinese, but still kept many of the 
assumptions from home.  For instance, they liked to talk about human rights and 
individual freedom. Chinese culture, on the other hand, put much more emphasis on 
family and duty.  Their American nationalism was diluted somewhat over the years 
and decades they were in China, but it never disappeared. American missionaries kept 
their identity as Americans. Almost all missionaries took furloughs to the United 
States no matter how long they had been in China. They wrote “home” to describe 
their life in China. With the exception of the China Inland Mission whose missionaries 
were often quite isolated from any other westerners, they tended to find their closest 
friends among other missionaries, rather than the local population. As evidenced by 
their letters and actions, they never forgot that they were Americans.   
The tension between nationalism and Christianity was not always obvious, but 
could not be ignored during the Chinese Civil War.  American missionaries were 
writing to friends, family, newspapers, and government officials to tell them what was 
happening in China.  Many of them argued that Communism was wrong and that 
everything must be done to resist it. This view fit nicely with the view of most 
Americans. By contrast, liberal missionaries would often go against the grain by 
arguing that the CCP was actually a lesser evil than the Guomindang.  They tended to 
look on the Communists as offering a potential improvement on the status quo, which 
was not something that was well-received in the United States.  Their presence outside 
the United States allowed them to be less susceptible to the anti-communist fears that 
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were sweeping their homeland.  In addition, their ecumenical world view made them 
less judgmental and dogmatic toward Communists.  As a result, they were willing to 
find some potential worth in the Communists rather than uniformly condemning them.  
The difference between the two views played out in who chose to leave China 
and who chose to stay.  Those who left at the time of the Communist victory were 
mainly those who were strongly anti-Communists. Their view of Christianity led them 
to believe that one should not compromise with evil and that cooperation with the 
CCP would cause them to become puppets of an evil regime. Leaving also 
demonstrated their strong association with their home country. When a crisis came, 
their connection to the Chinese and/or their mission was not strong enough to keep 
them there. Those missionaries who chose to stay may not have liked the CCP, but 
they were willing to find common ground with it. Their version of Christianity was 
more inclusive and less condemning.  They were, without realizing it, accepting part 
of what The Sand Pebbles’ missionary said. While not abandoning their sense of 
American identity,  they gave priority to their religious beliefs. 
This clash of ideals reflected a larger conflict over American Protestantism in 
the United States. Protestants have continually divided and fractured since the 
beginning of the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century. The first half of the 
twentieth century saw another such division and subsequent reorganization between 
liberal and conservative Protestants.
417
  Conservatives, who generally had a more 
fundamentalist view of Christianity, were more likely to embrace the Cold War 
dichotomy.  Liberals were more likely to look beyond it and support the ecumenical 
movement, whose members tried to find the good in all traditions.  They were much 
more accepting of a difference of opinion, preferring to look to the higher truths of 
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Christianity and not quibble on details of doctrine. By contrast, fundamentalists 
rejected ecumenism as making unacceptable compromises on essential doctrinal 
elements. Their hardline view of right and wrong translated easily to condemnation of 
Communism, while the more tolerant view of ecumenicals led them to be open to 
working under Communism.  
These dissenting voices have largely been lost.  Cold War histories rarely 
include missionaries as more than a cameo. When they are included, the narrative 
usually groups them with the overwhelming majority of Americans who condemned 
Communism.  There is a reason for that image, as some missionaries did join that 
majority. That image also fits with the conventional narrative.  The atheism espoused 
by Marxists was one of the foundations for Americans opposing communism. This 
was the same decade in which “In God We Trust” became the official motto of the 
United States and “under God” was inserted into the Pledge of Allegiance. It would 
seem likely that the religious community in the United States would uniformly oppose 
communism in all its forms.  Yet, as often is the case, the conventional narrative can 
miss significant exceptions.  Even though new work is being done to see the fractures 
in the early Cold War consensus, that work only rarely touches on religious dissent.  
Those missionaries were among the most knowledgeable Americans about both China 
and Communism, yet the historical narrative largely focuses on only the anti-
Communist voices, ignoring the breadth of opinions among missionaries. 
To fully understand these perspectives, it must be acknowledged that the CCP 
was guilty of many of the charges that were leveled against it. It did persecute Chinese 
Christians throughout the 1950’s. It confiscated some church property and viewed 
with great suspicion any Chinese who had connections to Americans. Its aggressive 
behavior in international relations also inflamed the American public, particularly in 
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the Korean War, but also with the two Taiwan Straits crises of 1954 and 1958. 
Chinese actions both domestically and internationally fed into Americans hatred of the 
Chinese.  
Nevertheless, the torrent of anti-Communist feeling meant that any story 
condemning the Chinese was taken at face value without questioning the source or 
looking for verification.  Stories of religious persecution in China were a popular 
meme, serving to reinforce the image of the Communists as brutal atheists.  
Missionaries tried to give another side of the story, but the American mainstream had 
already made up their minds about China, reinforced by stories of religious repression. 
 This story sounds like a tragedy.  Missionaries were faced with a crisis of faith 
made manifest. Despite the Communists' avowed atheism, many liberals believed that 
they could find a way to work with the CCP. Their decision was based on a mixture of 
hope and desperation. Hope that the Communists would value their services and 
desperation because this was the only way to continue their missions.  The only way to 
do that was to work under the Communists. Some were aware that the odds were 
against them, but the only other option was giving up and going back to America. One 
missionary, Sherwood Eddy, showed the mixture of the two emotions in a prediction 
in 1948 about how Christianity would survive in China: “Many Christians will have to 
adopt new methods and new ways and sometimes a new spirit. The center of worship 
may often have to move from the chapel to the homes of the people, where it was 
under similar conditions in the Roman Empire.”418  
Conservatives, on the other hand, often decided to leave. They believed that 
the dogmatic atheism of Communism and its dismissal of individual freedoms 
precluded any legitimate church activity.  While they also wanted to continue their 
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missions, they believed that trying to work with Communism was not only a waste of 
time, but might contribute to the CCP’s legitimacy.  By the mid-1950’s, it looked as 
though the conservatives had made the smart move by returning to America.  All 
missionaries were driven out in 1951 and Chinese Christians were being persecuted. 
The Three-Self Church was founded as an instrument for the CCP to control 
Christians. It appeared to hardly be a church at all because it was an appendage of the 
government.  
The tragedy got worse from there. During the Cultural Revolution of 1965-
1975, the Three-Self Church was completely suppressed. Flawed as it was, it had been 
the last major vestige of Christianity in China.  Christians became targets for mass 
movements trying to eradicate imperialist and bourgeois elements.  The Three-Self 
Church’s most prominent leader, Y.T. Wu, was arrested and sent to a labor camp. 
Those were  dark times for Chinese Christians and the former missionaries who saw 
their life’s work being destroyed.   
There is a famous story of Zhou Enlai being asked what he thought about the 
effects of the French Revolution, to which he replied: “It is too soon to say.” The 
authenticity of the story is doubtful, which is a shame, because it is easily applicable 
to missionaries who witnessed Christianity being crushed in China. Had they been 
able to look forward to the 1980’s, they would have seen the Three-Self Church 
reinstated. Even more encouraging, the Chinese Christian Council was formed as an 
alternative because many Christians wanted nothing to do with the state-controlled 
Three-Self Church.  
Had those missionaries been able to evaluate Christianity in the present day, 
they would have seen a vindication of their efforts. Although the Three-Self Church 
was restored, Chinese Christians avoided it and rebuilt the churches at a grassroots 
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level following the tradition of the missionaries. As Eddy suggested in 1948, house 
churches form the basis of this new Christianity.  A 2012 study by the CCP showed 
that there were 23 million Chinese Christians registered, but that only shows the ones 
willing to tell the government of their faith.
419
  Other estimates range as high as 120 
million.
420
  
The key question of the success of the missions was how Christianity fared 
after the missionaries left. While many liberal missionaries never gave up hope for 
Chinese Christianity, it was hard to maintain much optimism in the 1950’s. Yet events 
in the last thirty years suggest that the seeds they planted have flourished, despite 
relentless persecution for over two decades. Christians now almost certainly 
outnumber members of the CCP.
421
 Perhaps the biggest irony of this story is that 
missionaries were afraid Christianity would flounder in China without them. In reality, 
it thrived without them in a way that was beyond their wildest hopes.   
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